Opinion
B194051
12-13-2006
DWIGHT C. BERRY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CITY OF LONG BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Bret Rayburn and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Kaiser & Swindells, Pamela A. Swindells and Eric C. Demler for Real Parties in Interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this writ proceeding, Dwight C. Berry (Berry) challenges the trial courts denial of his Pitchess motion seeking discovery of personnel records from the Long Beach Police Department (LBPD). We find Berry satisfied the standard for triggering the right to an in camera inspection of LBPD Officer R. Ramirezs police personnel records. We therefore grant Berrys petition for writ of mandate in part, directing the trial court to conduct an in camera review of Officer Ramirezs records as set forth in the disposition section of this opinion.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An information charged Berry with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood alcohol. It was further alleged Berry had suffered four prior convictions pursuant to Vehicle Code sections 23550 and 23550.5.
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b).
According to the police report, Officer Ramirez was on patrol when he saw a blue Honda motorcycle being driven without lights during darkness. Officer Ramirez pulled the motorcycle over and spoke to Berry, who was the driver. Officer Ramirez made various observations that led him to believe Berry was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Officer Ramirez called for a "DUI Unit" to assist and Officer G. Prieto responded. When Officer Prieto arrived, Berry was sitting in the backseat of Officer Ramirezs patrol car. Officer Prieto determined Berry was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and arrested him. Officer Prieto, rather than Officer Ramirez, wrote the police report.
Berry filed a Pitchess motion seeking materials from the LBPD personnel files of Officer Ramirez. The requested materials were: "[a]ll complaints from any and all sources relating to acts of fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, illegal search/seizure; false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false police reports, writing of false police reports to cover up the use of excessive force, planting of evidence, false or misleading internal reports including but not limited to false overtime or medical reports, and any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude . . . ." (Emphasis deleted.)
In a declaration filed in support of Berrys Pitchess motion, defense counsel noted that, according to the police report, Officer Ramirez stopped Berrys motorcycle because Berry was riding the vehicle without lights during darkness. Berrys counsel then averred: "No other reason was given for stopping . . . Berry aside from the lights. [¶] Officer Ramirezs statement, included in Officer Prietos report is deliberately false and misleading. In addition it is highly unlikely. The model of Honda motorcycle which . . . Berry was allegedly seen driving cannot be driven without the front and rear lights illuminated. I am informed that while Mr. Berry was driving his motorcycle on the date of his arrest the lights on the motorcycle were in working order and were illuminated. [¶] Since there was no other reason in the police report or testified to at the preliminary hearing for conducting the traffic stop that resulted in Mr. Berrys arrest in this case, this misinformation was crucial and material. Since the information was conveyed by Officer Ramirez to the Officer who would write the report, his false statement caused the false report to be written in this case. To claim that a person committed a traffic infraction to justify a detention is to falsify probable cause and to effect an illegal arrest or detention."
The City of Long Beach (City) opposed the Pitchess motion, claiming it was overbroad and sought material precluded from production by case law. With respect to Berrys request for discovery of complaints that Officer Ramirez had authored false police reports, the City, citing California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010 (Luna), argued that "there can be no discovery for false reports as to an officer who never wrote a report but only contributed information to the officer who did write the report." The City concluded Berry had failed to establish how his detention by Officer Ramirez was material to the defense.
The trial court granted the Pitchess motion in part, allowing discovery of false statements, oral or written, made by Officer Ramirez. However, the trial court denied the remainder of Berrys request. With respect to Berrys request for complaints relating to false statements made by Officer Ramirez in police reports, the trial court denied the request on the basis that Officer Ramirez did not write a report. Berry then filed this petition for writ of mandate.
Berry claims the trial courts order is limited to false "oral" statements. However, the reporters transcript shows the trial court ordered discovery of all "false statements." In reaching its decision, the trial court stated: "I cant grant your Pitchess on false reports because the officer did not write a false report. All I can do is give you a Pitchess with respect to false statements thats all, on officer [Ramirez], and that would be it." Defense counsel then inquired, "[M]ay I say that your order is false statements, except for false reports?" The trial court responded, "Correct."
III. ISSUE
Berry contends he established good cause for the production of all the materials he requested, including complaints that Officer Ramirez authored false police reports.
IV. DISCUSSION
To obtain disclosure of police personnel records, the defendant must submit an affidavit establishing "good cause." (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).) The good cause requirement is a "relatively low threshold for discovery." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant demonstrates: (1) materiality of the requested material to the subject matter of the pending action, and (2) a reasonable belief the agency has the type of information shown. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); Warrick, supra, at pp. 1016, 1019.) A showing of materiality requires the defendant to set forth a "specific factual scenario" of officer misconduct applicable to his case that establishes a "plausible factual foundation" and articulates a valid theory of admissibility for the information sought. (Warrick, supra, at pp. 1025-1026.) A "plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred." (Id. at p. 1026.) The trial court does not determine whether the defendants version of events is persuasive. (Ibid.) "[T]he trial court looks to whether the defendant has established the materiality of the requested information to the pending litigation." (Ibid.) Mere relevance to credibility is insufficient to warrant disclosure, without a showing of good cause. (See Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1023-1024.) We review a trial courts ruling on a Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 992.)
When the appropriate standard is applied, it is clear Berry met the relatively low threshold for good cause. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) He set forth a specific factual scenario that at the time he was stopped by Officer Ramirez, the motorcycle lights were on, and that Officer Ramirez falsely represented to Officer Prieto, for inclusion in the arrest report, that the motorcycle lights were off at the time of the stop. This scenario established a plausible factual foundation for a claim that Officer Ramirez fabricated the fact that the lights were off and that he provided false information for inclusion in a police report.
Under Berrys scenario, the primary wrongdoing of Officer Ramirez was fabrication of probable cause to detain and dishonesty in reporting the incident to Officer Prieto for inclusion of false information in Officer Prietos report. Thus, discovery must be limited to claims of these specific types of malfeasance, and Berrys request for information pertaining to other types of wrongdoing is inappropriate. Consequently, Berry is only entitled to information pertaining to fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, false arrest and false statements, including false statements made by Officer Ramirez in police reports and false statements made to other officers for inclusion in their police reports, fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, illegal search and/or seizure and perjury. Planting of evidence and false internal reports are not sufficiently related to the malfeasance established by Berrys plausible factual foundation so as to warrant the wholesale intrusion into the personnel files of Officer Ramirez. Further, Berrys request for complaints of officer dishonesty and "evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude" are overbroad and thus impermissible. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021 [the information sought must be described with sufficient particularity to insure that the request is not so broad as to garner all information obtained by the People in investigating the crime, but limited to instances of officer misconduct asserted by the defendant]; see People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150.)
We also conclude that Berry is entitled to discover complaints that Officer Ramirez had authored false police reports. In denying Berrys request, the trial court appears to have adopted the Citys argument, based on Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, that evidence of false reports need not be disclosed if the officer involved did not actually write the report. This interpretation of Luna is flawed.
In Luna, five California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers were involved in defendant Lunas arrest for drunk driving. Officer McCain wrote an arrest report which provided his account of the events leading to Lunas arrest. (Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013.) Officer McCain also authored a traffic collision report, which included a virtually identical account of the circumstances of Lunas arrest. The traffic report included a summary of Officer Conleys involvement in the investigation. According to the report, Officer Conley advised Officer McCain that she had identified Luna as the driver of the BMW involved in the collision, and that Luna told her he had been drinking. (Id. at p. 1015.) Luna filed two Pitchess motions. The first sought an order compelling the CHP to produce records from the personnel files of all five officers involved in Lunas arrest. Luna asked for complaints of misconduct, including acts of force, violence, threats, lying and preparing false police reports. (Luna, supra, at p. 1015.) The CHP did not file written opposition to the Pitchess motion. However, a CHP officer appeared in court with the records. (Id. at p. 1016.) The trial court conducted an in camera review and found with respect to Officer Conley a "problem" police report she had filed. Defense counsel did not ask the trial court to produce this document, indicating his investigator would attempt to obtain it. (Ibid.)
Later, Luna filed a second Pitchess motion, indicating the investigators efforts had been unsuccessful. With respect to Officer Conley, Luna asked the trial court to order production of "any and all documents, records, reports, written reprimands, or any other documentation concerning any allegations, whether or not investigated or verified, that one or more of Officer Conleys . . . written reports were in any way misleading, fabricated, untruthful, biased, or inaccurate." (Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015.) The trial court ordered the CHP to produce the complaint concerning the "problem" police report prepared by Officer Conley. (Id. at p. 1018.) The CHP sought writ review.
The appellate court held that although Luna had satisfied the statutory good cause requirement for discovery of complaints of excessive force, the "problem" report authored by Officer Conley had no connection to Lunas allegations of excessive force. (Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1022.) The court framed the question presented by the writ petition as follows: "Thus, the question is whether [Lunas] Pitchess motions also established good cause for discovery of personnel records pertaining to misconduct of a type other than excessive force. [¶] We find that defendants initial Pitchess motion established good cause for discovery of complaints that Officer McCain had previously falsified police reports. The motion included Officer McCains DUI Report and Traffic Report, which indicated that defendant was violent and resisted arrest. These reports must be viewed in conjunction with counsels declaration, which avers that an independent witness will testify that defendant did not act violently until officers used excessive force. Thus, the motion provided a specific factual scenario (Officer McCains report of the circumstances of the arrest was false) established by a plausible factual foundation (a witness will testify to different circumstances). Had it found information pertaining to falsification of police reports by Officer McCain in its in camera review, the trial court could have properly ordered disclosure of that information within the limitations imposed by the Evidence Code. [¶] However, the trial court did not do so. Instead, it ordered [the] CHP to produce the investigation pertaining to a problem police report prepared by Officer Conley, not Officer McCain. This order constitutes an abuse of discretion because defendants motion did not demonstrate good cause for discovery of complaints or other documentation of problem police reports filed by Officer Conley. Defendant has not claimed that Officer Conley prepared a false police report concerning his arrest, nor did his motions set forth a specific factual scenario to support an allegation of any kind of misconduct on Officer Conelys part other than excessive force." (Luna, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1022-1023, fns. omitted.)
Luna does not stand for the proposition that a trial court is precluded from disclosing evidence of false reporting when the detaining officer did not author the arrest report. In his first Pitchess motion, Luna claimed the officers involved lied about the circumstances surrounding his arrest. Specifically, that they lied when they claimed he was violent, that he resisted arrest and that they did not use excessive force. It does not appear Luna ever claimed that Officer Conleys statements to Officer McCain were false or that Officer Conley provided false information to Officer McCain for inclusion in the police reports prepared by Officer McCain. Thus, the discovery sought, i.e., the "problem" police report prepared by Officer Conley, was unrelated to the good cause showing made by Luna.
Here, Berry set forth a specific factual scenario to support an allegation of misconduct on the part of Officer Ramirez. Specifically, Berry alleges Officer Ramirez falsified the reasonable suspicion for the stop and thereafter provided this false information to Officer Prieto, thus causing Officer Prieto to author a false police report. Evidence that Officer Ramirez had, in the past, included false information in a police report he authored would be relevant at trial. We therefore conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to review the LBPD police personnel records for complaints that Officer Ramirez had authored false police reports.
V. DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent trial court to vacate its order denying petitioner Berrys Pitchess motion seeking discovery of personnel records from the LBPD and to issue an order granting the motion. Respondent court is to conduct an in camera review of the personnel files of LBPD Officer R. Ramirez for relevance with respect to complaints of fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause, false arrest, false statements, including providing false information for inclusion in police reports, falsification of police reports, fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, illegal search and/or seizure and perjury.
According to the City, the trial court conducted an in camera review sometime after the Pitchess hearing. To the extent the trial court reviewed the files for false oral and written statements, the court need not repeat the exercise.
We concur:
BOREN, P.J.
CHAVEZ, J.