Opinion
23-CV-0803 (LTS)
03-06-2023
ELAINE WILLIAMS BETHEA, Plaintiff, v. NYCHA LAW DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, invokes the court's federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant “NYCHA Law Department” violated her rights. By order dated February 15, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings her claims using the court's general complaint form. She checks the box to invoke the court's federal question jurisdiction and, in response to the question asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, writes “Discrimination under the Fair Housing policy. Intimidation, Racism[.]” (ECF 2, at 2.) She alleges that the events giving rise to her claims occurred at an address in New York, New York, from “June 2001 to Present.” (Id. at 5.)
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
The following allegations are taken from the complaint. In 2001, Plaintiff was selected for a two-bedroom apartment at the Robert Fulton Houses. (Id.) She was selected for the apartment under a “Class Action suit.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff “was not given that selection at all.” (Id.) She instead was placed in a one-bedroom apartment in which she continues to reside with her grandson.
“Another material issue of fact” is that the “tenant selection and assignment plan” (TSAP) “is designed to ‘ensure' the housing Authority processes applications and transfer requests in a ‘fair' and ‘objective' manner in accordance with applicable Federal Law and regulations,” which Plaintiff maintains she was “never afforded . . . twenty-one years ago!” (Id.) (quotation marks and emphasis in original).
She asks the Court to “please explain to [her] why a waiting List Annual canvass case #62756, after twent[y]-one years is being offered to [her] now[.]” (Id. at 6) (emphasis in original). She further asks,
if the TSAP is designed to “Ensure” the housing authority processes applications in a fair and objective manner in accordance with applicable Federal Law and regulations[,] why didn't they do so, and if they had done so, would I have sustained a devastating slip and fall, which ended me up in the hospital having emergency spine surgery and paralized during the pandemic??(Id.)
Plaintiff describes her injuries as the following:
Hospitalized five days, Mold and Mildew, awful odor for months, leaking water from radiator in living room Quality of air in apartment unsafe as per health inspector taking grandson back and forth to emergency and Pediatrician or asthma. Sleeping with front door to apartment open to remove the awful odor for months. The Brown water from all areas in apartment faucets.(Id.)
Plaintiff does not specify the relief she is seeking.
DISCUSSION
A. Fair Housing Act
Because Plaintiff states that she experienced discrimination, intimidation, and racism, (see ECF 2, at 2), the Court construes the complaint as attempting to assert claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979). Specifically, it prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status . . . national origin,” or disability. 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(b), (f). The FHA also prohibits retaliation against persons who have asserted their rights under the FHA. See id. § 3617 (unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [among others, §§ 3604 and 3605] of this title”).
The Court assumes for the purposes of this order that the FHA covers Plaintiff's residence. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (defining “dwelling,” in part, as a “building” that is “occupied as . . . a residence by one or more families”).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting a violation of the FHA. She does not allege that (1) Defendant did anything to discriminate against her based on her race, (2) she exercised her rights under the FHA, or that (2) Defendant coerced, intimidated, or threatened her, or interfered with her exercise of those rights because of her race. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604, 3617. In fact, nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff specify her race. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that, in 2001, she was “approved and selected” for a two-bedroom apartment, but she was instead given a one-bedroom apartment. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant subjected her to discrimination or retaliation in housing on the basis of any impermissible factor, she fails to state a claim under the FHA. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims under the FHA for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Because Plaintiff asserts that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race, however, the Court, in an abundance of caution, grants her 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint in which she alleges additional facts suggesting an FHA claim. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the pleading should include specific facts describing how a named defendant discriminated against Plaintiff in housing because of her race.
Plaintiff's amended complaint should also address timeliness of her FHA claims. A civil action under the FHA may be brought no “later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a). Under the continuing violation doctrine, when an unlawful practice “continues into the limitations period, the complaint is timely” if the last alleged practice is within the two-year statutory period. Havens v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982). “A continuing violation may be found where there is proof of specific ongoing discriminatory policies or practices, or where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted . . . to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.” Tejada v. Little City Realty LLC, 308 F.Supp.3d 724, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (relying on Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied a two-bedroom apartment in 2001, 21 years before she filed this action. She also alleges, however, that the events giving rise to her claims are continuing to the present. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, she should clearly state when any alleged discrimination occurred and allege any facts suggesting that any such discrimination continued beyond the two-year statutory limitations period so that her claims are timely under the continuing violation doctrine.
B. Constitutional claims under Section 1983
Plaintiff also may be attempting to assert constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
In the “injuries” section of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her apartment had mold and mildew, an “awful odor,” water leaking from the radiator, and brown water coming from the faucets. (See ECF 2, at 6.) To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to hold Defendant responsible for inadequate conditions in her apartment, she fails to state a claim for relief. Courts have long held that there is no constitutional right to adequate or safe housing. See Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in [the constitution] any guarantee of access to dwellings of particular quality .... Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . [is a] legislative, not judicial, function[]”); Paige v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 17-CV-7481, 2018 WL 3863451, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2018) (“Defendants' failure to prevent lead paint poisoning is not tantamount to a violation of substantive due process. So too, it is not enough to allege that Defendants' ‘stood by and did nothing.'”) (citation omitted); Richardson v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-2545, 2013 WL 2124176, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (holding there is no “government obligation to provide adequate housing”) (citation omitted); see also Allen v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 10-CV-0168, 2012 WL 4794590, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2012) (rejecting due process claims arising from NYCHA's failure to address mold). The Court therefore dismisses any Section 1983 claims related to the conditions in her apartment that Plaintiff may be asserting for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Claims under state law
Plaintiff's assertions may implicate claims under state law. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state-law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2
Under Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions that refer to the name of a minor child must do so by using only the child's name's initials. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a)(3). Plaintiff, in her complaint, appears to reveal the full name of a minor child. Thus, in an abundance of caution, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to that submission to a “case participant-only” basis. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, she must comply with Rule 5.2 by referring to any minor child using only that child's initials.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid FHA claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to file an amended complaint detailing her claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff claims under the FHA and Section 1983 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead her claims under the FHA in an amended complaint, as described above.
Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-0803 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, or cannot show good cause as to why to excuse such failure, the Court will enter judgment: (1) dismissing Plaintiff's claims under federal law for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and; (2) declining to consider, under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, any claims Plaintiff may be asserting under state law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
(Image Omitted)