Summary
finding no preemption in state breach of contract claim because action could be decided without considering alleged unfair labor practice and precluding plaintiff from offering evidence in that regard
Summary of this case from Chavez v. Copper State Rubber of Arizona, Inc.Opinion
September 26, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Kennedy, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Denman, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs and motion denied. Memorandum: Special Term erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction (CPLR 3211 [a] [2]).
The sole issue on appeal is whether the complaint states causes of action which are preempted under the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) and thus may not be asserted in a State court (see, Motor Coach Employees v Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274; San Diego Unions v Garmon, 359 U.S. 236). No issue is presented as to the sufficiency or propriety of the complaint in any other respect.
Read together, plaintiff's first and second causes of action allege that plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from his employment in violation of a contract arising from defendant's written employment policies (see, Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458). The cause of action is not preempted merely because it also alleges that defendant was motivated by anti-union animus to breach the contract. While we recognize that conduct so motivated could constitute an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, defendant's motivation is irrelevant to plaintiff's cause of action for breach of the employment contract. The State action can be decided without consideration of the unfair labor practice and, indeed, plaintiff should be precluded from offering evidence in that regard (see, Farmer v Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290).
Plaintiff's third cause of action sounds in defamation and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. A cause of action for defamation is not preempted because defamation is not an unfair labor practice and it is only of peripheral concern to the Federal labor law (Linn v Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53; Wolf St. Supermarkets v McPartland, 108 A.D.2d 25, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 785). Nor is a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted. Plaintiff does not allege an unfair labor practice to satisfy the element of outrageous conduct, nor is Federal labor law concerned with whether defendant's conduct was outrageous (Farmer v Carpenters, supra; cf. Viestenz v Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699, cert denied 459 U.S. 972; Wilmot v Frank, 19 A.D.2d 542).