On appeal, the defendant argues that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed his appeal for lack of a final judgment. Specifically, he relies on this court's endorsement of bright line rules in the final judgment context in Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. at 522–23, 544 A.2d 634, as explained in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 498–500, 715 A.2d 743 (1998). The defendant contends that there was a final judgment in this case because all that remained for the trial court to do was set the amount of attorney's fees, despite the fact that those fees were awarded in the context of common-law punitive damages rather than pursuant to a statute.
(Emphasis in original.) The defendant further emphasizes that this court stated in Benvenuto v. Mahajan , 245 Conn. 495, 501, 715 A.2d 743 (1998), that this bright line rule "applies across the board, even to cases that might not seem particularly apt for it." To this end, the defendant contends that, in Hylton , this court considered how the bright line rule adopted in Paranteau related to the well established principle that judgments rendered on liability alone are not final for purposes of appeal until the amount of damages is determined and, moreover, that the Appellate Court's reliance on its cases applying footnote 11 of Paranteau as a basis for dismissing the appeal was misplaced because those cases were decided prior to Hylton . The defendant argues that the circumstances of its appeal are more factually similar to those of Hylton than the circumstances considered in footnote 11 of Paranteau because, "[i]n this case, as in Hylton , the Superior Court has already resolved the legal question of whether the plaintiff has the right to [file] a motion to recover attorney's fees as a form of damages.
After discussing Hylton , our Supreme Court, in Ledyard , returned to Paranteau and further limited the application of footnote 11 of that decision: "Footnote 11 of Paranteau can be explained as part of an effort to save jurisdiction over that appeal given the facts of that particular case, which predated our clarification in Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. , 226 Conn. 757, 762–63, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993), that the twenty day time limitation for filing an appeal set forth in Practice Book § 63-1 (a) is not subject matter jurisdictional. See Benvenuto v. Mahajan , [245 Conn. 495, 503–504 and n.4, 715 A.2d 743 (1998) ]. Nevertheless, footnote 11 is in tension with Paranteau's bright line rule as it has been extended in Benvenuto and Hylton .
Other jurisdictions have followed suit, opting for a bright-line rule that an unresolved request for attorney fees does not prevent finality of a judgment disposing of all issues in the underlying substantive claim. See, e.g.,State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So.2d 893, 899 (Ala.2002); Harold Ives Trucking, Co. v. Pro Transp., Inc., 341 Ark. 735, 737, 19 S.W.3d 600, 602 (2000) (per curiam); Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 521-23, 544 A.2d 634, 637-39 (1988), abrogated on other grounds as stated inBenvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 504 n. 4, 715 A.2d 743, 747 n. 4 (1998); McGurn v. Scott, 596 So.2d 1042, 1043-44 (Fla.1992); Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 Kan. 371, 373-74, 789 P.2d 211, 213-15 (1990); Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 337-38, 670 A.2d 472, 477-78 (1996); Midcom, Inc. v. Oehlerking, 2006 SD 87, ¶ ¶ 19-20, 722 N.W.2d 722, 727-28; Wlasiuk v. Whirlpool Corp., 76 Wash.App. 250, 253-55, 884 P.2d 13, 15-18 (1994).
“It is well settled that a judgment rendered only upon the issue of liability without an award of damages is interlocutory in character and not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.... Nevertheless, a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 313 Conn. at 478–79, 97 A.3d 970 ; see also Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 501, 715 A.2d 743 (1998) (recognizing that attorney's fees award is not part of supplemental postjudgment claim, but, rather, is integral to strict foreclosure judgment on merits still held to be severable from that judgment on merits for purposes of finality).In Hylton, the trial court had rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and it awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $342,648.
First, Barretta lost in state court by virtue of the judgment in strict foreclosure. See Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 715 A.2d 743, 745-47 (Conn. 1998) (judgment in strict foreclosure a final judgment despite remaining issues regarding attorney's fees); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review of Connecticut state court judgment in strict foreclosure). Second, Barretta claims that she will be injured by the foreclosure of her property, which was authorized by the state court. Third, the objections she asserts to the bankruptcy court's order collaterally attack the state court judgment and would effectively require the district court to declare the state court judgment void for her to prevail on the merits of her appeal. See Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002).
Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 42-110g(d). Such an award is available even for attorney's fees incurred in post-judgment proceedings, Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 502 (1998), and thus is certainly available in pre-judgment proceedings regarding confirmation of an arbitrator's award. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees for litigating Defendant's challenge to the arbitrator's award.
A judgment of strict foreclosure is a final judgment, subject to an appeal filed within twenty (20) days. Willow Funding Co. v. Grencom Assoc., 63 Conn. App. 832, 836-37 (Conn. App. 2001) (citing Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 501 (Conn. 1998)); Practice Book § 63-1. The Debtor's opportunity to appeal the judgment expired on February 25, 2019.
The fact that the trial court's decision contemplated further orders regarding the details of the sale does not affect the finality of the judgment under these circumstances. See, e.g., Benvenuto v. Mahajan , 245 Conn. 495, 501, 715 A.2d 743 (1998) (judgment of strict foreclosure is final for purposes of appeal, even though recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for litigation, and, thus, total amount of debt, remained to be determined); Bank of New York Mellon v. Mazzeo , 195 Conn. App. 357, 362 n.6, 225 A.3d 290 (2020) ("[a] judgment ordering a foreclosure by sale is a final judgment for purposes of appeal even if the court has not set a date for the sale"); Willow Funding Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates , 63 Conn. App. 832, 836–38, 779 A.2d 174 (2001) (same); see also Moran v. Morneau , 129 Conn. App. 349, 357, 19 A.3d 268 (2011) (postjudgment orders contemplated by trial court's decision were interlocutory decisions), overruled in part on other grounds by Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC , 335 Conn. 586, 239 A.3d 1162 (2020). Subsequent to this court's order for supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the trial court made a finding as to the defendants’ debt as of the date of its decision, the parties agreed that, notwiths
Under the bright-line rule of Paranteau , requests for attorney's fees categorically "will be treated separately" from decisions on the merits regardless of whether the "particular ... claim for attorney's fees was collateral to, or an integral part of, the judgment on the merits." Paranteau v. DeVita , supra, 208 Conn. at 522–23, 544 A.2d 634 ; see also Hylton v. Gunter , supra, 313 Conn. at 483–84, 97 A.3d 970 ; Benvenuto v. Mahajan , 245 Conn. 495, 498–500, 715 A.2d 743 (1998). But see Hylton v. Gunter , supra, at 485 n.13, 97 A.3d 970 (noting that "attorney's fees that themselves form the basis of a plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages, such as those occasioned by an insurer's breach of its duty to defend, are conceptually different and must be established in order to have an appealable final judgment").