Absent fraud or bad faith the arbitrators' determination is final and not subject to review. Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co. et al., Colo., 360 P.2d 980. Despite the plain, unambiguous carte blanche authority contained in the contracts Continental now insists that it was the mutual intention of the parties that the arbitrators be limited to the method used by Continental or to the "agreed-upon" facts.

The trial justice, after listening to the testimony elicited from the litigants, the gallery owner, and the other experts produced by the wife, ruled that the wife was bound by the Boston expert's appraisal. The trial justice rejected the testimony presented by the wife's experts and relied upon the well-established principle which states that when parties agree to have value fixed by appraisal, they must abide by their own agreement in the absence of such factors as fraud, collusion, or mistake. Hirt v. Hervey, 118 Ariz. 543, 578 P.2d 624 (App. 1978); Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co., 146 Colo. 112, 360 P.2d 980 (1961); Eliot v. Coulter, 322 Mass. 86, 76 N.E.2d 19 (1947); Ice Service Co. v. Henry Phipps' Estates, 245 N.Y. 393, 157 N.E. 506 (1927); Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wn.2d 509, 110 P.2d 182 (1941); 50 A.L.R.2d 1268 (1956 and Later Case Service); see also Low Estate Co. v. Lederer Realty Corp., 35 R.I. 352, 357, 86 A. 881, 882 (1913). The trial justice, in accepting the testimony of the Boston appraiser, rejected the wife's attempt to impeach the appraisal of her husband's "paintings."

And such was not done in the instant case. See Rhodig v. Cummings, 160 Colo. 499, 418 P.2d 521; Baldwin v. Schipper, 155 Colo. 197, 393 P.2d 363; Bigler v. Richards, 151 Colo. 325, 377 P.2d 552; Berry v. Asphalt Co., 146 Colo. 112, 360 P.2d 980; Johnston v. Johnston, 123 Colo. 28, 224 P.2d 949; and Parker v. Hilliard, 106 Colo. 187, 102 P.2d 734. In disposing of this latter ground of alleged error on the basis that there was a failure to make an offer of proof, we would not want to be understood as intimating that the trial court committed "technical error" in excluding the line of questioning to which objection was made.

Limited reviewability of the result of an agreed appraisal process is the rule in numerous jurisdictions. The following cases reflect the chronological development of the rule: King v. Dayton, 18 Ohio Dec. 567, 576–577 (1907) (requiring fraud, “great oppression,” or abuse of discretion on part of appraisers for court intervention); Ice Serv. Co. v. Henry Phipps' Estates, 245 N.Y. 393, 396, 157 N.E. 506 (1927) (appraisers' report “must be final, in the absence of fraud or a clear misconception of their duties,” especially where parties agreed to make action of appraisers final); Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wash.2d 509, 526–527, 110 P.2d 182 (1941) (citing 3 Williston on Contracts § 802 as “general rule” that “in the absence of mistake, arbitrary or capricious action, or fraud,” value fixed by appraisers is conclusive upon parties); Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co., 146 Colo. 112, 116, 360 P.2d 980 (1961) (where agreement was clear and unambiguous, accountant's determination was not subject to review in absence of fraud or bad faith); Hirt v. Hervey, 118 Ariz. 543, 545–546, 578 P.2d 624 (Ct.App.1978) (same); Brindle v. Brindle, 436 A.2d 718, 719–720 (R.I.1981) (same, citing to Eliot v. Coulter, supra, and referring to rule as “well-established principle”); AIU Ins. Co. v. Lexes, 815 A.2d 312, 314 (Del.2003); (same, citing to the principle as reiterated in Cambridge St. Metal Co. v.Corrao, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 155, 566 N.E.2d 1145 [1991] ).See also 14 Williston on Contracts § 42:29 (4th ed. 2000) (“In the absence of fraud or mistake, the price fixed by agreed appraisers is conclusive upon the parties.

Eliot v. Coulter, 322 Mass. 86, 76 N.E.2d 19, 21-22 (1947). See also Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co., 146 Colo. 112, 360 P.2d 980 (1961), in which the court refused to go behind an accountant's decision with respect to the factors bearing on "operating profit." The court there noted that the parties contractually agreed that an accountant would determine the existence and the amount of operating profit, if any, which would be divided among the parties.