State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with Federal courts to hear claims founded upon alleged violations of section 1983. ( Beverly Bank v. Board of Review (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 656, 660.) The plaintiff apparently claims that by disobeying the terms of the Illinois Revenue Act (35 ILCS 205/20e (West 1992)), the assessor violated: (1) the plaintiff's due process rights from the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V), applied to the States through the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV); (2) the plaintiff's equal protection rights from the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV); and (3) the plaintiff's due process and equal protection rights under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Thus, the plaintiff's section 1983 claim ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)) alleges that due process and equal protection violations have occurred.

Equal protection is denied when state officers enforce a statute in a discriminatory manner but only if the discrimination is intentional and purposeful. Beverly Bank v. Board of Review, 117 Ill. App.3d 656, 453 N.E.2d 96 (1983). To establish a discriminatory purpose, plaintiff must show more than an arbitrary application of statutes and rules.

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-36, 82 L.Ed.2d at 408-09, 104 S.Ct. at 3204-05. In Beverly Bank v. Board of Review (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 656, taxpayers filed suit against the Will County Board of Review alleging violations of due process and equal protection under section 1983. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant improperly increased the assessment of all industrial and commercial property.

Plaintiffs are permitted to bring a nuisance action against Aramoni if the mining activity creates an irreparable harm or causes injury, as is any resident of North Utica. ¶ 42 In Beverly Bank v. Board of Review , 117 Ill.App.3d 656, 72 Ill.Dec. 791, 453 N.E.2d 96 (1983), the court held that a plaintiff alleging that a law is neutral on its face, but administered in an unequal fashion must allege that the discrimination was "intentional or purposeful." Id. at 664, 72 Ill.Dec. 791, 453 N.E.2d 96. To establish an intentional or purposeful act, a plaintiff must plead and show that the decision maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected the course of action, at least in part, for the purpose of causing adverse effects on an "identifiable group.

For the purpose of an equal protection action, it is not enough to show that as a result of defendants' willful and purposeful acts, plaintiffs are treated dissimilarly when compared to other prisoners; instead, the essence of unequal protection of the law is that the same State actor favors one person or group over another while harboring the desire to discriminate for invalid reasons. (See Roach v. County of Lake (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 976, 983, 467 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 ("In order to establish a discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs must show that defendants singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected their course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on an identifiable group") (emphasis added), citing Shango, 681 F.2d at 1104; Azeez v. DeRobertis (N.D. Ill. 1982), 568 F. Supp. 8, 10; Beverly Bank v. Board of Review (1983), 117 111. App. 3d 656, 453 N.E.2d 96.) It is this nexus of action and improper purpose which is conspicuously absent in the complaint at bar. In fact, in their brief to this court as well as in argument before us, they stressed, as if they needed to, that IDOC was not a party to this action.

The plaintiffs have urged that under the rule reaffirmed in Patsy and as discussed in its ancestors, the question of whether they did or did not avail themselves of the tax objection procedure is immaterial to their right to institute and maintain their section 1983 damage action. This result is required according to the plaintiffs as indicated by our opinion in Beverly Bank v. Board of Review (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 656, 453 N.E.2d 96. In Beverly Bank, the court held the taxpayers were entitled to maintain their section 1983 action because of a constitutionally impermissible reassessment of their industrial and commercial property.

The unlawful administration by State officers of a State statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. ( Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321 U.S. 1, 8, 88 L.Ed. 497, 503, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401; Beverly Bank v. Board of Review (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 656, 664, 453 N.E.2d 96; Hill v. Daley (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 202, 206, 328 N.E.2d 142.) In order to establish a discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs must show that defendants singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected their course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on an identifiable group.

See Tobin for Governor, 268 F.3d at 522 (finding it important to the determination of whether the official was entitled to absolute immunity that Illinois statute afforded judicial review against board decisions). Moreover, PTAB decisions are appealable to the Illinois courts pursuant to Illinois Administrative Review Law. 35 ILCS 200/16-195; see also Beverly Bank v. Board of Review of Will County, 117 Ill.App.3d 656, 662, 72 Ill. Dec. 791, 453 N.E.2d 96 (1983). Therefore, we agree with the district court.

A taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision of the BOR is entitled to appeal that decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board. If the taxpayer remains dissatisfied, he is entitled to then seek judicial review of the decision of the Property Tax Review Board pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Alternatively, the taxpayer may file objections to the BOR's decision in the circuit court to obtain a tax refund. SeeBeverly Bank v. Board of Review of Will County, 117 Ill.App.3d 656, 662 (3rd Dist. 1983). In fact, the pleadings indicate that his appeal to the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board remains pending at this time.

" See District of Columbia v. Green, D.C. App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973); Beverly Bank v. Board of Revenue of Will County, 117 Ill. App.3d 656, 453 N.E.2d 96 (1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2153, 80 L.Ed.2d 539 (1984); State Tax Commission v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960); Foss v. City of Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128, 480 N.E.2d 717 (1985); State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 32 Ohio St.2d 28, 289 N.E.2d 579 (1972); Fray v. Culpeper County, 212 Va. 148, 183 S.E.2d 175 (1971). Persuasive in this conclusion is not only the clear criteria of the Constitution and the body of similar precedent of other jurisdictions, but also the Fourteenth Amendment consideration of the United States Supreme Court in significant conclusion that an equal-protection defect results where clearly unequal application of the taxation power is applied under state authority which does not provide for the classification of taxpayers within constitutional criteria.