Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-893.
June 23, 2003.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of June, 2003, this civil rights action having been transferred to the Civil Suspense File by Order dated August 20, 2002, on the ground that it arises out of an ongoing criminal case before Honorable John R. Padova, United States v. Donald Berry, Criminal No. 01-545, and the Court having been advised that the search which forms the basis of plaintiff's claims in the civil rights action was the subject of a suppression motion in the criminal case and that, by Order dated April 29, 2002, the suppression motion was denied, and that on September 18, 2002, plaintiff was convicted in the criminal case, and the Court concluding that there is no longer an impediment to proceeding further in the civil rights case and, specifically, adjudicating defendants' pending Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS ORDERED that the case is TRANSFERRED from the Civil Suspense File to the Court's active docket.
Upon consideration of the Motion of Detective Freddy Chaves and Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez for Summary Judgment (Document No. 15, filed November 7, 2002), and the related submissions of the parties, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of Detective Freddy Chaves and Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in FAVOR of defendants, Detective Freddy Chaves and Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez, and AGAINST plaintiff, Donald Berry.
The granting of the Motion of Detective Freddy Chaves and Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez for Summary Judgment is based on the following:
1. Plaintiff's civil rights action is based on his position that searches of his residence and motor vehicle on July 4, 2001, by defendants were unconstitutional;
2. Plaintiff's underlying criminal case, Criminal No. 01-545, was assigned to Honorable John R. Padova. In that case, plaintiff filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. Judge Padova conducted a suppression hearing on April 18, 2002. In an opinion dated April 29, 2002, Judge Padova denied the Motion to Suppress Evidence, ruling that the searches of plaintiff's residence and motor vehicle on July 4, 2001, were constitutional;.
3. The issues addressed in the suppression motion are identical to the issues raised in the instant civil rights action. In both cases the claims asserted by plaintiff related to the alleged unlawful search of his residence and vehicle. Specifically, plaintiff complained that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police, including the District Attorney's Office defendants, entered, searched and seized physical evidence from his residence and vehicle, supposedly without a warrant and probable cause;
4. On September 18, 2002, plaintiff was convicted at trial in the criminal case;
5. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is based on the argument that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising issues relating to the constitutionality of the searches and seizures on July 4, 2001, by reason of the September 18, 2002, conviction. It has long been held that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are fully applicable to civil rights actions brought under § 1983. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires (a) that the issue in question be identical to an issue actually litigated in the prior litigation; (b) that the prior litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and, (c) that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974);
6. The Court concludes that (a) the issues raised in the instant § 1983 action are identical to the issues actually litigated in the criminal case before Judge Padova and (b) plaintiff in the instant civil rights action was the defendant in the criminal case. Moreover, denial of a suppression motion followed by a conviction is a final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. See Nelson v. Howard, 810 F. Supp. 161, (E.D. Pa. 1992); Lomax v. Smith, 501 F. Supp. 119, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (1996) (a criminal conviction is deemed a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal); and,
7. The instant civil rights action is barred by reason of plaintiff s conviction in the criminal case.