Opinion
Civil Action No: SA-06-CV-313-XR.
September 8, 2006
ORDER
On this date, the Court considered Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue (Docket No. 4) and Plaintiffs' motion to transfer (Docket No. 10). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' motion to transfer venue is GRANTED. The case is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On or about April 10, 2005, Rosanna Lane ("Lane") was sitting at a conference table in a hotel owned and operated by Defendants in Nashville, Tennessee. She was attending her grandson's chess tournament. Plaintiffs allege that the conference table broke suddenly and without warning, falling on Lane's lap. Lane suffered severe injuries to her knees, wrist, and body. Lane underwent surgery to repair her knee. Unfortunately, Lee contracted an infection related to the knee surgery, which eventually led to her death. Plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of the Estate of Lane, sued Defendants for negligence and premises liability. In the "Jurisdiction and Venue" section of their Complaint, Plaintiffs failed to indicate the basis for proper venue in the Western District of Texas. Plaintiff merely stated that "Plaintiff is in Texas and Defendant is in Tennessee." In response to these patently defective venue allegations, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) 12(b)(3), or in the alternative, motion to transfer. In response, Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Western District of Texas was not an appropriate venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) or (a)(2); however, Plaintiffs requested that the Court transfer the case in the interests of justice to the Middle District of Tennessee instead of dismissing the case. Plaintiffs argued that transfer was justified because if the Court dismissed the case, then Tennessee's statute of limitations would probably prevent Plaintiffs from re-filing in the Middle District of Tennessee because their claims would be time-barred.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Venue is not proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).
The proper venue in diversity cases is determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Section 1391(a)(1) states that venue is proper in a judicial district where any Defendant resides, if all Defendants reside in the same State. Plaintiffs have sued several distinct, yet affiliated corporate Defendants. In order to determine the proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), the Court must first determine whether all of the corporate Defendants "reside" in Texas. Defendants Gaylord Entertainment Company, Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C., Opryland Hotel Nashville, L.L.C., and Opryland Attractions, Inc., were all incorporated in Delaware and all have their principal place of business is Nashville, Tennessee. Gaylord Entertainment Foundation is a non-profit corporation that was incorporated in Tennessee and has its principal place of business in Tennessee. New Gaylord Entertainment Company merged into Gaylord Entertainment Company on September 30, 1997, and it no longer exists. Thus, Gaylord Entertainment Company, Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C., Opryland Hotel Nashville, L.L.C., and Opryland Attractions, Inc. are citizens of both Tennessee and Delaware for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Gaylord Entertainment Foundation is only a citizen of Tennessee for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business). However, "citizenship" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is different than "residence" for purposes of venue. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) only if all five corporate Defendants "reside" in Texas and at least one of those corporate Defendants "resides" in the Western District of Texas.
For purposes of the federal venue statute, a Defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). In a state which has more than one judicial district and in which a corporate Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that state within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state. Id. Four corporate Defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction in any judicial district in Texas. Only one corporate Defendant might be subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas. Therefore, venue is not proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because all of the corporate Defendants do not reside in Texas.
Four corporate Defendants do not have sufficient contacts with any judicial district in Texas to establish personal jurisdiction. "In a diversity action, a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent permitted by the applicable state law." Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 2001). "[T]he Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. The Due Process Clause permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, (1945)). "`Minimum contacts' can be established either through contacts sufficient to assert specific jurisdiction, or contacts sufficient to assert general jurisdiction." Panda Brandywine Corp., 253 F.3d at 867 (citing Alpine View Co., 205 F.3d at 215). Specific jurisdiction arises when a nonresident defendant has "purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Id. at 868 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). General jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state are unrelated to the cause of action but are "substantial, continuous and systematic." Alpine View Co., 205 F.3d at 215 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984)).
All five corporate Defendants are not qualified to do business in Texas. They do not (1) maintain any agents, offices, bank accounts, or telephone numbers; (2) own, use, or possess any real or tangible personal property; (3) have not entered into any contract to perform services or to furnish materials; and (4) do not advertise, conduct regular business, and/or make any business decisions in Texas. They did not, at the time of the incident, purposely direct activities at Texas or maintain any substantial, continuous, or systematic contacts with Texas. With the exception of Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C., none of the Defendants appear to have any contacts with Texas, let alone sufficient contacts that would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the four corporate Defendants that have no contacts with Texas — Gaylord Entertainment Company, Opryland Hotel Nashville, L.L.C, Opryland Attractions, Inc., and Gaylord Entertainment Foundation. Since four corporate Defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction in any judicial district in Texas, venue is not proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because all the corporate Defendants do not reside in Texas.
Only Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C. might arguably be subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas. Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C. is the general partner of Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.P. and owns 1% of the limited partnership. The remaining 99% of Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.P. is owned by Opryland-Hotel-Texas, L.L.C. Opryland Hotel-Texas Limited Partnership is the entity which owns and operates the Gaylord Texan Hotel Convention Center in Grapevine, Texas (Tarrant County). Though Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C. is the general partner of Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.L.P. it does not pay an active role in the day-to-day management or operation of the Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.P. or the Gaylord Texas Hotel Convention Center. Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C. does not direct, influence, or control the activities, operation, or management of the Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.P. or the Gaylord Texan Hotel Convention Center in Grapevine, Texas. Tarrant County is located within the Northern District of Texas. The Court seriously doubts whether Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C.'s nominal status as general partner of Opryland Hotel-Texas, L.P. would subject it to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas. Assuming, arguendo, that personal jurisdiction is proper in the Northern District of Texas, then Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C. is a resident of the Northern District of Texas for purposes of the federal venue statute. However, venue would still not be proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because (1) the other four corporate Defendants do not reside in Texas and (2) none of the corporate Defendants, including Opryland Hospitality, L.L.C., reside in the Western District of Texas.
Venue is also not proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). That section states that venue is also proper in a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. The facts clearly establish that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Nashville, Tennessee. No events giving rise to the claim occurred within the Western District of Texas.
B. Although the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the corporate Defendants, the Court may still transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
"Once a district court determines that it lacks personal jurisdiction, it is within its discretion to transfer the case to a court of proper jurisdiction and venue if it finds that it is within the interests of justice to do so." Romero v. Cajun Stabilizing Boats, Inc., No. Civ. A.G. 05-483, 2006 WL 367871, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2006) (Kent, J.) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 82 S. Ct. 913, 916 (1962); Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savings Bank of South Carolina, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987); Bentz v. Recile, 778 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1985); Arriaga v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 380, 387-88 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Smirch v. Allied Shipyard, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 903, 913-14 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Williams v. Castro, 21 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (S.D. Tex. 1998)). "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Venue for this case is proper in the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because all of the corporate Defendants reside in the Middle District of Tennessee for purposes of the federal venue statute. Additionally, venue for this case is proper in the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Nashville, Tennessee, which is located within the Middle District of Tennessee.
The Court finds that it would be in the interest of justice to transfer the case to the Middle District of Tennessee instead of dismissing it because Plaintiffs' claims would probably be time-barred by the Tennessee statute of limitations and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Nashville, Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1) provide that actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Since the events giving rise to this case occurred on April 10, 2005, there is a strong chance that Plaintiffs' claims would be time-barred if the Court dismissed and Plaintiffs were forced to re-file. The Court finds that the interest of justice is best served by transferring this case to the Middle District of Tennessee. See Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc., 178 F. Supp.2d 1225, 1235-36 (N.D.Okla. 2001) (finding transfer rather than dismissal appropriate "given potential statute of limitations problems faced by [P]laintiff if [the] case were dismissed").
The Court is not holding that the claims would definitely be time-barred in Tennessee, just that there is a strong chance that they would be time-barred.