Bernardsville Quarry v. Bo. of Bernardsville

30 Citing cases

  1. Ivy Club v. Edwards

    943 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1991)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction where plaintiff had reserved its federal claim under England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, on appeal to the state court from an agency's decision

    Under England, it is not enough to simply refrain from litigating in state proceedings the federal constitutional questions that would be reserved for a subsequent federal trial. An effective England reservation requires that a reserving litigant notify the state tribunal of the federal questions. Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3057 (U.S. June 3, 1991) (No. 91-111). Ivy never informed the state administrative tribunals of its procedural due process and void for vagueness arguments.

  2. Lieber v. Marcus

    Civil Action No. 12-6549 (JLL) (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Consequently, if a plaintiff fails to litigate all her claims in an earlier proceeding, she is precluded from litigating them in a subsequent proceeding. See Bernardsville Quarry v. Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). As a preliminary matter, the Third Circuit has held that New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine does not "preclude the initiation of a second litigation before the first action has been concluded."

  3. Hannaway v. Paris

    Civil Action No. 07-2383 (JAG) (D.N.J. Sep. 11, 2008)

    The Entire Controversy Doctrine is essentially New Jersey's specific, and idiosyncratic, application of traditional res judicata principles."); see also Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Pursuant to the Entire Controversy Doctrine under New Jersey law, a plaintiff is precluded from litigating in a subsequent proceeding both claims that it actually litigated and claims that it could have litigated in an earlier proceeding.") (emphasis added).

  4. Kanter v. Scharf

    Civil Action No. 13-3157 (JLL) (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Consequently, if a plaintiff fails to litigate all her claims in an earlier proceeding, she is precluded from litigating them in a subsequent proceeding. See Bernardsville Quarry v. Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). Having carefully considered the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, it is clear to the Court that the claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint were either asserted in the context of the Kanter Declaratory Judgment action before the Law Division and Appellate Division, or could have been asserted, and were not. Both actions—the Kanter Declaratory Judgment action and the instant cause of action—are based on the same legal controversy, namely, Plaintiff's alleged ownership interest in the Property.

  5. Nubenco Enterprises v. Inversiones Barberena

    963 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1997)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that forum selection clause governing "[a]ny dispute arising from this agreement" was "one of limited authority"

    The key consideration here, however, is whether the claims could have been addressed in another litigation. See Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861, 112 S.Ct. 182, 116 L.Ed.2d 144 (1991). Both Watkins and Moitie, cited by Nubenco, discuss the doctrine of claim preclusion, which directs that a "final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action."

  6. Ricketti v. Barry

    775 F.3d 611 (3d Cir. 2015)   Cited 63 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discussing evolution of New Jersey Court Rules 4:30A and 4:5-1

    N.J. Ct. R. 4:5–1(b)(2); see Kent Motor Cars, 207 N.J. 428, 25 A.3d at 1037.See, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir.1991); DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (1995). All of the cases in this latter group were nonbinding, and some did not involve party joinder.

  7. Mothershed v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n

    463 F. App'x 777 (10th Cir. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    We concluded that England and its progeny "concern the doctrine of abstention - not subject matter jurisdiction." Mothershed, 390 F. App'x 779, 780 n.2; see also Bernardsville Quarry v. Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[A]n England reservation only applies where the district court abstains."). In so holding we rejected the argument that England was applicable to this case, which was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.

  8. Jasin v. Michael, Best & Friedrich, LLP

    409 F. App'x 575 (3d Cir. 2011)

    Id. at 81, 104 S.Ct. 892. See also Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 337 (3d Cir. 2004); Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1991); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1988). Thus, there is no error in the District Court's application of Wisconsin preclusion law.

  9. Studio v. Union City

    292 F. App'x 197 (3d Cir. 2008)   Cited 2 times
    Finding that "[w]hile two instances of City action occurred after the filing of the initial complaint," the entire controversy doctrine still barred subsequent claims because instances were part of continuous action which allegedly violated civil rights

    The entire controversy doctrine remains the law of the state of New Jersey, applicable in state court actions as well as cases requiring the application of New Jersey state law in this Court. See, e.g., Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 696 A.2d 633 (1997); DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494 (1995); Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2004); Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we will address only the first issue.

  10. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ.

    941 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991)   Cited 213 times
    Holding that "unlawful discrimination must be based on [the plaintiff's] objective appearance to others" because "[d]iscrimination stems from a reliance on immaterial outward appearances that stereotype an individual with imagined, usually undesirable, characteristics thought to be common to members of the group that shares these superficial traits"

    Thus it precludes not only claims which were actually brought in previous litigation, but also claims that could have been litigated in the previous litigation. Bernardsville Quarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). Under settled federal case law we must give the 1984 New Jersey state-court judgment the same preclusive effect that New Jersey would give that judgment.See id. at 929-930 (quoting Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984)).