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holding that there is no individual liability under ADA
Summary of this case from Sims v. TesterOpinion
Civil Action No: 99-2009, SECTION: "D" (2).
October 18, 2000.
Before the court are the following motions:
(1) "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary judgment" (Doc. No. 63) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness;
(2) "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Rehabilitation Act, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Doc. No. 64) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness;
(3) "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief Can be Granted as to the Plaintiff's Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act" (Doc. No. 65) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Robert Tanner, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness; and
(4) "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Doc. No. 66) filed by Defendant Robert Tanner.
The court notes that the motions pertaining to the ADA claims are essentially identical except for the fact that Defendant Tanner is not a mover in one, but is the sole mover in another. Likewise, the motions pertaining to the Rehabilitation Act claims are essentially identical except for the fact that Defendant Tanner is not a mover in one, but is included as a mover in the others.
Plaintiff, Oscar Berthold, filed a memorandum in opposition but he only makes an argument in opposition to the motions as they pertain to his claims asserted under the Rehabilitation Act. He makes no argument in opposition to the motions as they pertain to his claims asserted under the ADA.
All motions were set for hearing on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, and they are before the court on briefs, without oral argument. Having reviewed the memoranda of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that the motions should be granted as explained below.
I. Background
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Washington Correctional Institute (WCI) from July 21, 1998 through December 4, 1999. While incarcerated, Plaintiff had his left leg amputated on September 18, 1998. He filed the original Complaint, pro se, in this matter on July 6, 1999 alleging injury because the WCI refused to provide him with a prosthesis. Following a Spears hearing, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff asserted two cognizable claims: (1) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that Defendants failed to accommodate his disability by providing him with a prosthesis; and (2) a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs for a prosthesis and physical therapy following the amputation. (Doc. No. 35, pp. 1-2).
Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel, and the Magistrate Judge appointed the Tulane Law Clinic to represent Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 41). Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint against individual prison officials and employees (Richard Stalder, Ed C. Day, Kathy McGinnis, Robert Tanner, Dr. Arshad, Sherlene Boler, and Mary Faciane) asserting: (1) a medical indifference claim under the Eight Amendment; (2) a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; (3) a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; and (4) state law claims for the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. (First Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 51).
Of these Defendants, only Dr. Arshad is not a mover now before the court.
As to each Defendant, with the exception of Dr. Arshad, Plaintiff specifically states that the defendant "is being sued individually and in [his or her] official capacity." (Id.) All Defendants, with the exception of Dr. Arshad, now move for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims asserted under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Whether the Defendants, in Their Individual Capacities, Can Be Liable Under Title II of the ADA
In their motions now before the court, Defendants argue that there is no individual liability under Title II of the ADA. Plaintiff has offered no argument in opposition.
Title II of the ADA umabiguously extends to state prison inmates. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently heard oral argument (on October 11, 2000) on the issue of whether both Title I and II of the ADA are valid excercises of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. University of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett,___ U.S.___, 120 S.Ct. 1669, 146 L.Ed.2d 479 (2000).
Title II of the ADA (pertaining to "Public Services") provides in pertinent part that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added).
"Public entity" is not defined in the ADA's definitional section, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, to include individuals. "[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979).
Further, the weight of judicial authority supports the conclusion that individual defendants cannot be held liable for violation of Title II of the ADA. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005, 1005 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted in part, ___U.S.___, 120 S.Ct. 1003, 145 L.Ed.2d 947 (2000) and cert. dismissed, 120 S.Ct. 1265 (2000); Lewis v. New Mexico Dept. of Health, 94 F. Supp.2d 1217, 1230 (D.NM. 2000); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dept. of Police, 89 F. Supp.2d 543, 557 (D.NJ. 2000); Yesky v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 76 F. Supp.2d 572, 575 (M.D.Pa. 1999).
Further, several circuits have held that there is no liability under Title I of the ADA (pertaining to "Employment") against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as "employers" under the statutory definition. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); and EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280-82 (7th Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADA claims against Defendants (Richard Stalder, Ed C. Day, Kathy McGinnis, Robert Tanner, Sherlene Boler, and Mary Faciane), in their individual capacities, will be dismissed. However, at this time, Plaintiff's ADA claims asserted against Defendants, in their official capacities, remain viable. B. Whether the Defendants, in Their Individual Capacities, Can Be Liable Under the Rehabilitation Act
See supra footnotefn3.
In their motions, Defendants similarly argue that there is no individual liability under the Rehabilitation Act, which reads in part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States (as defined in this title] shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.29 U.S.C. § 794 (a) (emphasis added).
The Rehabilitation Act, enacted in 1973, was the first federal statute to provide broad prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of disability, but it applies only to programs and activities receiving federal assistance. Title II of the ADA, the broader statute, enacted in 1990, extends these prohibitions to public entities, regardless of whether they receive federal financial assistance.
Here it is clear that the individual defendants are not themselves program recipients of federal financial assistance. Cf. Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999) (employee of state agency could not bring § 1983 action against supervisor, individually, to enforce her rights under the Rehabilitation Act).
The Rehabilitation Act also provides that:
The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. § 12201.12204 and 12210), as such sections relate to employment.29 U.S.C. § 794 (d).
As noted in footnote 4, several circuits have held that there is no liability under Title I of the ADA against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as "employers" under the statutory definition.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act asserted against the Defendants (Richard Stalder, Ed C. Day, Kathy McGinnis, Robert Tanner, Sherlene Boler, and Mary Faciane), in their individual capacities, will be dismissed. However, Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act asserted against these Defendants, in their official capacities, remain viable.
Congress effectively abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.7(a)(1) ("A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [ 29 U.S.C.A. § 794]. . . .").
III. Conclusion
For reasons set forth above,IT IS ORDERED that the "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Doc. No. 63) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness, be and is hereby GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiff's ADA claims against these Defendants in their individual capacities; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Rehabilitation Act, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Doc. No. 64) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness, be and is hereby GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiff's claims asserted under the Rehabilitation Act against these Defendants in their individual capacities;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief Can be Granted as to the Plaintiff's Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act" (Doc. No. 65) filed by Defendants, Richard Stalder, Sherlene Boler, Robert Tanner, Mary Faciane, Ed Day and Kathy McGinness, be and is hereby GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiff's claims asserted under the Rehabilitation Act against these Defendants in their individual capacities; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiff's Claims Against the Individual Defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ACT") and the Rehabilitation Act, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Doc. No. 66) filed by Defendant Robert Tanner be and is hereby GRANTED, dismissing Plaintiff's claims asserted against Defendant Tanner, in his individual capacity, under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff's claims asserted against Defendants, in their official capacities, under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act remain viable at this time .
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