But there are two exceptions to the general rule that indictments drafted in the statutory language are sufficient. First, where an indictment contains a necessary allegation of an act by the defendant which comprises more than one statutorily defined means of its performance, but the indictment fails to specify which of the statutory definitions of the act is relied upon, the indictment fails to provide the constitutionally required notice. Gibbons v. State, 652 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); Gorman, 634 S.W.2d at 682-683; Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (Opinion on Rehearing); Mullinax v. State, 756 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1988); Jackson v. State, 743 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1985); and, Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1983). But see, Reese v. State, 712 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (Indictment for aggravating kidnapping did not have to further define "restrain.").
The motion to quash was overruled by the trial court. The Court of Appeals, in conflict with two other Courts of Appeals, Scott v. State, 646 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983), no pet., and Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983), pet. ref'd., held that since the property alleged to have been taken was cash money, the only manner in which appropriation could have been accomplished would have been by possession. See § 31.01(5)(A), supra.
She did not release any other details concerning the new company she would be employed with. Combined, all of the circumstances indicate that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. See Rodriguez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 921, 922-26 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Miller v. State, 909 S.W.2d 586, 594-95 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no pet.); Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305, 306-08 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, pet. ref'd). Issue No. Two is overruled.
Although the evidence is circumstantial, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we hold the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that appellant was the person who broke the seal of the trailer and stole the missing laptops. See Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305, 306-08 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, pet. ref'd) (holding evidence that defendant was last employee in store, had access to safe, and abruptly left area without notice to his spouse, was sufficient to sustain conviction for theft). Point two is overruled. While we appreciate the professional and zealous manner in which appellate counsel has advanced his points on appeal, we have carefully reviewed the record and conclude, as previously noted, that appellant's arguments should be overruled. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
In Scott v. State, 646 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983, no pet.), the court suggested that under Section 31.01(5)(B) the State may further be required to disclose whether it is alleging appropriation by "acquisition" or by "otherwise exercising control over property." See also Coats v. State, 712 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1983, pet. ref'd). However, where a statute sets forth several ways by which an offense may be committed, and those ways are subject to the same punishment, they may be alleged conjunctively.