Defendant analogizes Chance's position in relation to Dew with that of a county supervisor charged by statute with maintenance and repair of county roads, who is sued by a plaintiff injured through negligence in maintenance and repair of a road. Mississippi law limits the supervisor's liability to tasks he personally undertakes, which, when done negligently, proximately cause the plaintiff's injury. Lee v. Sills, 95 Miss. 623, 49 So. 259 (1909), Jackson v. Gordon, 173 Miss. 759, 163 So. 502 (1935); Berry v. Warren, 304 So.2d 284 (Miss. 1974). The court is not convinced that such analogues, though useful, clearly preclude the cause of action asserted by Dew against Chance. Chance's liability, if any, does not arise by statute; nor is Chance's alleged liability totally passive in nature in light of the fact that he contracted on behalf of the Railroad to remove the debris from Tcheva Creek Bridge.

While county officials possess a great deal of discretion in their allocation of resources for maintenance, they are charged also with an ongoing ministerial duty to inspect and maintain public roads. See Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-117, -119 (Rev. 2021); see Berry v. Warren, 304 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1974) (discussing the balance between the ministerial and discretionary functions of county supervisors).The parties agree that no Mississippi statute or case law is directly on point.