As between the law firm and the Marshal, the firm, as the entity in control of the litigation, had superior knowledge of its course (see, Bevona v. Judson Realty, 213 A.D.2d 349, 350). Thus, the firm bore the responsibility to keep the Marshal informed concerning the status of a warrant that appeared valid on its face (see,Chelsea Marina v. Scoralick, 94 A.D.2d 189, 193 [failure to advise Sheriff of temporary restraining order]), and any misapprehension necessarily implicates a lapse by counsel (supra, at 195).
Plaintiffs cannot evade their responsibility to proceed to judgment for a period of longer than ten years by claiming that defendants are responsible for the delay since the record reveals that no motion practice, scheduled deposition or any other proceeding was a barrier to obtaining a judgment on the default in interposing an answer to the amended complaint ( Bevona v Judson Realty, 213 A.D.2d 349; Winkelman v. H S Beer Soda Discounts, 91 A.D.2d 660). Nor did the filing of an answer by the defendants to the plaintiffs' original complaint render the provisions of CPLR 3215 (c) inapplicable, since after the complaint was formally amended and served, it superseded the original complaint, became the only complaint in the case, and therefore required that a new responsive pleading be substituted for the original superseded answer ( St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Law Bros. Contr. Corp., 170 A.D.2d 957).