To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff generally must show: "(1) injury in fact, which must be (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and defendant's conduct; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Bernstein v. City of New York , 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). In ADA actions seeking injunctive relief, the Second Circuit has found standing "where (1) the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff's visits and the proximity of [the accommodation] to plaintiff's home, that plaintiff intended to return to the subject location."

. Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must prove that the identified injury presents a “real and immediate threat of future injury,” rather than simply alleging a past injury. Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015).

Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must prove that the identified injury presents a “real and immediate threat of future injury.” Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2004)).

. See, e.g., Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting “we cannot yet infer intent to return” to establish standing)

A plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief for disability discrimination “where (1) the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff s visits and the proximity of defendants' [services] to plaintiff s home, that plaintiff intended to return to the subject location.” Bernstein v. City' of New York, 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2013). A plaintiff must make a “substantial showing before determining that future encounters are likely.”

” Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 Fed.Appx. 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has made clear that “‘allegations of possible future injury' or even an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood' of future injury are insufficient to confer standing.”

The "intent to return" analysis is a "highly fact-sensitive inquiry." Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 F. App'x 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2015). To establish this factor, "[t]he plaintiff must allege specific facts that show a plausible intention or desire to return to the place but for the barriers to access."

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he "must also prove that the identified injury in fact presents a 'real and immediate threat of future injury,' often termed a 'likelihood of future harm.'" Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 F. App'x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he "must also prove that the identified injury in fact presents a 'real and immediate threat of future injury[,]' often termed a 'likelihood of future harm.'" Bernstein v. City of New York, 621 F. App'x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2004)). "In reviewing standing under the ADA, 'a broad view of constitutional standing' is appropriate because 'private enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.'"

"Applying this standard in Camarillo [v. Carrols Corp. , 518 F.3d 153 (2d. Cir. 2008)], for example, [the Second Circuit] found standing where (1) defendants had failed to effectively communicate menu items to the legally blind plaintiff—an alleged ADA violation, (2) this discriminatory treatment was likely to continue, and (3) the plaintiff's past visits and proximity to the restaurant made it reasonable to infer her intent to return." Bernstein v. City of New York , 621 F. App'x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2015). The "intent to return" element is critical; "Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief where they are unable to establish a ‘real or immediate threat’ of injury."