Summary
dismissing claim where, prior to class certification, named plaintiff's claim alone could not provide court with proper jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Hilton v. Atlas Roofing Corporation of MississippiOpinion
Civ. No. 99-3618, SECTION "K" (2).
February 18, 2000.
Before the court are plaintiff's Motion to Remand and a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants, Travelers Health Network of Louisiana, Travelers Insurance Company, MetraHealth Insurance Company, United HealthCare of Louisiana, Inc. and United Health and Life Insurance Company (collectively "defendants"). The court heard oral argument on the Motion to Remand on January 19, 2000, and the parties have supplied the court with additional briefing. Considering the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, the court finds that plaintiff's Motion for Remand should be granted.
Background
This action arises out of Dr. William Stallworth's ("Dr. Stallworth") failure to order a mammogram for Jean Valette Berthelot ("Berthelot"). The mammogram may have assisted Dr. Stallworth in diagnosing Berthelot with breast cancer in its early stages. The facts giving rise to this litigation have had several incarnations. Plaintiff originally filed a medical malpractice action in state court. She also filed two purported class actions, one in state court and one in this court, both of which were dismissed on summary judgment. In dismissing plaintiff's class action, this court held that she had not stated a claim for relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Berthelot v. Travelers Ins. Co., 973 F. Supp. 596 (E.D.La. 1997).
After plaintiff's state court class action was dismissed, she filed a Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition in her medical malpractice action, asserting class allegations. Defendant removed the original state medical malpractice action to this court on December 1, 1999. The stated basis for removal is that plaintiff's incorporation of the class allegations raises a federal question under ERISA. Plaintiff seeks to have the case remanded on grounds that ERISA does not preempt her state claims.
At the time of the alleged wrong, Berthelot was employed by the Orleans Parish School Board, which is a governmental entity and, as such, is exempt from the constraints of ERISA. See Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc., 921 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1991); Berthelot, 973 F. Supp. 596. Berthelot is the only named plaintiff; and the class has not been certified. The other members of the purported class are identified by Berthelot as women between the ages of thirty-five and forty, who were enrollees of a Travelers HMO, and who were denied a mammogram by their physician.
Berthelot argues that ERISA does not preempt Dr. Stallworth's duty to order mammograms for women covered by non-governmental plans. Essentially, she contends that the state claims asserted by the unnamed plaintiffs do not "relate to" employee welfare benefit plans and are therefore not preempted by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the private, non-governmental plans of yet unnamed plaintiffs are governed by ERISA. Defendants further argue that the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Berthelot's claims.
During oral argument, the court queried whether it could exercise jurisdiction of a case based on the claims of persons not named in the action and who were not yet members of a certified class. The parties were permitted to file supplemental briefs to address this question.
The court overtly suggested to plaintiff's counsel that he might prevail on the Motion for Remand because of the court's lack of jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed plaintiffs. The court even cited cases to support this proposition. Nonetheless, plaintiff's supplemental brief contains no mention of this issue.
In opposition, defendants argue that because the plaintiff's complaint makes allegations that implicate ERISA, this court has jurisdiction on that basis alone.
Legal Analysis
It is clear that dismissal of an action is warranted if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Prior to class certification, the action is one brought by the named plaintiff(s) individually, seeking to join others upon certification to form a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994) ( citing Kaplan v. Utilicorp United, Inc. 9 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1993).
Prior to certification of a plaintiff class, the only plaintiff before the court is the representative party. Consequently, a court without jurisdiction over the claims of this party must dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. Further support for this conclusion is derived from Supreme Court precedent dismissing an action prior to class certification when the claims of the representative party have become moot. Board of School Comm'rs of City of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
In Jacobs, the Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court," the mootness of the claims of the purported representative dictated dismissal of the uncertified "class action" as well. Id. at 130, see also Sannon v. U.S., 631 F.2d 1247, 1252 (5th Cir. 1980); Jhamb v. California Physicians Service, 1996 WL 61281 (N.D.Cal); Dorsey v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 703354 (E.D.La.)(Vance, J.). The court's ability to entertain the class action is therefore contingent on its ability to assert jurisdiction over the claims of the named plaintiff(s). The court's ability to assert jurisdiction over potential members of a potential class is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether this court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because none of these individuals with ERISA plans are before the court.
In this case, defendants urge the court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987). in Taylor, the plaintiff had brought suit in state court, alleging state law causes of action against his employer and the underwriter of his ERISA plan. After the defendants removed, the plaintiff moved to have the case remanded to state court. The defendants argued that ERISA preempted plaintiff's state law claims and that the claims were subject to the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Supreme Court held that "this suit, though it purports to raise only state law claims, is necessarily federal in character" and was therefore removable under § 1441. Id. at 1548. To reach it's holding, the Court first had to find that the plaintiff's claims related to an employee benefit plan, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Hence, the claims were preempted by ERISA and subject to the court's federal question jurisdiction.
Taylor is inapposite to the issue before the court. The court need not reach the question of whether the claims of unnamed plaintiffs may be preempted by ERISA. The court lacks jurisdiction to make such a finding. As Berthelot is the only named plaintiff, her claim alone may provide this court with jurisdiction. Because Berthelot was covered by a governmental plan, not governed by ERISA, this court does not have jurisdiction over her claim. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1); Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc., 921 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Remand is hereby GRANTED, and this action shall be remanded to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED as MOOT.