Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 658(7), 771 S.E.2d 255 (2015). See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819–820(III) (A), 835–836(V), 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178(III), 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008) ; Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152(1)(b), 598 S.E.2d 488 (2004) ; Bettis v. State, 328 Ga.App. 167, 168 –169(1), 761 S.E.2d 570 (2014). Here, although Smith made several unequivocal assertions of his right to represent himself before the trial commenced, the trial court did not conduct a Faretta hearing and apprise Smith of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

A jury initially found Bettis guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal attempt to commit rape, one count of kidnapping, and one count of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, but this Court reversed Bettis’ convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the trial court failed hold a hearing before denying Bettis’ request to represent himself at trial. Bettis v. State , 328 Ga. App. 167, 169-170 (1), 761 S.E.2d 570 (2014). Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, the evidence adduced at trial showed that on June 3, 2009, Martha Seago was visiting her husband who was hospitalized at a local hospital when she decided to use the restroom.

n failing to conduct a Faretta hearing); Crutchfield v. State , 269 Ga. App. 69, 71-72 (2), 603 S.E.2d 462 (2004) (finding that defendant’s refusal to answer when trial court explicitly asked if he wanted to fire his counsel and defendant’s additional expressions of dissatisfaction with his attorney did not constitute an unequivocal assertion to represent himself); Howard v. State , 251 Ga. App. 243, 244-45 (6), 553 S.E.2d 862 (2001) (holding that defendant’s attempt to fire trial counsel a few days before the start of trial because he disagreed with how counsel was handling the case and his request that the court appoint new counsel did not constitute an unequivocal request to represent himself). Cf. Smith , 332 Ga. App. at 852-54 (2), 775 S.E.2d 211 (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant reiterated several times to the trial court that he wished to represent himself and did not want his appointed counsel to try the case on his behalf); Bettis v. State , 328 Ga. App. 167, 169-71 (1), 761 S.E.2d 570 (2014) (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant flatly requested that the court allow him to represent himself). For all these reasons, we affirm Woodard’s convictions in part, but because the aggravated-battery counts should have merged with the count for kidnapping with bodily injury for purposes of sentencing, we vacate his sentence in part and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

This brief colloquy with the trial court did not amount to an unequivocal request for self-representation. See Bettis v. State , 328 Ga. App. 167, 169 (1), 761 S.E.2d 570 (2014) ("[T]o invoke the right of self representation, the defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of his right to represent himself prior to the commencement of his trial." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

The trial court’s exchange with White and its query as to whether the case could "continue on" distinguishes this case from those in which the trial court summarily denied a defendant’s request for self-representation.Our opinion in Bettis v. State , 328 Ga. App. 167, 761 S.E.2d 570 (2014), relied upon by White on appeal, is distinguishable. In that case, the trial court denied the defendant’s request immediately, the record contains no colloquy between the trial court and the defendant like the one that transpired in this case, and the defendant was never asked if he wanted to continue with trial counsel.