Opinion
A-23-CV-1121-DII-ML
02-07-2024
GREGORY BEVERSDORFF, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, GRANITE SHOALS & BURNET COUNTY OFFICIALS, Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Mark Lane, United States Magistrate Judge
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The Magistrate Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(e) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates Judges, as amended. Before the court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) and supplemental filings (Dkts. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23). After considering the pleadings, the record, and the relevant law, the Magistrate Court submits the following Report and Recommendation.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Gregory Beversdorff argues his previous § 2241 petition in 1:21-CV-230-LY was improperly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. However, the same analysis applies to this § 2241 petition. Beversdorff has been indicted for, and is currently awaiting a trial on, state charges of (1) attempted capital murder of a peace officer or fireman, (2) aggravated assault against a public servant, and (3) deadly conduct through the discharge of a firearm. Counsel has been appointed to represent him against those charges.
Proceeding pro se in this habeas proceeding, Beversdorff's lengthy and voluminous handwritten filings are difficult to decipher. Dkts. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23). However, it is clear that he has not exhausted his state remedies.
II. ANALYSIS
A state pretrial detainee is entitled to raise constitutional claims in a federal habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if two requirements are satisfied. First, the petitioner must be in custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). Second, the petitioner must have exhausted his available state remedies. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); Saucier v. Warden, 47 F.3d 426, 1995 WL 71331, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (court cannot reach merits of petition seeking pretrial federal habeas unless state habeas remedies have been exhausted).
The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of the federal habeas claim has been “fairly presented” to the highest state court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, the petitioner must present his claims to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner. Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, a claim is deemed “fairly presented” in state court only if the petitioner relies upon identical facts and legal theories in both the state court proceeding and the action for federal habeas relief, thereby alerting the state court to the federal nature of the claim. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2001).
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the public records related to Beversdorff's criminal charges in Cause No. #49598 in Burnet County, Texas. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (court may take judicial notice of fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (approving judicial notice of public records by district court reviewing motion to dismiss). The docket sheet of Petitioner's state case reflects he is represented by appointed counsel and there is no indication he has presented his claim to the highest state court. Accordingly, Beversdorff has not yet exhausted his available state remedies.
Additionally, the court should abstain from hearing this Beverdorff's petition under the Younger abstention doctrine. The Younger doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state criminal defendant's claims when three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir.2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)) (internal citations omitted). Here, the relief Beversdorff seeks would interfere with the state criminal case against him, and the state has a strong interest prosecuting the crimes he is charged with. Moreover, Beversdorff has appointed counsel in his criminal case and Beversdorff can raise his constitutional challenges through that counsel in the state case. Accordingly, even if Beversdorff's claims were not barred by his failure to exhaust state remedies, the undersigned would recommend dismissing his claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
Consequently, Beversdorff is ineligible for habeas corpus relief, and the undersigned will recommend his petition be dismissed.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS the District Court DISMISS Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) without prejudice for failure to exhaust his state remedies.
The referral to the Magistrate Court should now be canceled.
IV. WARNING
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. UnitedServs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).