Opinion
C/A No.: 3:20-2077-JMC-SVH
06-29-2020
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Noble Saquan Tarkee El Bey ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint seeking compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tyler Bryant Brown, Solicitor for Sumter County; James C. Campbell, Clerk of Court; Pam Haynesworth, Chief Deputy Clerk of Court; Robert D. Beckford, Jr., Detective for Sumter County; and Ricky L. Morse, Detective for Sumter County (collectively "Defendants"). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the complaint without issuance and service of process. I. Factual and Procedural Background
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Brown did not inform him of the grand jury's decision on his case. [ECF No. 9 at 10]. He alleges Brown failed to enter a court order delaying action on warrants and failed to acknowledge his motion addressing the issue. Id. He alleges Campbell and Haynesworth refused to timely file motions he submitted pro se. Id. at 11.
By order issued on June 8, 2020, the undersigned gave Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects in his complaint. [ECF No. 7].
Plaintiff states that after telephone conversation with Beckford and Morse, he visited the police department to obtain the property he alleges was illegally taken. Id. at 12-14. Beckford attempted to question him, but when Plaintiff asserted his right to remain silent, Beckford arrested him. Id. at 14-15. He alleges Beckford illegally obtained two arrest warrants for him. Id. at 14. II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Prosecutorial Immunity for Brown
Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, including criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) ("[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity"); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir. 2000) ("A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for prosecutorial functions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.") (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges Brown failed to advise him of actions taken related to his criminal charges. [ECF No. 9 at 10]. Because Plaintiff claims Brown's actions were connected with criminal judicial proceedings, Brown is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions and should be dismissed.
2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity for Campbell and Haynesworth
It is well-settled that judges and court support personnel have immunity from a claim for damages and injunctive relief arising out of their judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (finding the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court support personnel because of "the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts[.]"); Abebe v. Seymour, C/A No. 3:12-377-JFA-KDW, 2012 WL 1130667, *2-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (finding Section 309(c) of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996) amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief against a judicial officer "for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."). Plaintiff's claims against Campbell and Haynesworth arise from their alleged failure to timely file Plaintiff's pro se motions. [ECF No. 1 at 6]. Because these allegations concern actions taken in their capacity as judicial officers, Campbell and Haynesworth are protected by quasi-judicial immunity and should be summarily dismissed from this action.
3. Insufficient Allegations Against Beckford and Morse
Plaintiff's claims against Beckford and Morse are subject to dismissal for failure to provide sufficient factual allegations. Plaintiff indicates Beckford arrested him pursuant to warrants Plaintiff alleges were illegally obtained. [ECF No. 9 at 14].
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's allegations constitute a claim of false arrest. Although Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (finding Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar false arrest claims by pretrial detainees), would apply to this case, Plaintiff's claims fail because he has been indicted in Sumter County for first degree burglary. A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause sufficient to defeat claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest under § 1983. See Gatter v. Zappile, 67 F. Supp. 2d 515, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (collecting cases holding that a grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause, aff'd, 225 F.3d 648 (3d Cir. 2000) ); Odom v. Roberts, C/A No. 6:12-2452-TMC-JDA, 2012 WL 4061679, at *2 (D.S.C. August 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 6:12-2452-TMC, 2012 WL 4059916 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2012).
See Sumter Cnty, Clerk of Court, Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Sumter/PublicIndex/CaseDetails.aspx?County=43&CourtAgency=43001&Casenum=2019A4320100842&CaseType=C&HKey=116507210889102671111158411810110197907797707097708747547049120567485668381981018689684968577752 (last visited June 8, 2020) (showing Indictment Number 2020GS4300167 after an arrest on November 14, 2020).
In addition, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 158-62 (4th Cir. 2003); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Further, federal district courts should abstain from considering constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., 887 F.2d at 52. Here, Plaintiff can properly present his constitutional claims in his state criminal proceeding. III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on June 8, 2020, the undersigned gave Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects in his complaint and further warned Plaintiff that if he failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. [ECF No. 7]. Here, because Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to cure the deficiencies, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this action with prejudice. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. June 29, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).