In this case, Checkpoint can pursue no claim on the merits against Knogo since we have no jurisdiction over merits claims between private parties, as opposed to claims for costs and attorney fees and expenses in restricted circumstances. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Berdick v. United States, 222 Ct.Cl. ___, 612 F.2d 533 (1979); Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. United States, 176 Ct.Cl. 694, 364 F.2d 415 (1966); Berkeley v. United States, 149 Ct.Cl. 549, 276 F.2d 9 (1960); National City Bank v. United States, 143 Ct.Cl. 154, 163 F. Supp. 846 (1958). In any event, Ct.Cl. Rule 102(a)(2) permits the court to dismiss at plaintiff's instance without a stipulation between the parties, as Checkpoint concedes.

This is true where plaintiff sues as subrogee. "A subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor and has no better rights than possessed by the latter." Berkeley v. United States, 149 Ct.Cl. 549, 555, 276 F.2d 9, 12 (1960). See also, United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 67 S.Ct. 1599, 91 L.Ed. 2022 (1947); Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Erie Western Transportation Co., 117 U.S. 312, 321, 6 S.Ct. 750, 29 L.Ed. 873 (1886).

A careful reading of plaintiff's petition reveals that, in reality, she is asking this court to settle a cause of action against Albert Turner Co. and/or Bankers Trust. Whatever may be the merits of her claim against the third-party defendants, we must conclude that her suit lies beyond our jurisdiction. Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 149 Ct.Cl. 549 (1960); National City Bank of Evansville v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 846, 143 Ct.Cl. 154 (1958). Inasmuch as we have decided that neither plaintiff nor the intervenor may recover on the only grounds urged by them, it is apparent that no genuine issue remains in the case.

Petitioner claims as the subrogee of these laborers and materialmen, and "[a] subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor and has no better rights than those possessed by the latter." Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 12, 149 Ct.Cl. 549, 555 (1960). It is an elementary law of suretyship "that one cannot acquire by subrogation what another whose rights he claims did not have." United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 242, 67 S.Ct. 1599, 1603, 91 L.Ed. 2022 (1947), rev'g Munsey Trust Co. of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 976, 107 Ct.Cl. 131 (1946).

See 41 U.S.C. § 114(c). Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 149 Ct.Cl. 549 (1960). Section 14(c) of the act ( 41 U.S.C. § 114(c)) provides that:

As a further jurisdictional objection, the Government contends that while the amount allowed is a matter in which the United States has an interest, the claim is not one against the United States. Therefore, appellee contends, any effort to increase the Commission's award of attorneys' fees would be a claim against the tribe and not the United States, and not within the jurisdiction of this court, citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); National City Bank of Evansville v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 846, 143 Ct.Cl. 154 (1958); and in Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 149 Ct.Cl. 549 (1960). However, these cases deal with the general jurisdictional power of this court to enter money judgments against the United States, and not with the specific jurisdictional power of the court to review final determinations of the Commission and where required, remand thereto with appropriate directions.

Since the Bank's debt has been discharged in full, it no longer has a valid claim against the United States either for itself or as a trustee for Spiotta who, in any event, would have no greater rights than the Bank possesses under the first assignment. Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 149 Ct.Cl. 549 (1960); United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 67 S.Ct. 1599, 91 L.Ed. 2022 (1947). Beaconwear thus remains the only party which has a legal claim to the amount due under the contract. It alone signed the contract; all the arrangements and adjustments were negotiated and executed solely in its name and all administrative appeals were prosecuted in its name.

"(c) If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is filed in a district court, the district court shall, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to the Court of Claims, where the case shall proceed as if it had been filed in the Court of Claims on the date it was filed in the district court." The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of the claims of the appellants seeking to recover damages against the appellee, McLaughlin, Inc. Its jurisdiction is confined to actions or claims against the United States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1940), and Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9 (Ct. of Claims, 1960). Appellants properly invoked the jurisdiction of the United States District Court to recover damages against this party. To the extent that the work performed by McLaughlin, Inc., was done under its contract with the Bureau of Public Lands, and in conformity with the terms of said contract, no liability can be imposed upon it for any damages claimed to have been suffered by the appellants.

Also, decisions concerning admiralty actions note that "`a subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor and has no better rights than those possessed by the latter.'" Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, 206 F. Supp. 15, 19 (N.D.Ill. 1962), quoting Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 12 (Court of Claims 1960). Plaintiff Del Monte, as the assignee of a consignee, bases its action on the rights of a Japanese corporation.

The Government persuasively contends that the attempted joinder of a private litigant in a tax refund action is improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f); Lazier v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 241, 243 (D.N.D. 1948); DeVan v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 992, 995 (D.N.J. 1943); see also, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Berkeley v. United States, 276 F.2d 9, 12, 149 Ct.Cl. 549 (1960). Since the relief to which plaintiff is entitled may occur without the involvement of IBT, the company is obviously not necessary in order to achieve a just adjudication.