Summary
In Berman v. Berman, 233 Ga. 76 (209 S.E.2d 622) (1974), service of a subsequent contempt application upon the contemnor's attorney was approved where a prior contempt application was still pending; i.e., the contemnor was being represented by the attorney in a pending proceeding.
Summary of this case from Austin v. AustinOpinion
29021.
SUBMITTED AUGUST 9, 1974.
DECIDED OCTOBER 8, 1974. REHEARING DENIED OCTOBER 25, 1974.
Contempt. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Norvell.
Manning, Read Richardson, Curtis R. Richardson, for appellant.
Kaler, Karesh Frankel, Glenville Haldi, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court holding the appellant in contempt of court and ordering him to pay additional interest and attorney fees.
This is the fifth appearance of this case in this court. See Berman v. Berman, 231 Ga. 216 ( 200 S.E.2d 870); Berman v. Berman, 231 Ga. 723 ( 204 S.E.2d 124); Berman v. Berman, 231 Ga. 727 ( 204 S.E.2d 125); and Berman v. Berman, 232 Ga. 342 ( 206 S.E.2d 447).
The present order stems from the failure of the appellant to pay the appellee the sum of $4,385.47 and the further sum of $804 as additional tuition due for one of the children's school expenses. Both of these items had previously been adjudicated by the trial court and affirmed by this court in one or more of the above stated previous appeals.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over him in that he was not personally served with a copy of the motion as required by law. Service of the motion was perfected upon the appellant's attorney of record as provided in Code Ann. § 81A-105 (b). Personal service was obtained upon the appellant in the original contempt proceeding and the order under review here is not an independent proceeding but merely a continuation of matters previously adjudicated and affirmed on appeal by this court. The trial court did not err under such circumstances in ruling that personal service was not required. The facts in this case distinguish it from Moore v. Moore, 229 Ga. 135 ( 189 S.E.2d 431) and similar cases.
Under the evidence presented the trial court was authorized to make an additional award of interest covering the period from the date of the trial court's order to the date the check was endorsed and in making additional award of attorney fees.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.