Opinion
No. C01-1994Z
February 25, 2002
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss registration of judgment and vacate writs of garnishment, docket no. 15. Because this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court GRANTS this motion and DISMISSES this action, without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Bergen Industries, Bolero Shipping Company, and Rybcomflot, (collectively "Bergen") are Russian companies who owned a number of fishing boats. Defendant Joint Stock Holding Company Dalmoreproduct ("DMP") chartered at least three of Bergen's vessels. When DMP became delinquent in its payments Bergen terminated the charter agreement and sought return of the vessels. Pursuant to the forum selection clause in the charter agreement, Bergen sued DMP in the English High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench, which rendered judgment for Bergen for over $48 million and ordered the return of the vessels. Bergen registered this judgment with this Court in October, 2001. Bergen subsequently applied for, and received, writs of garnishment against several persons and entities in this district. DMP challenges this action by bringing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and any claims asserted must fall within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, a Russian company seeks to enforce a British judgment against another Russian company pursuant to a state statute. Although substantive law indicates that this judgment may be enforceable, it is not enforceable by this Court.
An action to enforce a foreign judgment is a separate civil action imposing its own jurisdictional requirements. See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 481 cmt. g, h (1987). As there is no allegation of diversity here, plaintiffs must base subject matter jurisdiction on some form of federal question. The full faith and credit clause does not provide jurisdiction over this claim, see Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 883 (4th Cir. 1992), nor is there an allegation of a treaty providing jurisdiction. While 28 U.S.C. § 1963, permits the registration of judgments from other districts, it does not specifically permit registration of judgments from foreign countries. See Fox Painting Co. v. N.L.R.B., 16 F.3d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Nothing in the language of section 1963 grants authority to a district court to register judgments of any courts other than other district courts or the Court of International Trade."). Plaintiffs seek to base subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds: admiralty and a federal question arising under the federal common law. Neither theory reaches far enough.
Plaintiffs argue that because the underlying facts centered on a charter agreement, the action arises under this Court's admiralty jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' Response, docket no. 33, a 3-4. But this action no longer involves a maritime dispute; the action on the charter contract unquestionably maritime in character, was litigated in England. The separate question here is whether the English judgment should be enforced. This is a unique civil action untouched by the substantive law leading up to judgment. Admiralty does not supply jurisdiction over this action.
Next, plaintiffs argue that there is jurisdiction because this matter arises under the federal common law relating to judgments. Plaintiffs' Response, docket no. 33, at 4. This argument turns on the principle of comity by which the Supreme Court has recognized that judgments from foreign countries may be enforced despite the lack of enforcement under the full faith and credit clause or treaty. This principle stems from the Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which frames the analysis by which a foreign judgment may be given effect, but which does not independently create jurisdiction. The Hilton analysis is thus closely analogous to — if not a form of — preclusion analysis, which is substantive law dependent upon, not an extension of, a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Treatment of comity with respect to British judgments in closely related cases shows that the Court must first consider the jurisdictional limits imposed by Article III before it may consider prudential doctrines like comity. In British Midland Airways Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit held that judgments rendered by British courts are entitled to enforcement under Hilton's comity analysis. However, the court stated that "[b]ecause this is a diversity action, the law of the forum with respect to comity should be applied." British Midland Airways, 497 F.2d at 871 n. 2. In Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit held that a British judgment was enforceable under Illinois's Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, the same act under which plaintiffs seek to enforce the judgment here. However, before engaging in analysis under the Illinois Act and comity doctrines including Hilton, the court began its opinion by stating, "[t]hese are diversity suits brought in the federal district court." Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 475. IfHilton's international comity analysis carried its own jurisdictional predicate, these courts would need not have been bound by diversity to apply state law.
Plaintiffs are correct in noting that subject matter jurisdiction "will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972). But plaintiffs here are not asserting a federal claim. Instead, they have registered the judgment pursuant to Washington's Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, R.C.W. §§ 6.40.010-915, and are seeking to enforce the judgment under that statute. Thus, there is not even a question of federal common law here.
CONCLUSION
The proper forum in this district for this claim between these parties is Washington's state courts. There is simply no Article III predicate for this claim. Therefore, this Court cannot enforce the British judgment. Because this Court never has had jurisdiction over this claim, all writs of garnishment based upon the registered judgment are without valid basis and accordingly must be quashed and all subsequently filed (and currently pending) motions dismissed as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.