However, "[a] qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof" because, to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiffs "must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine [dispute of material fact] as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Callahan, 623 F. 3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)) (alteration in original).
"Consistent with our standard of review for summary judgments, the legal issues underlying the district court's qualified-immunity ruling is reviewed de novo." Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022).
generally must be based upon probable cause particularized to that person. Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857-58 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 1783 (2023). Because Deputies Gatwood and Nelson have invoked qualified immunity, Mr. Bartula must show not only that probable cause to seize him did not exist, but also that the officers were objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause to seize him.
In suits alleging false arrest, the plaintiff must prove the following to overcome qualified immunity: (1) the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was engaging in criminal activity, and (2) that the officer was objectively unreasonable in believing that such probable cause existed. Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 858 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
Determination of the applicability of the qualified immunity defense requires two inquiries: (1) whether the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right or statute, and (2) whether the official's conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law existing at the time of the incident of which a reasonable person would have known. Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 1783, 215 L.Ed.2d 670 (2023); Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009). If the Court answers both questions in the affirmative, the government official is not shielded from liability based upon qualified immunity.
Therefore, to defeat qualified immunity on an unlawful arrest claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) probable cause did not exist, and (2) the defendant-official was "objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause for the arrest." Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 858 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 1783 (2023).
However, "[a] qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof" because the plaintiff, to overcome qualified immunity, "must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine [dispute of material fact] as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)) (alteration in original). "A genuine [dispute] of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
See Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 208 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, in the qualified immunity context, Kevin must raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether Vera (1) lacked probable cause to believe Kevin was engaging in criminal activity, and (2) was "objectively unreasonable in believing" such probable cause existed. Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 858 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
However, "[a] qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof" because the plaintiff, to overcome qualified immunity, "must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine [dispute of material fact] as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)) (alteration in original). "A genuine [dispute] of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
But even if he did, he cannot show that he had a right to enter the courthouse, let alone enter without complying with reasonable security protocols. See, e.g., Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 858 (5th Cir. 2022) (“It is not clearly established that the officers were required to allow plaintiffs to pass through security screening; nor