Opinion
CV 02-3310 (DLI)(ARL).
August 3, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court, on referral from District Judge Irizarry, is the motion for summary judgment by the defendants, the County of Nassau, the Nassau County Police Department, Police Commissioner William Willet, Chief Herbert Faust, Deputy Inspector Scott Wanlass, and Detective Lieutenant James Granelle. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Natalie Beyer ("Beyer"), is an employee of the defendant Nassau County Police Department. The complaint in this action, filed in June 2002, alleges that Beyer was discriminated against on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986. Beyer also asserts a claim pursuant to New York Executive Law §§ 290, et seq. Beyer contends that her requests to be transferred from the Nassau County Police Department's Serology Section to its Latent Fingerprint Section and to attend training outside the department were denied on the basis of her gender. Putting aside the reasons for the denial of her requests, there is little dispute about the underlying facts of this action.
Beyer graduated from the Nassau County Police Academy in August of 1987 and was hired as a police officer in the Nassau County Police Department the following January. Prior to being hired by the Police Department, Beyer obtained a bachelor's degree in chemistry from Pace University. After serving as a patrol officer for the Seventh Precinct for less than a year, Beyer was transferred to the Serology Section of the Serology Investigations Bureau. The Serology Investigations Bureau is part of the Department's Detective Division. In September 1990, Beyer was made a detective.
Police officers assigned to the Serology Section were responsible for analyzing blood and body fluids recovered in cases involving homicide, rape, assault, and leaving the scene of an accident. Defs. 56.1 Statement at ¶ 5. Officers assigned to the Serology Section must have a bachelor's degree in biology, chemistry, forensic science, or criminalistics. Id. at ¶ 7. The detectives/scientists who conduct the chemical analyses are required to provide written reports to the precinct and are often called upon to testify at criminal trials. Id. at ¶ 7. Beyer remained with the Serology Section until January 10, 2003, when all of the detectives assigned to the Serology Section were transferred to precinct detective squads because the Police Department decided to outsource its serology work. Id. at ¶ 16. Beyer was reassigned to the 7th Precinct where she currently works. Pl. Mem in Opp. at 5.
The facts set forth in the defendants' 56.1 statement that are cited to by the court have been admitted by the plaintiff.
On November 2, 1999, long before a determination was made to disband the Serology Section, Beyer applied for a transfer from Serology to the Latent Fingerprint Section. Defs. 56.1 Statement at ¶ 15. The Latent Fingerprint Section is part of the Technical Service Bureau of the Detective Division. Id. at ¶ 8. Police officers in the Latent Fingerprint Section are technicians responsible for comparing and identifying fingerprints found at crime scenes. Id. at ¶ 2. The requirements for assignment to the Latent Fingerprint Section are a strong interest in fingerprint science and an interest in acquiring computer skills necessary to operate the computerized fingerprint system. Id. at ¶ 4. Unlike the Serology Section, assignment to the Fingerprint Section did not require a science degree. Id. Beyer was qualified for the latent fingerprint job having obtained a master's degree in forensic science. Pl. Mem in Opp. at 3.
In 1999, Beyer was interviewed by Detective Sargent Mary Prial and Captain Scott Wanlass who recommended her for the job with the Latent Fingerprint Section, but her request was denied. Id. In November 2000, Beyer re-applied for a transfer. Id. at 4. She was interviewed by Detective Sargent Kim Shockley and Captain Scott Wanlass, who again recommended her for the job, but her request was denied. Id. Beyer asserts that the denial of her request was due to her gender. See Complaint. She argues in this regard that Lieutenant Granelle, the supervising officer of the Latent Fingerprint Section, told her that there were 17 people more qualified than her and that the department would "have to take care of the boys . . . that did the right thing for the job over the last ten years." Pl. Mem in Opp at 4. Although the plaintiff mentions that she applied for a transfer again in 2002, her papers were never processed and there is no evidence of this request before the court.
In addition, Beyer contends that between 1993 and 1999, she applied for and was denied out of town training. Beyer states that the denial of her requests for training in serology and other forensic methods affected her ability to learn the latest developments in her field and adversely impacted her professional capacity as a scientist and a police detective. Id. at 16. The defendants contend that Beyer did not need any more training to ensure that her position in the Serology Section was secure or to perform her duties and responsibilities. Tully Aff. at ¶ 11.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standards
"'Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes concerning any material facts, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Jamaica Ash Rubbish Removal Co. v. Ferguson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P. 153 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) and citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the district court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998). If there is evidence in the record as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1996). The applicable substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The trial court's responsibility is "'limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.'" B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 522 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). When, however, there is nothing more than a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Rather, there must exist 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial' in order to deny summary judgment as to a particular claim." Jamaica Ash Rubbish, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). A moving party may obtain summary judgment by demonstrating that little or no evidence may be found in support of the non-moving party's case. "When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." Marks v. New York Univ., 61 F. Supp. 2d 81, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
"[T]he summary judgment standard applies with equal force to discrimination cases as it does to other cases." Faruq v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4676, *12 W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2006). "The salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation." Ashton v. Pall Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985) (additional quotation marks omitted)). Thus, "[t]hough caution must be exercised in granting summary judgment where motive is genuinely in issue . . . [it] remains available for the dismissal of discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact." McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). With these standards in mind, the court addresses the plaintiff's claims.
B.) Beyer's Title VII Claim:
Beyer claims that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e, et seq. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual "with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Beyer must demonstrate that: "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the action permit an inference of discrimination. See Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2004) ( citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Although the burden of proving the prima facie case is de minimus, the claim fails if the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
The defendants do not dispute that Beyer was a member of a protected class or that she was qualified for the job. Accordingly, the court's analysis begins with whether or not the denial of Beyer's transfer requests amounted to adverse employment actions. The court must then address whether the denial of her requests for out of town training amounted to adverse employment actions. The defendants contend they do not.
1. The Failure to Transfer
Beyer claims that the defendants' refusal to transfer her to the Latent Fingerprint Section in November 1999 and 2000 amounted to an adverse employment action. More specifically, she asserts that the refusal to transfer her to a "materially different" position, which in her view was "within a burgeoning elite department," constituted an adverse employment action.
Employment actions that have been deemed sufficiently disadvantageous to constitute an adverse employment action include 'a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices . . . unique to a particular situation." Williams, 368 F.3d at 128 (quoting Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000)). As such, Beyer must establish that the denial of her request for a transfer to the Latent Fingerprint Section "created a materially significant disadvantage" in her working condition. Id. Beyer has not met this burden.
To begin with, Beyer did not suffer a termination, a decrease in wage or salary, or any loss of benefits as a result of having been refused a transfer in November 1999 and November 2000. Her title, salary and benefits would have been identical had her transfer request been granted. The record is also clear that when Beyer requested the transfer, that is, in 1999 and 2000, Beyer's responsibilities in the Serology Section were equal to, if not greater than, those required of detectives in the Latent Fingerprint Section. The duties of police officers assigned to the Serology Section, included, among other things:
1. visual and tactile examination of evidence;
2. performing chemical screening tests for fluids (blood, semen, sweat, etc.) and ascertaining whether human or animal in origin;
3. performing blood typing and enzyme tests to eliminate or confirm a suspects presence at a crime scene;
4. visiting crime scenes and performing blood splatter analysis;
5. performing color tests, P30 confirmatory tests, and light screening with respect to semen; and
6. preserving evidence for further testing and evaluation.
Tully Aff. at ¶ 7; Beyer Aff. at ¶ 5. The duties of police officers assigned to the Latent Fingerprint Section included, among other things:
1. developing and evaluating fingerprints using scientific techniques;
2. comparison and identification of fingerprints;
3. photographing evidence and latent prints;
4. entry of latent prints into the Nassau County Orion and New York State Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
Department Notification 99-164 and 00-155, Ex. D to Sandel Aff.; Beyer Aff. at ¶ 5. While Beyer is correct that the work performed by police officers in the two sections was "completely and materially different," see Beyer Aff. at ¶ 7, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the responsibilities of a police officers in the Serology Section were in any way diminished.
Beyer's argument that her title with the Serology Section was less distinguished than it would have been had she been re-assigned to the Latent Fingerprint Section is also without merit. "Where 'the change in position would have resulted in a significant change in duties and could potentially lead to increased opportunities for advancement,' courts have held a failure to transfer to constitute an adverse employment action." Williams, 199 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 368 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Belch v. Jefferson County, 108 F.Supp. 2d 143, 154 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also De La Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. Dept. Of Soc. Serv., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (although thin, evidence of transfer to less prestigious unit providing little opportunity for growth sufficient to satisfy third prong of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case). Here, however, the evidence is clear that she would have held the same position and title in the Latent Fingerprint Section. If anything, at the time, the Serology Section required more qualified and highly trained police officers. See Department Notification 99-164 and 00-155, Ex. D to Sandel Aff.; Defs. 56.1 Statement at ¶ 7. Moreover, although the Serology Section had outsourced some its technical work several years prior to Beyer's transfer requests, there is simply no evidence that in 1999 or 2000, when the transfer requests were made, anyone at the police department knew that the Serology Section would be eliminated. While in hindsight a transfer to the Fingerprint Section would ultimately have proved more advantageous to plaintiff because of the elimination of the Serology Section, there is no evidence that at the time she applied for the transfer the plaintiff or anyone at the police department knew this would happen and prove to be the only advantage of the transfer.
In fact, Beyer's contention that an adverse employment action can be demonstrated by the "inherent elite status of the Latent Fingerprint Section as compared to the now defunct Serology Section," highlights the flaw in Beyer's claim. Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 15. The Serology Section remained in effect for three years following her request for a transfer and a year after she filed the complaint. The fact that the Serology Section is now defunct is, therefore, irrelevant to her claims. Beyer must undoubtedly be disappointed that the police department has outsourced its serology work and transferred detectives to precincts. Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's current position as a precinct detective does not include any scientific work, Beyer has offered no evidence, unrelated to the ultimate closing of the Serology Section, in support of her contention that the denial of a transfer impeded her ability to advance in the police department.
Further, Beyer's stated desire to be transferred to the Fingerprint Section in order to work with state of the art technology or her belief that she was more suited to the Latent Fingerprint Section does not support a claim of adverse employment. See Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff offered no evidence to support claim that transfer impacted on plaintiff's particular expertise or resulted in change of responsibilities so significant to constitute set back in career); Williams, 368 F.3d at 128 (denial of lateral transfer not an adverse employment action despite employee's positive view of transfer); Garber v. New York City Police Dept, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12590 *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1997) aff'd 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32058 (2d Cir. June 12, 1988) (subjective feelings about transfer does not amount to adverse employment action). Beyer has offered no evidence to support her claim that her skills and training were more suited to the work being performed in the Latent Fingerprint Section in 1999 or 2000. Nor has she offered any evidence to support her bare-bones claim that she was more qualified for the Latent Fingerprint Section position. Although Beyer believes that her master's degree in forensic science and sixteen years of laboratory experience made her more suited for assignment to the Latent Fingerprint Section, the record is clear that a master's degree was not a prerequisite for the job. Moreover, Beyer admits that Lieutenant Granelle advised her that 17 people were more qualified. Pl. Mem in Opp. at 4. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's Title VII claim arising from the defendants' failure to transfer should be granted.
2. The Denial of Request for Training
Beyer also claims that the denial of her request for training amounted to an adverse employment action. Specifically, Beyer contends that "the repeated denial of [her] requests for training in serology and other forensic methods adversely affected her ability to learn the latest developments in her field, adversely affecting her professional capacity as a scientist and police detective." Pls. Mem in Opp. at 16. A review of the law in this Circuit indicates that the denial of training has been considered an adverse employment action only where it has materially affected a plaintiff's working conditions and/or her prospects for promotion. See Kravitz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21618 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18420 (2d Cir. 2002) (failure to raise issue of fact to defeat summary judgment where no evidence presented beyond conclusory allegation that plaintiff was harmed by not receiving training); Costanzo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4911 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) (exclusion from training sessions not necessary or beneficial to employer not an adverse employment action); Copeland v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 412. 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (failure to provide training not adverse employment action where training would not qualify employee for promotion or wage increase); compare Holtz v. Rockefeller Co., 258 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (supervisor's statement that she preferred training younger employees sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment in age discrimination suit); Ewing v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8849 * 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2001) (sufficient evidence of adverse employment action where plaintiff showed that he received less training on machines than similarly situated white employees thereby eliminating possibility of career-enhancing machine job).
Here, Beyer has not provided any evidence to indicate that she was required to attend training sessions or that the training sessions would affect her ability for advancement or promotion. In fact, the opposite is true. The plaintiff alleges that she was denied the right to attend the following training sessions:
1. New York Police Program: Forensic Drug Chemistry Issues — Albany, New York, April 14-16, 1993;
2. St. Petersburg Junior College Criminal Justice Institute: Crime Scenes — St. Petersburg, Florida, May 26-28, 1993;
3. American Academy of Forensic Scientists — San Antonio, Texas, February 14-19, 1994;
4. Verbal Application to observe Courtroom Testimony;
5. California Criminalistics Institute: PCR-DNA analysis, Sacramento, California, April 27-May 1, 1998;
6. International Association of Forensic Sciences Meeting, Los Angeles, California, August 22-28, 1999;
7. Symposium on Human Identification, Lake Buena Vista, Florida, September 28-October 2, 1999; and
8. International Congress for Forensic Haemogenectics, San Francisco, California, August 18-21, 1999.
However, she has offered no evidence to support the need for the above training sessions other that her conclusory allegation that she "need[ed] the recurrent training courses as a professional forensic scientist." Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 17.
In contrast, the defendants have offered evidence to support the conclusion that (1) no additional training was required in order for the plaintiff to perform her duties, see Tully Aff. at ¶ 11, (2) several of the courses involved DNA analysis training, and therefore, were not beneficial to the Department since it had outsourced DNA work; (3) the Department provided the plaintiff with the training it felt was warranted, see Tully Supp. Aff. at ¶¶ 2-3; and (4) the plaintiff could only be promoted through a civil service test, not by receiving additional training, see Defs. Mem. at 14. Accordingly, the fact that the defendants did not give the plaintiff time off or agree to cover the cost of these out of town trips is not, absent other evidence, tantamount to an adverse employment action. Thus, the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's Title VII claim arising from the defendants' denial of training must also be granted.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff's allegations of denial of training are time barred. See Def. Mem. at 15; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (individual alleging discrimination under Title VII must first assert claims with EEOC within 300 days of violation). Although the plaintiff acknowledges that all but three of the requests were made outside the 300 day window, see Pls. Mem. in Opp at 19-20, the court need not address the argument in the Title VII context having found that the denial of training did not amount to adverse employment action. The court does note, however, that the 300 day requirement is not jurisdictional, rather, like statutes of limitations, is subject to "waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. TWA, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Accordingly, any consideration of the argument would be subject to the court's ruling on the defendants' request to amend their answer to include the affirmative defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and statute of limitations, which is addressed below.
C.) Beyer's § 1983 and Human Rights Law Claims:
The defendants also seek to dismiss Beyer's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York Human Rights Law to the extent the claims rely on her allegation that she was denied training. The defendants do not address the merits of the plaintiff's claims, rather, the defendants argue that with the exception of Beyer's last three requests to attend training sessions, the claims are time barred. See Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2001) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 governed by New York's three year statute of limitations); Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying three year statute of limitations to New York Human Rights Law claim). Although Beyer acknowledges that, other than three requests for training she made between June and September 1999, her claims fall outside the three year window, Beyer argues that the court should deny the defendants' motion because they have not asserted a defense based on the statute of limitations and should not be permitted to amend their answer. See Pls. Mem. In Opp. at 19-20; see also Day v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006) (defendant forfeits statute of limitation defense not asserted in answer or amendment); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Accordingly, the question the court must address is whether the defendants should be permitted to amend their answer at this time.
The defendants contend that the court may construe their motion for summary judgment as a motion to amend, relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Block v. First Blood Assoc., 988 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1993). In Block, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Sweet's decision to treat the appellees' motion for summary judgment as a motion to amend after they had failed to include the statute of limitations defense in their answer finding that:
The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad faith. However, 'the longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of a showing of prejudice.' In determining what constitutes 'prejudice,' we consider whether the assertion of the new claim would: (I) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction. 'Mere delay, however, absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to amend.'Block, 988 F.2d at 350 (citations omitted). Because the Block plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they could have brought their claim in another forum had the defendants raised the statute of limitations earlier or that the sixteen month delay in raising the defense was the result of bad faith, the Second Circuit upheld the District Judge's decision to permit the amendment. Compare Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing decision to allow defendant to amend answer to assert res judicata defense because defendant acted in bad faith by failing to apprise plaintiff of relevant decision); Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1968) (reversing decision to allow defendant to amend answer to assert statute of limitations defense where plaintiff could have brought action in another forum had defense been timely raised).
Although the defendants have not explained the delay in raising the statute of limitations defense, Beyer's claims were untimely on the day they were commenced to the extent she relies on her requests for training prior to June of 1999. Moreover, the defendants were not aware of any facts unknown to the plaintiff, nor is there evidence that they acted in bad faith. Finally, Beyer's contention that the amendment would be prejudicial because discovery has been completed is without merit. Allegations that a party has expended "time, effort and money" during discovery do not amount to "substantial prejudice," which is required by the Second Circuit. Block, 988 F.2d at 351. Also, the factual allegations asserted by the plaintiff in support of her Title VII claim are identical to the facts asserted in support of her § 1983 and New York Human Rights Law claims. Accordingly, the same discovery would have been conducted had the defendants asserted the statute of limitations defense sooner. Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants be permitted to amend their answer to assert a statute of limitations defense. The court further recommends that the plaintiff's § 1983 and New York Human Rights Law claims be dismissed to the extent they rely on the pre-June 1999 requests for training.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the report and recommendation, the undersigned recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. The defendants' motion does not, however, address the plaintiff's § 1983 or New York Human Rights Law claims to the extent that Beyer may be relying on the denial of her transfer requests. The defendants' supporting papers also acknowledge that three of the requests for training fall within the three year statute of limitations and thus are not time barred. Accordingly, while the defendants have requested that the court dismiss the plaintiff's case in its entirety, there may be claims that have not been resolved by the instant motion. As neither party has addressed this issue, the undersigned cannot determine whether any of the plaintiff's claims would remain viable should this recommendation be adopted.
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court with a courtesy copy to the undersigned within 10 days after being served with a copy of this Report. Failure to file objections within this period waives the right to appeal the District Court's Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).