Bernal v. People

109 Citing cases

  1. People v. Plancarte

    232 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    Declining to consider an issue defendant did not raise in his opening brief

    People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 103 (Colo. 2003). In Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002), the Colorado Supreme Court set out a two-part test to determine whether a photographic lineup violates a defendant's due process protections. First, the court must determine whether the defendant has proved that the photographic array was impermissibly suggestive; and second, after the defendant has met this burden, the state must show that the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

  2. People v. Shanks

    467 P.3d 1228 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    ¶ 44 "The ultimate question as to the constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact." Bernal v. People , 44 P.3d 184, 190 (Colo. 2002). Thus, "[w]hen reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we generally defer to the trial court's factual findings, but review its legal conclusions de novo."

  3. People v. McCants

    504 P.3d 1002 (Colo. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 2 At trial, McCants challenged the reliability of a police officer's out-of-court identification of him based on what he contends was an impermissibly suggestive photo array. Relying on People v. Howard , 215 P.3d 1134 (Colo. App. 2008), the trial court concluded that a police officer's identification is per se reliable and, therefore, exempt from a reliability analysis as otherwise required by Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 196, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), and Bernal v. People , 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002). ¶ 3 We reject the proposition that a different analytical framework applies when the reliability of a police officer's identification of a suspect from an allegedly suggestive photo array is challenged, and, to the extent this conclusion conflicts with Howard , we decline to follow it.

  4. State v. Borghesi

    66 P.3d 93 (Colo. 2003)   Cited 75 times
    Holding that the defendant's threatening two clerks, who were counting their employer's money at the single cash register, constitutes two aggravated robberies under Colorado law

    People v. Mack, 638 P.2d 257, 265 (Colo. 1981). In Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 190-91 (Colo. 2002), we outlined a two-part test to determine the admissibility of out-of-court photographic identifications. First, a court must consider whether the defendant has demonstrated that the array was impermissibly suggestive.

  5. People v. Singley

    412 P.3d 741 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that the accuracy of a witness’ physical description of the suspect is "more probative of weight than admissibility"

    ¶ 13 The supreme court has outlined a two-part test for determining the admissibility of out-of-court photographic identifications. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 190–91 (Colo.2002). ¶ 14 First, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the array was impermissibly suggestive.

  6. People v. Williams

    446 P.3d 944 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    ¶ 6 The constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures presents a mixed question of law and fact. Bernal v. People , 44 P.3d 184, 190 (Colo. 2002). Because defendant objected, we review for harmless error and will reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that any erroneous admission of the identification contributed to the conviction.

  7. People v. Beller

    411 P.3d 1145 (Colo. App. 2016)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that the "trial court's jury instructions identified aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, robbery, and attempted robbery as predicate offenses for the felony murder count"

    ¶ 54 To determine whether a statement bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, courts assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. See Bernal v. People , 44 P.3d 184, 197 (Colo. 2002). Factors relevant to a statement's trustworthiness include where, when, and how the statement was made; to whom the statement was made; what prompted the statement; what the statement contained; and what may have motivated the declarant to make the statement.

  8. People v. Bondsteel

    442 P.3d 880 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 23 times
    In People v. Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶ 53, 442 P.3d 880, aff'd, 2019 CO 26, 439 P.3d 847, the court reasoned that verdicts by which the defendant was acquitted of five charges and convicted of a lesser charge showed that the jury was able to separate the facts and legal theories involved in each offense.

    First, a defendant must show that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002). An identification is impermissibly suggestive if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

  9. People v. Owens

    97 P.3d 227 (Colo. App. 2004)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence that raised speculation but provided no "direct connection" between the alternate suspect and the crime

    If the defendant meets that burden, the evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution demonstrates that the identification was reliable despite the improper suggestiveness. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002). Because the resolution of defendant's due process challenge involves a mixed question of fact and law, we give deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact, but may give different weight to those facts and reach a different legal conclusion from the trial court.

  10. People v. Vialpando

    490 P.3d 648 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 7 times
    Assuming that the prosecutor's analogy of a folded American flag to describe reasonable doubt was improper, but concluding it was not plain error

    ¶ 72 The constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact. Bernal v. People , 44 P.3d 184, 190 (Colo. 2002) ; People v. Martinez , 2015 COA 37, ¶ 9, 378 P.3d 761. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, but "we may give different weight to those facts and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard."