Summary
ruling titled "Minute Order" was not prepared in conformance with section 696.3 specifying the requirements for appealable orders
Summary of this case from Charles Sanders Homes, Inc. v. Cook & Assocs., Eng'g, Inc.Opinion
No. 84323.
November 10, 1994.
ORDER
Appellee's motion to dismiss is denied. This appeal was timely commenced within 30 days of the filing of an order prepared in conformance with 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.3[ 12-696.3], 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 990A[ 12-990A]. The trial court's March 1 ruling was not prepared in conformance with 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.3[ 12-696.3], Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1994).
HODGES, C.J., LAVENDER, V.C.J., and ALMA WILSON, KAUGER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur.
SIMMS, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., dissent.
Concluding that the appellant's petition in error was timely brought, the court ignores the substance of the trial court's March 1, 1994 post-decree entry and holds that it does not trigger appeal time because it is not in literal compliance with all of the 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.3[ 12-696.3] requirements. I cannot accede to the court's view. The March 1 memorial, while called a "minute order," is obviously a recordable entry when measured by 12 O.S. 1991 § 24[ 12-24] standards. It substantially meets all the § 696.3 requirements for triggering appeal time.
See appendix "A" to this writing for the full text of the March 1, 1994 entry.
The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.3[ 12-696.3], effective October 1, 1993, are:
"A. Judgments, decrees and appealable orders that are filed with the clerk of the court shall contain:
1. A caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designation of the parties, the file number of the case and the title of the instrument;
2. A statement of the disposition of the action, proceeding, or motion, including a statement of the relief awarded to a party or parties and the liabilities and obligations imposed on the other party or parties;
3. The signature and title of the court; . . . ."
The term "minute order" is an oxymoron having no legal meaning. Minute entries are not now and have never been orders. See Rodgers v. Higgins, Okla., 871 P.2d 398, 407-408 (1993); Hulsey v. Mid-America Preferred Ins. Co., Okla., 777 P.2d 932, 935 (1989); Miller v. Miller, Okla., 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1983); McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Okla., 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1981); State v. Froese, 200 Okla. 486, 197 P.2d 296, 298 (1948). This tenet has been codified by the 1993 amendments to the Judgment Act. See 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.2.C[12-696.2.C]. which provides in pertinent part:
"The following shall not constitute a judgment, decree or appealable order: A minute entry. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
"Recordable" means that by force of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24[ 12-24] an instrument meeting that section's criteria must be entered on or "recorded" in the court's journal. The clerk may "enter" only that which is "on file". The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 § 24[ 12-24] are:
"Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases . . . shall be entered copies of the following instruments on file:
1. All items of process by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of each defendant in the case; and
2. All instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the judge and specify clearly the relief granted or order made." [Emphasis added.]
This court stands committed to the view that, once an appealable event has occurred, a trial judge is utterly without authority to extend appeal time by any means or in any manner, direct or oblique. Appeal time's trigger is a law-driven mechanism which is beyond the reach of human tinkering. In derogation of this legal principle, today's holding confers a license upon the drafter of a memorial to prevent it from triggering appeal time by simply inserting "minute" into its title or text.
See Herring v. Wiggins, 7 Okla. 312, 54 P. 483 (the court's syllabus ¶ 1) (1898); Bellamy v. Washita Valley Telephone Co., 25 Okla. 792, 108 P. 389 [the court's syllabus ¶ 2) (1910); Philbrock v. Home Drilling Co., 117 Okla. 266, 246 P. 457 (the court's syllabus ¶ 2) (1926); Sowers v. Archer, 161 Okla. 148, 17 P.2d 422, 423, (1932); Starr v. Woods, 162 Okla. 242, 19 P.2d 561, 562 (1933); Watchorn v. General Finance Sales Co., 162 Okla. 203, 19 P.2d 566 (the court's syllabus ¶ 2) (1933); Manos v. Leche, 205 Okla. 213, 236 P.2d 693, 695 (1951); Salyer v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., Okla., 727 P.2d 1361, 1362 n. 2 (1986); Grant Square Bank Trust Co. v. Werner, Okla., 782 P.2d 109, 111 n. 4 (1989).
For a detailed explanation of my views, see Aven v. Reeh and Mansell v. City of Lawton.
Aven v. Reeh, Okla., 878 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1994) (Opala, J., dissenting).
Mansell v. City of Lawton, Okla., 877 P.2d 1120, 1121 (1994) (Opala, J., dissenting).