Opinion
No. 59309-9-I.
January 22, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 03-2-13236-3, Larry E. McKeeman, J., entered November 28, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) may be liable to a parent for a claim of negligent investigation if the agency's faulty or biased investigation causes a harmful placement decision affecting a child. But there is no genuine dispute that Shawn Beschta knew the factual bases for his personal injury claims more than three years before he filed this action. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Beschta's claims for negligent investigation, alienation of affection, and state and federal constitutional violations were time barred. The trial court's dismissal of the claims on summary judgment is affirmed.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Beschta, the materials before the trial court support the following factual summary. Beschta and Deanna Engstrom are the parents of J.B., born August 5, 1993. Beschta first saw J.B. about a year after he was born. From then on, according to Beschta, he saw J.B. "sporadically," a minimum of three to five times per year, when J.B. would stay with Beschta for periods ranging from a weekend to "a month or two."
On November 23, 1998, the Snohomish County Sheriff's Department placed J.B. into protective custody because of concerns that he was being neglected or physically abused by Engstrom or Engstrom's boyfriend. Child Protective Services (CPS) placed J.B. into foster care at that time, and on November 30, 1998, the Snohomish County Juvenile Court entered a shelter care order requiring out-of-home placement.
Beschta maintains he first became aware that J.B. had been placed into foster care in late December 1998. On December 28, 1998, Beschta met with Malay Chakrabarti, J.B.'s social worker, and asked Chakrabarti to place J.B. with him, rather than in foster care. Based on an understanding that J.B. had special needs because of ADHD and behavioral problems, Beschta's need to care for two other children while working and attending school, and Beschta's temper and criminal history, Chakrabarti recommended that reunification was not in J.B.'s best interest at this time.
On February 12, 1999, Beschta filed a Notice of Contested Shelter Care Hearing, asking the court to place J.B. with him or, in the alternative, allow unsupervised visits. Dolores Jones, J.B.'s new social worker, recommended that J.B. not be placed with Beschta immediately. She concluded that placement with Beschta would require a transitional period because of J.B.'s special needs, the lack of bonding between J.B. and Beschta, Beschta's criminal history, uncertainty about Beschta's ability to care for a third child, and the lack of documentation regarding Beschta's participation in prior drug treatment and anger management programs.
At a hearing on February 22, 1999, the juvenile court denied Beschta's motion for placement or unsupervised visitation and ordered that before it would consider unsupervised visitation, Beschta was required to provide the court with the results of a monitored UA conducted that day, the Homestudy report, proof of an evaluation with Project Safe, and detailed information about the type of anger management program he had completed. Beschta submitted to the required UA test, which came back positive for THC. Beschta also tested positive for THC later in February 1999 and again in April 1999.
On April 9, 1999, Beschta stipulated to the entry of a dependency order regarding J.B. Among other things, the order directed Beschta to participate in family preservation services and follow the recommendations of his Project Safe Drug and Alcohol Evaluation. The juvenile court also directed that J.B. be transitioned to his father's home after Beschta completed four clean UA tests. In July and August 1999, Beschta submitted four clean UA tests.
In October 1999, CPS received referrals from J.B.'s foster mother and his counselor regarding a bruise on J.B.'s arm when he returned from an overnight visit with Beschta. J.B. told his counselor that Beschta had punched him on the arm. In light of the new allegations, as well as Beschta's failure to complete all court-ordered services, social worker Cindy Leppell declined to recommend that J.B. be transitioned to full-time placement with Beschta at this time. Beschta has denied causing the bruise and maintains that Leppell fabricated the claim.
On October 13, 1999, the court found that Beschta had not cooperated with family preservation services or completed all recommendations from his drug or alcohol evaluation. The court ordered Beschta to comply with all court-ordered services and undergo a psychological evaluation. At some point during the hearing, Beschta insisted that he be allowed to relinquish his parental rights to J.B. The court rejected Beschta's demand, and he later changed his mind about relinquishment.
At a review hearing on March 20, 2000, the court found that Beschta had still not completed the court-ordered requirements, including the psychological evaluation. The court ordered that J.B. remain in foster care while Beschta completed the required services.
On August 10, 2000, partly in response to a motion by Beschta, the juvenile court adopted a transition plan to place J.B. full-time with Beschta. Beschta's psychological evaluation, prepared by Comer LaRue, recommended that J.B. be placed with Beschta following a short transition period. LaRue concluded that Beschta did not pose an obvious risk to J.B. and had demonstrated good parenting skills. J.B. was permanently placed with Beschta on September 4, 2000.
On December 3, 2003, Beschta filed this action for damages against DSHS and several DSHS employees, including Malay Chakrabarti and Cindy Leppell. Among other things, he alleged claims involving negligent investigation, alienation of affection, and violations of his state and federal constitutional rights. DSHS moved for summary judgment, arguing that Beschta's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that Beschta had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to the merits of each claim.
The trial court granted summary judgment on November 28, 2006, relying solely on a determination that Beschta's claims were time barred.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court undertakes the same inquiry as the trial court and considers the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Schaaf v. Highfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21, 896 P.2d 665 (1995).
CR 56(c); see also White v. State, 131 Wn.2d 1, 9, 929 P.2d 396 (1997).
DECISION
Beschta contends material factual issues remain as to when his claims accrued and that the trial court therefore erred in entering summary judgment. We note initially that Beschta's brief consists primarily of factual allegations, none of which are supported by reference to relevant portions of the record as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. An appellate court has no obligation to search through the record to find the portions that may support a party's claims. But we have reviewed the materials submitted to the trial court on summary judgment de novo and agree that Beschta's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
RAP 10.3(a)(5) and (6) require a party to support factual assertions and legal argument in a brief with references to relevant portions of the record.
See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
Beschta has asserted essentially three claims against DSHS and its employees: negligent investigation, alienation of affection, and federal and state constitutional violations. All of these claims are based on DSHS's alleged actions or omissions during the period from November 23, 1998, when J.B. was removed from his mother and placed into a foster home, to September 4, 2000, when J.B. was permanently placed with Beschta.
Beschta concedes that his claims are governed by the three-year limitation period for personal injuries. He was therefore required to file his action within three years from the date he knew or should have known the factual basis for his claims.
See RCW 4.16.080(2); Petcu v. State, 121 Wn. App. 36, 68, 86 P.3d 1234 (2004) (negligent investigation); Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wn. App. 13, 20-21, 510 P.2d 250 (1973) (alienation of affection); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 86, 830 P.2d 318 (1992) (section 1983 actions).
See Petcu, 121 Wn. App. at 68.
In order to maintain a claim of negligent investigation, Beschta was required to establish that DSHS conducted a biased or incomplete investigation that resulted in a harmful placement decision, "such as removing a child from a nonabusive home, placing a child in an abusive home, or letting a child remain in an abusive home." A claim for alienation of affection requires, among other things, the malicious interference by a third person with an existing family relationship. An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a showing that a person deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the person was acting under the color of state law.
M.W. v. Dep't of Soc. Health Servs., 149 Wn.2d 589, 602, 70 P.3d 954 (2003); see also Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 123 P.3d 844 (2005).
Babcock v. State, 112 Wn.2d 83, 107-08, 768 P.2d 481 (1989), reconsideration granted on other ground, 116 Wn.2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991).
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
The crux of Beschta's claims is the assertion that DSHS's negligent investigation and intentional misconduct improperly delayed J.B.'s placement with Beschta. As DSHS notes, Beschta's claims can arguably be deemed to have accrued at several points while J.B. was in foster care when the trial court expressly denied Beschta's requests or motions to place J.B. with him. But in any event, we conclude that the claims accrued no later than August 4, 2000, when Beschta submitted a lengthy declaration to the court in which he set forth all of the material factual allegations supporting his cause of action.
In the declaration, which relied heavily on facts contained in the recently completed psychological evaluation, Beschta informed the court in great detail of the reasons for his mistrust of DSHS and the agency's "appalling" mishandling of the case. Among other things, Beschta alleged that DSHS had not informed him of the ongoing abuse that had occurred prior to J.B.'s removal from Engstrom's home, that Malay Chakrabarti's initial investigation of placement options was inadequate and had failed to consider placement with Beschta's relatives, that Chakrabarti had misrepresented Beschta's criminal history to the court and had threatened to take away the two other children that Beschta was caring for, that J.B.'s counselor had actively and inappropriately opposed reunification, that Cindy Leppell had misled the court about the circumstances surrounding the bruise of J.B.'s arm in October 1999, causing further delay in J.B.'s placement with Beschta, that DSHS had ignored the deficiencies in J.B.'s current foster care, that DSHS had failed to consider the clear evidence of his parenting abilities, and that DSHS had wrongly questioned his ability to monitor J.B.'s medical needs. Beschta further alleged that DSHS's actions had kept J.B. away from the people who loved him and had caused two important years of J.B.'s development to be "filled with trauma and confusion."
The alleged facts and resulting harm set forth in Beschta's declaration are precisely the same circumstances upon which he relies to oppose summary judgment dismissal of his claims. Because Beschta specifically alleged all of the essential facts of his claims, the discovery rule did not further toll the commencement of the limitations period. The fact that Beschta might not yet have possessed proof of all of his allegations or that he did not know the facts were sufficient to support a legal claim does not delay accrual. Because Beschta did not file this action until December 2, 2003, more than three years after the date of his declaration, the trial court properly dismissed his claims on summary judgment.
See Beard v. King County, 76 Wn. App. 863, 867, 889 P.2d 501 (1995).
See Beard, 76 Wn. App. at 868; Allen v. State, 118 Wn.2d 753, 758, 826 P.2d 200 (1992).
Beschta contends the limitations period should be tolled because he could not reasonably be expected to pursue a civil action while having to deal with the State's allegations during J.B.'s dependency. But the court in Petcu v. State rejected an essentially identical argument, noting that "a showing of hardship or understandable delay is insufficient to support tolling of the statute of limitations." Beschta also suggests the limitations period was tolled because he was incapacitated for several months in 2002. Because he has not supported this contention with legal argument or citation to any authority, we decline to consider it.
Petcu, 121 Wn. App. at 72.
See Ang v. Martin, 154 Wn.2d 477, 487, 114 P.3d 637 (2005).
In summary, there is no material dispute that Beschta was aware of the factual bases for his claims by August 2000, and the trial court properly concluded that the claims were time barred. Because summary judgment was proper on this basis, we do not consider DSHS's contentions that summary judgment was also appropriate on the merits of Beschta's claims.
We affirm.