Berntsen v. United States

25 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Collins

    61 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1932)   Cited 13 times

    But, in our opinion, it cannot properly be so interpreted. It must be read in connection with the plaintiff's letter to Senator Goff to which it is apparently a reply. If the former had contained a definite claim for benefits under the policy, the reply might be construed as a denial of liability. See Berntsen v. United States, 41 F.2d 663, 665 (C.C.A. 9). But in the absence of a claim on the policy, the statement in the assistant director's reply to Senator Goff can only reasonably be interpreted as courteous information from the veteran's whole record in the bureau. It is a matter of common knowledge that before the amendment of July 3, 1930, there was much uncertainty in many suits under this act to determine what constituted sufficient evidence of a disagreement to justify the bringing of the suit.

  2. Smith v. United States

    56 F.2d 636 (S.D. Iowa 1931)   Cited 8 times

    under a war risk insurance policy, to have these claims made under form 579 of the United States Veterans' Bureau, and, after investigation of such claim, to make a formal decision thereon and notify the soldier of the rejection of his claim and that a disagreement exists, and the court will take judicial notice of this procedure by the Veterans' Bureau. There is no claim in any of these suits that any formal denial of the claim and acknowledgement of a disagreement has been made by the Director or by any subordinate board authorized so to do by him. It has been held under the Veterans' Act of 1924 that a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of an action upon such a claim is a presentation of that claim to the Bureau for adjustment and adjudication and a rejection by the Bureau of the claim so made, and it is the issue thus raised between the claimant and the Bureau that Congress authorized to be presented to a court for adjudication. Manke v. United States (C.C.A.) 38 F.2d 624; Bernsten v. United States (C.C.A.) 41 F.2d 663, 665; United States v. Burleyson, supra. The plaintiffs herein rely upon the case of Dobbie v. United States, 19 F.2d 656, decided by the District Court for the Southern District of Texas, wherein the court held that an unreasonable delay by the Veterans' Bureau may amount to a denial of the claim and thus confer jurisdiction upon the courts.

  3. Galey v. United States

    104 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1939)

    The appellant relies upon generalizations in the cases to the effect that war risk policies do not lapse for non-payment of premiums so long as the government owes the veteran compensation which it has not paid. But these are all found in cases wherein it is clear that the veteran was suffering from a disability compensation for which was not limited by subsection 4 of § 202 at the time his policy lapsed. United States v. Hendrickson, 10 Cir., 53 F.2d 797; Berntsen v. United States, 9 Cir., 41 F.2d 663; United States v. Sellers, supra. Hollrich v. United States, D.C., 49 F.2d 445, 446, expressly recites that the veteran "Was then, on the rating of the Bureau, suffering from a compensable disability." In none of the references is there an adjudication of the right of set-off by reason of uncollected compensation to a veteran having a disability of less than 10% at the time of lapse, and it is a contradiction in terms to say that a disability is compensable when the statute forbids the payment of compensation by reason thereof.

  4. Gambill v. United States

    102 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1939)   Cited 4 times

    Final disagreement between the claimant and the government as to the merits of the claim was necessary before suit could be instituted, the Bureau being the instrumentality through negotiations for the allowance of such a claim. Such denial must be final, and administrative relief exhausted before action can be instituted, otherwise the statute of limitations is suspended. Harris v. United States, 4 Cir., 72 F.2d 982, 983; Berntsen v. United States, 9 Cir., 41 F.2d 663; United States v. Golden, 10 Cir., 34 F.2d 367; United States v. Rosie Bell Stand, 10 Cir., 102 F.2d 472. In United States v. Bollman, 8 Cir., 73 F.2d 133, 135, it is said:

  5. Marsh v. United States

    97 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1938)   Cited 21 times

    The question arises whether, in view of the rejection of a claim based on the policy in 1920, the running of limitations was suspended while the claim filed in 1931 was under consideration by the Bureau; but we think it clear that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The suit was upon the latter claim, not the former (Berntsen v. United States, 9 Cir., 41 F.2d 663); and the statute expressly provides for the suspension of the limitation during the period it is under consideration. If the Bureau had refused to consider it on the ground that a similar claim had been denied, a different question might be presented by analogy to the rule applicable to suspension of the running of the statute of limitations relating to appeals pending application for rehearing. Morse v. U.S., 270 U.S. 151, 154, 46 S.Ct. 241, 242, 70 L.Ed. 518. But the claim was substantially different from the one presented in 1919 and 1920 in that it was based on total and permanent disability and not death alone; and the Bureau did pass upon and reject it, just as though the former claim had not been filed. Under such circumstances, we think it clear that the rights of the claimants were not prejudiced by the filing of the former claim. As we said in the recent case of United States v. Powell, 4 Cir., 93 F.2d 788, 791, which is directly in point:

  6. Dobbins v. United States

    91 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1937)   Cited 3 times

    However, one of the conditions prescribed is that a disagreement must exist. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 445; McLaughlin v. U.S., supra; Chavez v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. Burleyson (C.C.A.9) 44 F.2d 502; Straw v. U.S. (C.C.A. 9) 62 F.2d 757; Berntsen v. U.S. (C.C.A. 9) 41 F.2d 663. The purpose of requiring a disagreement was clearly expressed in Mara v. U.S., supra, as follows:

  7. United States v. Arditto

    86 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1936)   Cited 3 times

    Upon appeal the same claims are relied on for reversal. In support of the first, appellant urges that claimant, having presented a meritless claim of one character and obtained denial thereof, has prosecuted this litigation upon a claim of wholly different character which was never presented to the Veterans' Bureau for consideration. The contention is made upon the authority of United States v. Knott, 69 F.2d 907 (C.C.A.6), and Berntsen v. United States, 41 F.2d 663 (C.C.A.9). A brief history is as follows: In 1892 Anthony Abboni was taken from a home for abandoned children in Italy. He was brought to America in 1907.

  8. United States v. Madigan

    85 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1936)   Cited 1 times

    "It is manifest that under section 305 a veteran who has become totally and permanently disabled is entitled to payment under his war-risk insurance if he has failed to collect compensation due him sufficient to pay the premium thereon." Berntsen v. United States, 41 F.2d 663, 665 (C.C.A.9). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said of section 305 in United States v. Sellers, 75 F.2d 623, 625: "This is not a provision for reinstatement, but a declaration that under the named circumstances the policy is not to be considered as ever having lapsed, followed by a direction for its payment as a matured claim.

  9. United States v. Martin

    80 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1936)   Cited 3 times
    In United States v. Martin, 10 Cir., 80 F.2d 460, the court restated the rule, now sustained by the decided cases, that recovery cannot be had on these policies unless, while the insurance is in force, the insured is afflicted with a disease which not only totally disabled him but from which there was no reasonable prospect of recovery if properly treated.

    As ground for reversal, appellant contends that the claim for insurance benefits was not sufficiently definite to support a disagreement, and that therefore the court is without jurisdiction. Of the cases cited, one arose before the 1930 amendment, Berntsen v. United States (C.C.A.9) 41 F.2d 663, one claim relied on in another case was for compensation and not insurance, and the other claim was under a different policy than the one in suit, Stender v. United States (C.C.A.8) 75 F.2d 579, and the other case was a mere inquiry as to status with no suggestion of a claim, Chavez v. United States (C.C.A.10) 74 F.2d 508. On July 30, 1930, the act conferring jurisdiction on the courts "in the event of disagreement as to claims" under war risk policies, was amended to define the term "claim" as follows: "The term `claim' as used in this section, means any writing which alleges permanent and total disability at a time when the contract of insurance was in force, or which uses words showing an intention to claim insurance benefits."

  10. United States v. Thomas

    85 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1936)

    The petition in this cause failing to allege facts showing a disagreement between the appellee and the United States Veterans' Bureau, as required by section 19 of the World War Veterans' Act 1924, as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445; and also failing to allege facts from which the court can determine whether the delay of the Veterans' Bureau in passing upon the appellee's claim was or was not the equivalent of a denial of the claim and a disagreement under the statute: It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded. Berntsen v. United States (C.C.A.) 41 F.2d 663; United States v. Densmore (C.C.A.) 58 F.2d 748; Griffin v. United States (C.C.A.) 60 F.2d 339; United States v. Alberty (C.C.A.) 63 F.2d 965; Fouts v. United States (C.C.A.) 67 F.2d 249; Stallman v. United States (C.C.A.) 67 F.2d 675; Ginochio v. United States (C.C.A.) 74 F.2d 42; United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750, 753, 24 L. Ed. 579. Upon remand the appellee will be permitted to amend his petition to show the necessary jurisdictional facts and thereafter to proceed to a retrial of the cause. Judgment of District Court reversed.