Summary
holding that while plaintiff was injured when a portion of plywood fence surrounding a construction site fell and struck him, defendants made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment demonstrating that the plywood fence was not an object being hoisted or that required securing for the undertaking, and that it did not fall because of the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device
Summary of this case from Barden v. City of N.Y.Opinion
2015-07751. Index No. 13230/07.
08-16-2017
Gerson BERMAN–REY, appellant, v. Sigifredo GOMEZ, et al., respondents.
Mirman, Markovits & Landau, P.C., New York, NY (Ephrem J. Wertenteil of counsel), for appellant. Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson, NY (Nicholas M. Cardascia and Glenn A. Kaminska of counsel), for respondents.
Mirman, Markovits & Landau, P.C., New York, NY (Ephrem J. Wertenteil of counsel), for appellant.
Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson, NY (Nicholas M. Cardascia and Glenn A. Kaminska of counsel), for respondents.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rudolph E. Greco, Jr., J.), entered June 18, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendants' cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1).
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when a portion of a plywood fence surrounding a construction site fell over and hit him on the head. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed as an assistant carpenter on a project to renovate and enlarge a residence owned by the defendants Sigifredo Gomez and Liliana Gomez. Sigifredo Gomez was the principal of a welding and ironworks contracting company, and the plywood fence surrounding the construction site was erected by employees of his company. Although no work was being performed on the date of the plaintiff's accident, the plaintiff alleges that he and his employer were at the construction site that day to retrieve tools. Following the accident, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). As relevant to this appeal, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted their cross motion. The plaintiff appeals from so much of the order as granted those branches of the defendants' cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1).
Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty placed upon owners and contractors to provide employees with a safe place to work (see Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Const. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 352, 670 N.Y.S.2d 816, 693 N.E.2d 1068 ; Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d 121, 127–128, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ). Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that he was injured at a work site as a result of a dangerous premises condition, a property owner's liability under Labor Law § 200 and for common-law negligence rests upon whether the property owner created the condition, or had actual or constructive notice of it and a reasonable amount of time within which to correct the condition (see Wadlowski v. Cohen, 150 A.D.3d 930, 931, 55 N.Y.S.3d 279 ; Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 130, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ). Here, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that they neither created the alleged dangerous premises condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence. The defendants' evidentiary submissions, which included the conflicting deposition testimony of the plaintiff and Sigifredo Gomez, failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants created the alleged dangerous condition, or had actual or constructive notice of its existence (see Chorzepa v. Brzyska, 143 A.D.3d 935, 39 N.Y.S.3d 518 ; Korostynskyy v. 416 Kings Highway, LLC, 136 A.D.3d 758, 759, 24 N.Y.S.3d 747 ; Doto v. Astoria Energy II, LLC, 129 A.D.3d 660, 663–664, 11 N.Y.S.3d 201 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ). However, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). To prevail on a cause of action pursuant to section 240(1) in a " ‘falling object’ case, the injured worker must demonstrate the existence of a hazard contemplated under that statute ‘and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein’ " ( Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 N.Y.3d 658, 662, 985 N.Y.S.2d 416, 8 N.E.3d 791, quoting Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ). This requires a showing that at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking (see Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 N.Y.3d at 662–663, 985 N.Y.S.2d 416, 8 N.E.3d 791 ; Outar v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 731, 732, 799 N.Y.S.2d 770, 832 N.E.2d 1186 ; Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ). Labor Law § 240(1)"does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker" ( Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 N.Y.3d at 663, 985 N.Y.S.2d 416, 8 N.E.3d 791 ). In support of their cross motion, the defendants made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action by demonstrating that the plywood fence was not an object being hoisted or that required securing for the purpose of the undertaking, and that it did not fall because of the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device (see Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., L.L.C., 22 N.Y.3d at 663, 985 N.Y.S.2d 416, 8 N.E.3d 791 ; Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ; Seales v. Trident Structural Corp., 142 A.D.3d 1153, 1156, 38 N.Y.S.3d 49 ; Vatavuk v. Genting N.Y., LLC, 142 A.D.3d 989, 990, 37 N.Y.S.3d 445 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.