Opinion
LLIFA104010003S
03-01-2016
Dawn M. Bessette v. Phillip G. Bessette
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO MODIFY ALIMONY (#113.00)
HON. RUPAL SHAH, J.
The defendant, Phillip Bessette, filed a motion to modify alimony on May 27, 2015, seeking termination of alimony as of the date of the motion based on the plaintiff's cohabitation. The court heard evidence on the defendant's motion to modify on December 10, 2015. The parties submitted briefs in support of their interpretations of the alimony provision. Based on the evidence presented and the briefs that were submitted, the court grants the defendant's motion to modify and terminates alimony to the plaintiff.
I
The alimony provision contained in the parties' separation agreement provides
The Husband shall pay during his lifetime to the Wife, until the earlier of her death, remarriage, cohabitation with a male with which the Wife is involved in an intimate relationship or six and one-half years from the date of the dissolution of the marriage of the parties, the sum of $300 per week; provided that, at such time as child support ceases alimony shall be increased to $600 per week. Cohabitation shall be defined as the wife having someone as defined above move in with her or the Wife moves in with such individual at another location . . .
The parties stipulated at the hearing that the plaintiff was having an intimate relationship with her boyfriend and that her boyfriend was residing at her home as of the date of the motion. The defendant claims that the alimony provision is self-executing and thus the cohabitation statute, § 46b-86(b) of the General Statutes, does not apply. The plaintiff claims that the cohabitation statute applies and that the court needs to make the secondary determination under the statute of a financial impact before the alimony order may be modified.
II
When a judgment incorporates a separation agreement in accordance with a stipulation of the parties, it is to be regarded and construed as a contract. Greenburg v. Greenburg, 26 Conn.App. 591, 592, 602 A.2d 1056 (1992). " A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous . . ." Nation-Bailey v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182, 192, 112 A.3d 144 (2015) (quoting Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 383-84, 107 A.3d 920 (2015)).
Where a divorce decree includes an alimony provision that specifies the terms of its termination and makes no reference to the cohabitation statute, Connecticut courts have found the provision to be unambiguous and self-executing. See Mihalyak v. Mihalyak, 30 Conn.App. 516, 620 A.2d 1327 (1993); Krichko v. Krichko, 108 Conn.App. 644, 948 A.2d 1092 (2008).
III
The court agrees with the defendant's interpretation of the alimony provision. It is clear, unambiguous and self-executing. The language of the alimony provision clearly articulates when alimony may be terminated. There is no ambiguity in the provision allowing for the termination of alimony. The agreement treats cohabitation as an event akin to death or remarriage, both of which are events that terminate alimony. The agreement also defines cohabitation and there is no reference whatsoever to the cohabitation statute, Gen. Stat. § 46b-86(b).
The plaintiff's position is not a reasonable interpretation of the alimony provision. The plaintiff relies on DeMaria v. DeMaria, 247 Conn. 715, 724 A.2d 1088 (1999), but that case is inapposite as that matter involved an alimony provision that did not define cohabitation and created some ambiguity regarding the provision's interpretation. Thus, the court in DeMaria was properly guided by the cohabitation statute in determining the meaning of the language. Here, there is no ambiguity and the court must be guided by the clear provisions of the agreement into which the parties entered. See Greenburg, supra, 26 Conn.App. at 597-98.
IV
After considering the parties' testimony and after having reviewed the parties' legal submissions and the relevant facts and case law, the court hereby grants the defendant's motion to modify and terminates alimony as of the date of the motion's filing, May 27, 2015.
So ordered.