Opinion
NO. 1:01CV452-D-A
February 4, 2002
OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE
Presently before the court is the Defendant Furniture Brands International's motion for a transfer of venue. Upon due consideration, the court finds the motion to transfer is well-taken and shall be granted.
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Terry Berry is a Mississippi resident who resides in Lee County and began working for Defendant Lane Furniture Industries, Inc. ("Lane") in September of 1979. On or about August 29, 2001, Berry filed a Petition for Release of Retirement Benefit Plans and Complaint for Damages in the Chancery Court of Lee County against Lane and Furniture Brands International ("Furniture Brands"). Furniture Brands is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Lane is also a Delaware corporation and is a subsidiary of Furniture Brands. The petition states "as a benefit of his employment Terry Berry received a Retirement Benefit Plan administered by Furniture Brands." The petition also states that on September 9, 2000, Terry Berry was terminated by Lane. Berry asserts that since his termination and due to mismanagement of the fund, the retirement benefit fund has significantly reduced in value and that "the negligent management of the fund by Furniture Brands . . . constitutes good cause for the dissolution of the fund and the return of its full cash value to Terry Berry." While Berry does state that he worked for Lane, all of the allegations in the complaint are directed at Furniture Brands. Berry does not allege that he was terminated wrongly by Lane or assert that Lane had any role in the alleged negligent management of the fund.
The record does not disclose where Lane's principal place of business is. Lane is qualified to do business in Mississippi.
Furniture Brands assumed the centralized administration of plans (which were originally administered in part by Lane) in 1994. As is more fully discussed below, Furniture Brands argues that if this action were to proceed in the State of Mississippi, Furniture Brands will incur unnecessary administrative burdens in restructuring work schedules, expenses in traveling, meals and lodging for certain employees and individuals.
On November 23, 2001, Defendants removed the action from the chancery court to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in that this case requests relief exclusively available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), from an employee benefit plan, and is therefore preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et. seq., the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
Thereafter, the Defendants moved to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
B. Discussion — Motion for Transfer of Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
"For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The ERISA venue provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), states "[w]here an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found. . . ." Thus, this action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Missouri originally as the plan is administered there, and at least one of the Defendants resides or may be found there. "Decisions to effect 1404(a) transfers are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and review of a transfer is limited to an abuse of that discretion." Mills v.Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988)).
The purpose of the venue transfer statute is to "prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Gundle Lining Const. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.Tex. 1994) (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). In order to establish that transfer is appropriate, the defendant must demonstrate that the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of the transfer. Gundle, 844 F. Supp. at 1165.
There exists a veritable plethora of factors this court may consider in making a § 1404(a) determination, which include:
1) the convenience of the parties;
2) the convenience of material witnesses;
3) the availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses;
4) the cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses;
5) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
6) calendar congestion;
7) where the events in issue took place; and
8) the interests of justice in general.
Id. at 1165; see also Apache Prods. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 154 F.R.D. 650, 653 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (listing factors for consideration in § 1404(a) analysis).
Normally, in determining the propriety of a transfer, the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to great weight. Willowbrook Foundation, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n., Inc., 87 F. Supp.2d 629, 635 (N.D.Miss. 2000) (citing Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966)). This is particularly true when the plaintiff's choice of forum is his own state. Willowbrook Foundation, Inc., 87 F. Supp.2d at 635. As courts have recognized, "[t]he plaintiff's privilege of choosing his venue, at the very least, places the burden on the defendants to demonstrate why the forum should be changed." Apache Prods. Co., 154 F.R.D. at 653. But where the defendant does show that another forum is significantly more convenient for the parties and witnesses, and that there appears to be no substantial impediment otherwise, the plaintiff's choice must give way and the court should not hesitate to transfer. Id.
Furniture Brands offered the affidavit of Richard Lockard, Assistant Secretary and Director of Employee Benefits and Risk Management of Furniture Brands. Lockard stated that "[a]ll administration of the plan at issue and any supporting document[s], are centralized in the offices of Furniture Brands International, Inc., in St. Louis, Missouri." Lockard stated that administration is broken down into four general areas : (1) Asset Management, (2) Plan Valuation, (3) Legal Council and ERISA Compliance, and (4) General Plan Administration. Furniture Brands has four executive personnel responsible for asset management of the plan at issue in this case. All individuals are residents of St. Louis, or the surrounding area. The six member investment committee has four members in St. Louis, and two that are residents of North Carolina. There is also an asset management advisor, who resides in Atlanta, Georgia.
As far as Plan Valuation, Furniture Brands has a non-employee "Enrolled Actuary" responsible for performing the annual valuation of the plan. That individual resides in St. Louis and Furniture Brands maintains those records in St. Louis. Furniture Brands' ERISA counsel is located exclusively in St. Louis. As far as General Plan Administration, Lockard stated that all interpretative source documentation and employee records (such as employment criteria, records request, appeal processes, and salary histories) are maintained in St. Louis.
Furniture Brands assumed the above mentioned centralized administration of plans (which were originally administered in part by Lane) in 1994. Furniture Brands asserts that if this action were to proceed in the State of Mississippi, Furniture Brands will incur unnecessary administrative burdens in restructuring work schedules, expenses in traveling, meals and lodging for the above mentioned individuals. Defendants argue that Plaintiff will not have to bear similar expenses if this case is litigated in Missouri, and that "it is doubtful that he will have any other witnesses than himself." Furniture Brands also notes that any negligent management of the fund would have occurred in St. Louis.
Berry does not name any other potential witnesses who are from Mississippi, except a passing reference to a Donna Berry, but merely states that Berry is a resident of Lee County, Mississippi. Berry alleges in conclusory manner, that "[m]any, if not most of the books and records presented in this case will be drawn from the [L]ane Lee County facility." While the court notes that Berry is a Mississippi resident who filed suit in Mississippi, the court finds the above factors preponderate in favor of transfer. The most significant factor to consider when passing on a motion to transfer under Section 1404(a) is the convenience of the party and non-party witnesses. Willowbrook Foundation, Inc., 87 F. Supp.2d at 636; Darchuk v. Kellwood Co., 715 F. Supp. 1438, 1439 (W.D.Ark. 1988) (transferring case involving alleged denial of proper benefits under ERISA to Eastern District of Missouri where defendant identified ten individuals residing in St. Louis and their proposed areas of testimony, and the plaintiff identified himself as the only Arkansas witness). Furniture Brands has identified several individuals involved in managing and administering the fund who are residents of St. Louis. It further appears that most, if not all, of the documents related to the plan in this case are located there as well. Berry has not named one individual from Mississippi, besides himself, who will testify. As such, the court finds the Defendants have demonstrated that the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of the transfer.
In Plaintiff's response to motion to change of venue, it has both Terry Berry and Donna Berry listed as plaintiffs. Plaintiff Terry Berry does not expressly state who Donna Berry is, or whether it is likely that she would testify. As the Defendants noted in their reply, this is the first mention of Donna Berry, who was not listed as a named Plaintiff in the original filing of this case in state court, is not listed on the federal docket, nor was she joined in this action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is granted, and this matter shall be transferred to the Eastern District of Missouri.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendant's motion to transfer venue (docket entry 5) is GRANTED; and
(2) this cause is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
SO ORDERED.