See, e.g., Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly, 322 Ga. App. 699 , 705-706 (3) (746 SE2d 173 ) (2013) (violations of Georgia Water Quality Control Act, Georgia Waste Control Act and Georgia Erosion and Sedimentation Control Act “fall within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-6”); Dupree, supra at 141-142 (1) (violation of federal O SHA regulations are admissible as evidence of and give cause of action when in concert with OCGA § 51-1-6). We do not agree with the Defendants’ argument that Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826 (780 SE2d 689 ) (2015) and U. S. Bank v. Phillips, 318 Ga. App. 819 (734 SE2d 799 ) (2012), require a different result. In Best Jewelry, supra, the plaintiff filed a class action, inter alia, on the grounds that the superior court’s e-filing system, as implemented, violated various statutes and regulations.
(Citations omitted.) Best Jewelry Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 826-827, 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015) (cert. denied).
"[I]t is well settled that violating statutes and regulations does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action by an individual claiming to have been injured from a violation thereof." Best Jewelry Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Reed Elsevier Inc. , 334 Ga.App. 826, 833, 780 S.E.2d 689, 695–96 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Rather, the statutory text must expressly provide a private cause of action."
Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826 , 833 (1) (b) (780 SE2d 689 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted); accord Forsh v. Williams, 321 Ga. App. 556 , 561 (2) (740 SE2d 297 ) (2013); Govea v. City of Norcross, 271 Ga. App. 36 , 41 (1) (608 SE2d 677 ) (2004). 32
As noted above, the complaint alleges that AMS: (Punctuation omitted.) City of Sandy Springs v. City of Atlanta , 358 Ga. App. 604, 605, 855 S.E.2d 779 (2021). See also Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc. , 334 Ga. App. 826, 835 (2), 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015) (allegation that an e-filing fee was "unreasonable" and denied access to courts was a legal conclusion insufficient to save the complaint from dismissal). [A]fter restrictions [on outside visitation] were purportedly established, Arbor Terrace failed to exercise even slight diligence to enforce them as individuals from outside the facility were still permitted to visit individual[s] inside the facility and no commonsense safety precautions were implemented such as limiting visitation to an isolated area in the facility....
By its plain language, OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) does not create an independent cause of action allowing the Insolvency Pool to file suit in order to enforce the set-off provision. See Somerville v. White , 337 Ga. App. 414, 417 (1), 787 S.E.2d 350 (2016) ("In the absence of ... textual support, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc. , 334 Ga. App. 826, 833 (1) (b), 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015) ("[T]he statutory text must expressly provide a private cause of action.") (citation and punctuation omitted). And while OCGA § 33-36-14 (b) may create such an independent cause of action, the statutory language limits the Insolvency Pool's recovery to "[a]ny amount paid a claimant in excess of the amount authorized" by the Insolvency Pool Act.
And while the parties do not raise this issue, I do wonder whether Aguila can still maintain his claims against Kennestone in the absence of an expressly provided private right of action or without satisfying the stringent requirements of OCGA § 51-1-6. See The Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc. , 334 Ga. App. 826, 835 (3) (a), 780 S.E.2d 689 (2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that it "stated viable claims" for "common-law torts" because it "has not argued on appeal that these common-law claims have any basis other than the alleged statutory violations discussed and rejected above"); see also OCGA § 9-2-8 (a) & (b). I am authorized to state that Judge Gobeil joins in this concurrence dubitante.
Because EMTALA imposes no legal duty on individual doctors, Black cannot maintain a cause of action against the individual doctors under OCGA § 51-1-6 and, thus, the trial court properly granted the doctors’ motions to dismiss her violation of a legal duty claim. See Wells Fargo Bank , 293 Ga. at 164-165, 744 S.E.2d 686 ; see also Best Jewelry Manufacturing Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 833-834 (1) (b), 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015) ; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Phillips , 318 Ga. App. 819, 825-826 (3), 734 S.E.2d 799 (2012).Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Finally, we affirm the dismissal of the claim of civil conspiracy against Tozer and Rasband. The district court ruled, and we agree, that the claim of civil conspiracy necessarily fails because the complaint fails to allege underlying claims of tortious interference. "Absent [an] underlying tort, there can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc. , 334 Ga.App. 826, 780 S.E.2d 689, 697 (2015) (citation omitted).D. The Complaint Fails to State Claims of Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud.
Id. ¶ 13; id., Ex.8. Compl. ¶ 14; see also The Best Jewelry Mfg. Co., Inc. v. LexisNexis Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 836 (2015). Compl. ¶ 15; id., Exs. 9, 10.