Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-5985.
June 21, 2004
ORDER AND REASONING
AND NOW, this day of June, 2004 upon consideration of Defendant Trustees' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's response, and the reply briefs of both Parties, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. The following is FURTHER ORDERED:
1) The September 15, 2000 Order of Judge Waldman, as it pertains to Defendant Trustees' counterclaims II and III, is VACATED.
2) Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant Combined Fund Trustees and against Plaintiff on counterclaims II and III in the following amounts: two million five hundred and seven thousand eight hundred and thirty-three 42/100 dollars ($2,507,833.42) in interest; two million eight hundred and eighty thousand five hundred twelve and 30/100 dollars ($2,880,512.30) in liquidated damages; costs and reasonable attorney's fees to be determined.
3) Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant 1992 Plan and against Plaintiff on counterclaims II and III: forty-one thousand nine hundred 52/100 dollars ($41,900.52) in outstanding premiums; six thousand seven hundred and sixty 81/100 dollars ($6,760.81) in interest; eight thousand three hundred eighty 11/100 dollars ($8,380.11)in liquidated damages; costs and reasonable attorney's fees to be determined.
4) The Defendants shall submit appropriate documentation regarding the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and costs within ten (10) days from the date of this Order. The Plaintiff may file any objections within seven (7) days of said submission. At that time this Court will determine the amount of such fees which will be recoverable.
The reasons for the Court's decision are stated below.
The purpose of the instant Motion is to resolve a conflict between the District Court's decision of September 15, 2000, and Third Circuit's Opinion reversing it. The District Court initially held that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act"), 26 U.S.C. § 9701-9722, was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts V and VI of the Complaint and Defendant Trustees' counterclaims. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff, and upheld the constitutionality of the assignments to Plaintiff under the Coal Act. See Berwind, 307 F.3d at 242. The ruling, however, did not explicitly discuss the District Court's dismissal of Defendant Trustees' counterclaims against Plaintiff. This Court must now reach these remaining claims.
Counterclaims II and III relate to Trustees' right to interest, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. Because Plaintiff has offered no substantive defense to these claims, there is no question of material fact as to Defendants' entitlement to these damages under the statute. The right to such interest, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees is established by the Coal Act and ERISA. Section 9721 of the Coal Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9721, directs that Section 4301, 29 U.S.C. § 1451, of ERISA shall apply to any claim arising out of an obligation to pay as required by the Coal Act in the same manner as any claim arising out of an obligation to pay withdrawl liability. Anker Energy v. Consolidated Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1999). In turn, Section 4301(b) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1451(b), directs that a failure by an employer to pay withdrawl liability shall be treated in the same manner as a delinquent contribution. Anker, 177 F.3d at 178-179. Thus, delinquent obligations imposed by the Coal Act are treated as delinquent contributions under ERISA, and the delinquent contributor is liable for interest, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. Anker, 177 F.3d at 178-79. The only opposition offered by Plaintiff to an award of these damages is that the District Court's Order of September 15, 2000 conclusively resolved these counterclaims it its favor and the Trustees have waived any right to challenge that judgment.
On remand, a trial court must proceed in accordance with the mandate and law of the case as established on appeal. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948). In the absence of specific direction, the question as to what proceedings can be had must be determined from the nature of the case and the pertinent statutory provisions. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943 (1985). A trial court may consider those issues not expressly or implicitly disposed of by the appellate decision. See id. at 950; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18 (1979). Here, all parties agree that the Third Circuit has rendered no judgment on the Trustee's counterclaims.
In light of the Third Circuit's decision discussed above, this Court must vacate Judge Waldman's earlier Order as it pertains to counterclaims II and III. This Court is required to adhere to the decisions and mandates of the appellate court; failure to grant summary judgment on these Counts would leave unresolved a conflict between the District Court's initial judgment and the Third Circuit's determination. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the September 15, 2000 Order was res judicata as to Defendants' counterclaims and that any arguments in favor of the counterclaims have been waived. The sole basis upon which Plaintiff sought and won summary judgment on the counterclaims in the September 15, 2000 Order was that the Coal Act as applied to Plaintiff was unconstitutional. The Third Circuit clearly rejected this argument. The Defendants did not waive their counterclaims following the September 15 Order because they explicitly appealed from the Order in the Notice of Appeal. There was no briefing specifically required regarding the counterclaims because they turned entirely on the constitutional issue.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides that a Court on motion and upon such terms as are just, may vacate a final judgment for any reason justifying relief from the judgment. A change in the law of the case, making it inconsistent with the judgment, is a just reason.
Accordingly, Plaintiff must pay Defendant Combined Fund Trustees $2,507,833.42 for interest on the delinquent payments; $2,880,512.30 for liquidated damages; and costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Plaintiff is obligated to pay Defendant 1992 Plan $41,900.52 in premiums still outstanding; $6,760.81 in interest; $8,380.11 in liquidated damages; and costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The Court will determine appropriate attorney's fees after submission of relevant documentation by Defendants.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.