Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 328 Mo. 888 [ 42 S.W.2d 579, 582]; Young v. Management Eng. Co., (Mo.App.) 45 S.W.2d 927, 929. In the case of Johnson v. London Guarantee Accident Co., 217 Mass. 388 [ 104 N.E. 735], and Bergeron's case, 243 Mass. 366 [ 137 N.E. 739], there was a diseased condition due to lead poisoning and in Textileather Corp. v. Great American Ind. Co., 108 N.J.L. 121 [ 156 A. 840], death was caused by benzol poisoning. In all these cases the date of the injury was declared to be the time when the accumulated effects first incapacitated the employee for work.
The findings of the compensation commission are contradictory. Sec. 3320 (A) (L); Odanah Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (Wis., 1937), 275 N.W. 634; Antonio De Flippo's case, 284 Mass. 531, 188 N.E. 245 (Dec. 6, 1935); Federico's case, 283 Mass. 430; Johnson's case, 217 Mass. 388, 391; O'Donnell's case, 237 Mass. 164; Bergeron's case, 243 Mass. 366; Fabrizio's case, 274 Mass. 352; Langford's case, 278 Mass. 461; Johnson's case, 279 Mass. 461, 483; Irene Marsh et al. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 18 P.2d ___, 217 Cal. 338, 86 A.L.R. 563; Beaver v. Morrison Knudson (Idaho), 41 P.2d 605, 97 A.L.R. 1399; Rialto Lead Co., etc. v. State Industrial Comm., 112 Okla. 101, 240 P. 96, 44 A.L.R. 494; Hustus' case, 123 A.L.R. 514, 123 Me. 428; In re Milton's case, 120 A. 533, 120 Me. 437; In re Durney, 111 N.E. 166, 222 Mass. 461, 462; Kimlark Rug Corp. v. Stansfield (Wis.), 246 N.W. 424; North End Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 258 N.W. 439; Michigan Quartz Silica Co. v. Industrial Comm. (Wis.), 252 N.W. 167; Montell Granite Co. v. Industrial Comm., 278 N.W. 391; Evans v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 105 S.W.2d 1081; Kostron v. American Packing Co., 45 S.W.2d 871; Bridges v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co., 52 S.W.2d 582; Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. Railroad Co., 33 S.W.2d 179, 42 S.W.2d 579; Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 234 N.W. 756, 204 Wis. 493, 236 N.W.
Such a conclusion is based on the proposition that a compensable injury is an injury for which compensation is payable, and the date of the injury is not the time of the accident or occurrence causing injury, but the time when the right to compensation accrues. "We have ample authority for the foregoing interpretation of the law in such decisions as that of Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388 [ 104 N.E. 735]; Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366 [ 137 N.E. 739]; Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 96 Conn. 414 [ 114 A. 92]; Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428 [ 123 A. 514]; McKenna's Case, 117 Me. 179 [103 A. 69]; Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co., 99 Neb. 328 [156 N.W. 511]; Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 204 Wis. 493 [234 N.W. 756, 236 N.W. 378]; Martin-Laskin Co. v. Industrial Com., 172 Wis. 548 [179 N.W. 740]; Zurich etc. Co. v. Industrial Com., 203 Wis. 135 [233 N.W. 772]; Hornbrook-Price Co. v. Stewart, 66 Ind. App. 400 [118 N.E. 315]. "The latest decision brought to our notice is that in the case of Textileather Corp. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 108 N.J.L. 121 [ 156 A. 840], wherein the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held on October 30, 1931, `it is disability after exposure in the employer's business that creates the obligation to compensation', and the carrier at the time of disability to be liable.
As stated by this court in In Re Palama, 34 Haw. 65 (1937) at 67, "The great purpose of the Act in so far as it relates to the type of injury we are now considering is to provide means for compensating the employee for pecuniary loss arising out of his disability to work, and to accomplish that purpose the statute should receive a liberal construction." The words "as soon as practicable after the happening thereof" should not be interpreted to require claimant to act within any time limit after the injury, but rather to require a claimant to give an employer notice of the injury after he becomes aware or should have become aware that the injury he suffered may be compensable under our Workmen's Compensation Law. Columbus Mining Co. v. Childers, 265 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1954); Wheaton's Case, 310 Mass. 504, 38 N.E.2d 617 (1941); Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366, 137 N.E. 739 (1923). Appellant also contends that claimant terminated her employment on March 25, 1964, and being able to do light work did not seek other suitable employment elsewhere; and that the finding of the trial court that claimant "has been totally disabled for work since March 25, 1964, and continues to be temporarily totally disabled" was erroneous.
The quoted words have been construed as not limited to such injuries as are caused by contact with some physical object, Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, 225, Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388, Burn's Case, 218 Mass. 8, 12, Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 489, 492, Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 499, Crowley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 373, 374, Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516, 517, 518; and awards have been held to have been properly made, as here, for a personal injury not attributable to any physical impact. See, for example, Brightman's Case, 220 Mass. 17; McPhee's Case, 222 Mass. 1; Mooradjian's Case, 229 Mass. 521; Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366; Johnson's Case, 279 Mass. 481; Zucchi's Case, 310 Mass. 130; Griffin's Case, 315 Mass. 71; Mercier's Case, 315 Mass. 238. The principle enunciated in the Spade case cannot be extended to cases arising under the workmen's compensation act.
Case of Carroll, 225 Mass. 203, 207, 114 N.E. 285. Cases in which it has been held that the board was warranted in taking the date incapacity began as the date of the injury are cases where there was no finding of the exact date of the injury ( Atamian's Case, 265 Mass. 12, 16, 163 N.E. 194) or where there was evidence that the cause of the injury was cumulative, as here, and, furthermore, that the employment continued to be a contributing cause of such injury up to the date incapacity began. See In re Johnson, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N.E. 735; Case of Bergeron, 243 Mass. 366, 137 N.E. 739; Case of Johnson, 279 Mass. 481, 181 N.E. 761. Where, in the case of a cumulative cause of injury there has been a change of insurer, it has been deemed essential that the employee, in order to establish the liability of the later insurer to pay compensation, prove the existence of a causal relation between theemployment during the period covered by its policy and the employee's injury. Case of Fabrizio, 274 Mass. 352, 174 N.E. 720; Case of Langford, 278 Mass. 461, 463, 180 N.E. 228; Case of De Filippo, 284 Mass. 531, 534, [ 188 N.E. 245.] The implication is that where no such causal relation exists the employee's injury which results in his incapacity is to be regarded as having occurred prior to that period and not at the date incapacity began." (Italics added.)
Applying this rule, the liability rests upon the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company upon the admitted facts. Secs. 3713, 3716, R.S. 1939; Allen v. Raftery, 174 S.W.2d 345; Renfro v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 130 S.W.2d 165; Leonard v. Fisher Body Co., 137 S.W.2d 604; North End Foundry Co. v. Ind. Comm., 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439; Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756, 204 Wis. 500, 236 N.W. 378; Odanah Iron Co. v. Ind. Comm., 226 Wis. 20, 275 N.W. 634; Employers Mutual Lia. Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 217 N.W. 738, 196 Wis. 410; Marsh v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 86 A.L.R. 563; DeFillippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531, 188 N.E. 245; Federico's Case, 283 Mass. 430, 186 N.E. 599; Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N.E. 735; O'Donnell's Case, 237 Mass. 164, 133 N.E. 621; Donahue's Case, 188 N.E. 149; Bergson's Case, 43 Mass. 366, 137 N.E. 739; Rossi v. Thomas F. Jackson Co., 117 Conn. 603, 169 A. 617; Natural Products Ref. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 10 A.2d 138, 123 N.J.L. 522; Larkow v. Standard Mirror Co., 295 N.Y.S. 524, 251 A.D. 762; Lanzetta v. Allied Decorating Co., 24 N.Y.S.2d 829, 261 A.D. 861. [560] HYDE, J.
Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223. Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366. Panagotopulos's Case, 276 Mass. 600, 604. Johnson's Case, 279 Mass. 481. Wentworth's Case, 284 Mass. 479. Rodrigues's Case, 296 Mass. 192. Robinson's Case, 299 Mass. 499.
Injury and compensable disability are more in the nature of synonymous terms than are date of injury and date of the accident. Thus, in Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp. 96 Conn. 414, 114 A. 92, it is said: `A compensable injury is an injury for which compensation is payable, and the date of such an injury is not the time of the accident or occurrence causing the injury, but the time * * * when the right to compensation accrues.' See, also, Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366, 137 N.E. 739; Johnson v. London G. A. Co. 217 Mass. 388, 104 N.E. 735; In re Brown, 228 Mass. 31, 116 N.E. 897; In re McCaskey, 65 Ind. App. 349, 117 N.E. 268; Johansen v. Union Stock-Yards Co. 99 Neb. 328, 156 N.W. 511; Stolp v. Department of Labor and Industries, 138 Wn. 685, 245 P. 20. To the same effect are our own decisions.
This case is similar to a number of cases in which it has been held that a gradual accumulation of foreign material in the employee's system due to the conditions of his employment, causing definite physical harm, may be found to have brought about a compensable injury sustained at the time when the employee became unable to work. Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388. O'Donnell's Case, 237 Mass. 164. Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass. 366. Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497. Fabrizio's Case, 274 Mass. 352. Langford's Case, 278 Mass. 461. De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531. Minns's Case, 286 Mass. 459.