Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-CV-06216.
June 11, 2004
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2004, upon consideration of the Motion for a New Trial filed by Rosalind and Dennis Bethea ("Plaintiffs") pro se pursuant to Rule 59 on March 19, 2004 (Doc. No. 56), it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 2000, Plaintiffs, along with eight other individuals, filed this action against Michael's Family Restaurant and Diner ("Defendant") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for alleged denial of right to make and enforce contracts on basis of race. Plaintiffs allege that on December 31, 1999, Defendant and/or its agents refused to provide service to them. Following discovery and submission of final pretrial memoranda (Doc. No. 42), the parties submitted proposed joint points for charge and jury interrogatories on March 1, 2004. (Doc. No. 44). The trial commenced on March 2, 2004. (Doc. No. 47). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs on March 4, 2004. Hrg. Tr. at 7. The Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs on March 8, 2004 (Doc. No. 46). The Court granted Plaintiffs' request for an extension of time in which to file post-trial motions and Plaintiff filed the Motion for a New Trial on March 19, 2004. (Doc. No. 53, 56).
All other named plaintiffs in this action settled on or before September 15, 2003. (Doc. No. 35, 36).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In general, the ordering of a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir. 1991);Honeywell v. American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 851 F.2d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989). In considering a motion for a new trial, a court must refrain from interfering with the jury's verdict unless it is clear that "the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result.'" Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D.Pa.,1993)citing Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice 3819 (2d ed.)), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960). Accordingly, a "court must defer to the jury whenever its findings are reasonably supported by the record, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict winner." Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1987)). The court has broad discretion in deciding a motion for a new trial when the proffered ground is legal error. Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1993). The scope of that discretion narrows for a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, because in such circumstances, the movant asks the Court to substitute its own judgment on the facts for that of the jury. Id. at 1290. In order to evaluate a motion for a new trial on the basis of trial error, the Court must first determine whether an error was made in the course of the trial and then, it must determine "whether that error was so prejudicial that refusal to grant a new trial would be `inconsistent with substantial justice." Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 709 F.Supp. 600, 601 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 61), aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991); see Gebhardt v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 348 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1965) ("If the evidence in the record, viewed from the standpoint of the successful party, is sufficient to support the jury verdict, a new trial is not warranted merely because the jury could have reached a different result.").
IV. DISCUSSION
A fair reading of Plaintiffs' motion reveals that they move for new trial on four basic grounds: (1) error in the jury charge; (2) misconduct of the Court, counsel, and the jury, (3) the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, and (4) newly discovered evidence. Pl's Mot. at 9-15. These are proper grounds under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D.Pa. 1988),modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989). See generally 11 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2805 (1973).
A. Jury Charge
The Court's jury charge, taken as a whole, in light of the evidence, clearly conveyed the controlling legal principles and incorporated the instructions and verdict slip agreed to by the parties. Jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion to determine whether they properly apprize the jury of the issues and the applicable law and are not misleading or inadequate.Dressler v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 143 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). See also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 114-115 (3d Cir. 1999)citing Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997). In order for a court to grant a new trial based on a failure to give a properly requested jury instruction, the Court must review the charge as a whole, in light of the evidence, to determine whether it adequately conveyed the controlling legal principles. Link v. Mercedes Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1986); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 191 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (holding that a movant cannot prevail by showing that one portion of the charge, standing alone, is suspect). In this case, the Court delivered the final jury instruction and jury interrogatories to the jury as stipulated to and jointly drafted by the parties. Plaintiff raised no objections to the Court's final instruction to the jury. After the commencement of deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the Court as to whether the jury interrogatories needed to be answered sequentially. Hrg. Tr. at 2. Following a brief discussion with counsel during which both agreed that the questions need not be answered in sequence, they urged the Court to answer the question posed in that manner. The Court instructed the jury accordingly. Hrg. Tr. at 2-3.
At no time during the discussion with the Court, the instructions to the jury, or answer to the jury's question, did Plaintiff object to the charges now in question; consequently, Plaintiff waived the right to do so now. "[N]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. A party who fails to clearly and specifically object to an allegedly erroneous charge waives the issue on appeal," and may only seek "plain error" review of the charges to which he has untimely objected.Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2000). The requirement "ensures that the district court is made aware of and given an opportunity to correct any alleged error in the charge before the jury begins its deliberations." ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d 622, 669-670 (E.D.Pa. 2003) citing Fashauer v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1288 (3d Cir. 1995). The Court finds Plaintiff's untimely objection does not adequately establish plain error such that a new trial is warranted. Moreover, because Plaintiff requested that the Court answer the question in the particular manner that the Court indeed employed, by virtue of that request, Plaintiff approved it and any error in that solicited instruction is harmless. Where an objection to form is waived by specific approval before it is submitted to the jury, any claim that an error in the Court's jury charge is harmless. Schott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 124-125 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Since the defendants did not in the trial court object to the form of the interrogatories either before or after the verdict, and do not on appeal argue that they were prejudiced by the way the questions were formulated, we must read them in a manner which reconciles them with the jurors' probable intention in light of the Court's instructions."), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982). Despite the clear waiver, the Court will address each argument on the merits.
This Court employs the same standard of review as would the Court of Appeals. A district court also must utilize plain error review when deciding whether to grant a reversal or new trial based on objections untimely raised. Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 946 F.Supp. 384, 391 (E.D.Pa. 1996); ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d 622, 669 (E.D.Pa. 2003).
B. Court, Jury, and Counsel Misconduct
The Plaintiffs' claims that the Court, counsel, and the jury misconduct tainted the verdict are unsupported. Plaintiffs incorrectly suggest that the jury engaged in misconduct by submitting a question to the Court after deliberations had begun. Where a jury makes known its difficulty and requests further instructions on the law applicable to an important issue, the trial judge is required to give such supplemental instructions as may be necessary to guide it in the determination of the issue. Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409, 415 (3rd Cir. 1967)citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 611 (1946).See Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Intern., Inc., 664 F.2d 23, 28 (3rd Cir. 1981) ("[T]he court has a duty to respond to a jury's request for specific instructions and the form and extent of supplemental instructions are within the sound discretion of the court."). That the jury submitted a question to the Court seeking clarification of the instructions is not tantamount to misconduct; on the contrary, it is customary. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' suggestion that the jury failed to deliberate is unsupported by the record. See generally Hrg. Tr. (indicating that the jury deliberated for approximately two hours). As a result, the Court finds no evidence of jury misconduct sufficient to support the grant of a new trial.
Plaintiffs' only claim of judicial misconduct is the alleged error in allowing the jury to answer the jury interrogatories out of sequence. Pl's Mot. at 12. Because this issue has been addressed above and the Court concludes that no error resulted, we will not revisit it.
The Court turns to the question of alleged counsel misconduct and concludes that counsel performed his duties to Plaintiffs without prejudicing or influencing the verdict. A new trial may be granted only where improper statements "made it `reasonably probable' that the verdict was influenced by prejudicial statements or argument of counsel." Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 363-364 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The trial judge has considerable discretion in determining whether conduct by counsel is so prejudicial as to require a new trial. Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1993) citing Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Greate Bay Hotel Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994);Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921. Plaintiffs contend that counsel failed to object to the questions asked of the jurors during voir dire, alleging that despite her requests of counsel, the Court asked no question as to whether the jurors had prior experience in the restaurant industry. Pl's Mot. at 14. However, the Court did conduct this inquiry. See Hrg. Tr. at 7. In fact, the Court sought proposed voir dire questions from counsel and implemented their suggestions. Plaintiffs further allege that counsel failed to ask the questions or make the objections suggested by Plaintiffs. Pl's Mot at 13. Yet, on multiple occasions during the trial, the Court observed counsel review written and oral suggestions made by Plaintiffs, confer with his client, oblige their requests, and make additional inquiries of witnesses based on those exchanges. Counsel performed his duties with propriety in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure throughout the duration of the trial. That he chose a litigation strategy different from that which Plaintiffs suggested, or in hindsight would have preferred, does not amount to counsel misconduct.
The first attorney retained by Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Withdraw on May 27, 2003 (Doc. No. 27) due to irreconcilable conflict with the Plaintiffs. Trial counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2004 (Doc. No. 51) also citing irreconcilable conflict and Plaintiffs' distrust of counsel's advice and judgment.
C. Verdict Against Great Weight of Evidence
Nothing in the record supports the suggestion that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence such that injustice resulted. While a jury verdict cannot be based on mere speculation, a court can only exercise its discretion to grant a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence when the failure to do so would result in injustice or would shock the conscience of the court. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward Co., 377 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1967); Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1352-53. A new trial cannot be granted, merely because the court would have weighed the evidence differently and reached a different conclusion. Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1348. Plaintiff suggests that the evidence does not support the verdict reached; in so doing, Plaintiff summarizes the evidence presented to the jury without providing a basis in the record to suggest that the jury's conclusions were so unreasonable as to require the Court's intervention. Pl's Mot. at 14-17. The Court is unwilling to substitute its interpretation for that of the fact finder.
D. Newly Discovered Evidence
Finally, Plaintiffs' argument that newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial is insufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial. The party seeking this relief bears a heavy burden. Id. at 930. Motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2). Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 60(b)(2). Specifically, the moving party must show that the newly discovered evidence is (1) material and not merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered prior to trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (3) would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. Id. at 930. Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983); Giordano, 385 F.2d at 155, The Third Circuit view [s] both Rule 59(a) and 60(b) motions as "extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary justifying circumstances are present." Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also Plisco v. Union Railroad Co., 379 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir.),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967). The decision to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id.; Giordano v. McCartney, 385 F.2d 154, 155 (3d Cir. 1967). Without specificity, Plaintiffs suggest that documents available prior to trial and pertinent to the issues at trial would have impacted the outcome of the litigation if introduced. Pl's Mot. at 18-20. Plaintiff does not adequately establish the materiality or unavailability of these documents nor does Plaintiff indicate how they might have impacted the result such that this extraordinary relief is warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Motion for a New Trial (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED with prejudice.