Thompson v. Lagerquist, supra. See also Benton v. Modern Finance c. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979); Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apts., 233 Ga. 208 ( 210 S.E.2d 722) (1974); Piggly-Wiggly Ga. Co. v. May Investing Corp., 189 Ga. 477 ( 6 S.E.2d 579, 126 ALR 1465) (1939). I respectfully dissent, because I think that the majority opinion, contrary to prior Georgia case law, puts a chink in that foundation today.

A construction of Code Ann. § 67-1505 which, under the facts of this case, would allow notice by mail to be the legal equivalent of personal service would cause that section to run afoul of our concept of due process. Benton v. Modern Finance Invest. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979); Melton v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 400 ( 249 S.E.2d 82) (1978). Although the trial court has a duty under Code Ann § 67-1505 to pass upon the legality of the notice given, this court ultimately must decide on the facts of each particular case whether the notice given was or was not legally adequate under our statutes and fundamental law.

In order to comply with state and federal concepts of due process, the method of service must be “reasonably calculated to give [a defendant] actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” Melton v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 400, 403, 249 S.E.2d 82 (1978) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) ); see also Benton v. Modern Finance & Inv. Co., 244 Ga. 533, 534, 261 S.E.2d 359 (1979) (method of service may be constitutionally defended on ground it is “reasonably certain to inform those affected or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes”) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (punctuation omitted)). Our Supreme Court previously declared unconstitutional as violative of due process a statute that authorized service by merely leaving a copy at the defendant's most notorious place of abode.

This fact addresses the concern expressed by Benton that otherwise the defendant might be absent from the abode for an extended length of time or might be in the process of moving from one residence to another, or that the copy might be destroyed by inclement weather or be removed by other persons. Supra, 244 Ga. at 535. Benton v. Modern Finance Investment Co., 244 Ga. 533, 535 ( 261 SE2d 359) (1979).Fain v. Hutto, 236 Ga. 915, 917 (1) ( 225 SE2d 893) (1976).

[Cit.]" Benton v. Modern Finance c. Co., 244 Ga. 533, 534 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979). Service of process was not perfected on Charming Shoppes, Inc., because as a foreign corporation not doing business in Georgia it should have been served under the provisions of OCGA § 14-2-504.

The record does not reflect that any further efforts were made to serve Thomas. Tacking service to the door of Thomas' residence was clearly not sufficient to comply with the personal service requirements of OCGA § 9-11-4 (d). Benton v. Modern Finance c. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979). The failure to accomplish personal service in a manner which complies with the statutory scheme requires that the complaint against Thomas be dismissed. Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418 ( 383 S.E.2d 108) (1989).

Indeed, if the statute were construed otherwise, it would undoubtedly be violative of the constitutional due process requirement that service of process be effected in a manner which is reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the action and to afford him an opportunity to present his defenses. See generally Benton v. Modern Fin.c. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979), citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank c. Co., 339 U.S. 306 ( 70 SC 652, 94 L.Ed.2d 865) (1949). Accord Davis v. Hybrid Indus., 142 Ga. App. 722 (1) ( 236 S.E.2d 854) (1977).

To give a court personal jurisdiction over a party, valid service of process is required unless it is waived. Benton v. Modern Fin. c. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359) (1979). If service is not made in conformity with OCGA § 9-11-4, any judgment against the defendant is void.

Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 150 ( 121 S.E.2d 22). There can be no serious argument that notice is the very bedrock of due process. Benton v. Modern Finance c. Co., 244 Ga. 533 ( 261 S.E.2d 359); Thompson v. Lagerquist, 232 Ga. 75 ( 205 S.E.2d 267). The record in this case also makes it quite clear that the question of paternity was never in dispute in the initial hearing and Ms. Fluker has never been given the opportunity to present evidence as to the paternity of her children. We can but conclude therefore that the notice given Ms. Fluker in relation to the final appeal was not sufficient to apprise her of each and every claim asserted by DHR so as to allow her to prepare any defense she may have had.

The method of service properly authorized under Code Ann. § 22-403 is not subject to constitutional attack because it is "in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected [and is] not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes." Benton v. Modern Finance c. Co., 244 Ga. 533, 534 ( 261 S.E.2d 359). If the defendant HMZ had complied with the statutory requirement to maintain a registered office and registered agent, and had notified the Secretary of State of its change of address, it would have had service of the suit.