ΒΆ 59 But some "negligent driving" could be reasonably foreseeable. Take Bentley v. Saunemin Township , 83 Ill. 2d 10, 46 Ill.Dec. 129, 413 N.E.2d 1242 (1980). The plaintiff's decedent was driving on a gravel road when he approached State Highway 47.
Zerbenski v. Tagliarino, 67 Ill. App.3d 166, 172, 384 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1978). There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill.2d 10, 17, 413 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (1980). Moreover, a defendant may be held liable even if his negligence is not the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, so long as his conduct contributed in whole or in part to the injury. Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School, 123 Ill. App.3d 423, 430, 462 N.E.2d 858, 863 (1984).
See Gilmore v. Stanmar Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 651, 658, 199 Ill.Dec. 189, 633 N.E.2d 985 (1994). ΒΆ 31 We further note that following oral arguments held in this case, we granted the City's motion to cite supplemental authority, including Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill.2d 10, 46 Ill.Dec. 129, 413 N.E.2d 1242 (1980). As stated therein, β[t]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.β
Defendant maintains that where plaintiff is the driver in the car on the left at an uncontrolled intersection, his failure to yield the right-of-way is the proximate cause of the collision and that, as a matter of law, the failure to maintain a stop sign cannot be a proximate cause of the collision. β’ 1, 2 It is fundamental that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. ( Bentley v. Saunemin Township (1980), 83 Ill.2d 10, 17, 413 N.E.2d 1242, 1246.) The question of proximate cause is generally one of fact and can only be a question of law when the facts are not only indisputable but are also such that there can be no difference in the judgment of reasonable men as to the inferences to be drawn from them.
Seeid. at 404. In Bentley v. Saunemin Township , 83 Ill.2d 10, 46 Ill.Dec. 129, 413 N.E.2d 1242 (1980), an administrator sued the township and highway commissioner on behalf of the estate of a passenger who was killed in an automobile collision at an intersection at which a stop sign was obscured by foliage. Seeid. , 46 Ill.Dec. 129, 413 N.E.2d at 1243.
β’ 2 The question of division of responsibility between various governmental agencies for road maintenance is generally one of law for the courts. ( Bentley v. Saunemin Township (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 598, 602, 396 N.E.2d 285, 288, aff'd (1980), 83 Ill.2d 10, 413 N.E.2d 1242.) In the instant case, to establish defendant was negligent, plaintiff must demonstrate defendant had a duty to maintain the roadway and intersection in question, there was a breach of the duty, and an injury proximately resulted from that breach.
[Citation.]'" Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. (1976), 64 Ill.2d 380, 394-95. β’ 1 The same concept was applied in Bentley v. Saunemin Township (1980), 83 Ill.2d 10, 413 N.E.2d 1242, in which the supreme court held that the township was negligent for not trimming the branches at an intersection. It said the negligence was a proximate cause of the death of a passenger in an automobile which collided with another vehicle at the intersection.
According to the Seventh Circuit, "[a] defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury if all events following that conduct, including any actions by the plaintiff, are its reasonably foreseeable results." Suzik v. Sea-Land Corp., 89 F.3d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Bently v. Saunemin Twp., 83 Ill. 2d 10 413 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. 1980). ITW contends that Lott cannot establish proximate cause because she did not heed the aforementioned warnings to keep hands out and to disconnect the electrical power at the wall-mounted disconnect switch before cleaning.
Mack, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 57. There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury (Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill. 2d 10, 17 (1980)), and a defendant may be held liable even if his negligence is not the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, so long as his conduct contributed in whole or in part to the injury. Mack, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 57. ΒΆ 44 "It is the general rule in Illinois and other jurisdictions that a person has no duty to anticipate the criminal acts of third parties." Bence v. Crawford Savings & Loan Ass'n, 80 Ill. App. 3d 491, 493 (1980).
Although Cotton may have made the final decision to fire plaintiff, the disclosure by Golden to Harris could still have been found to have been a cause of his termination. See Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill.2d 10, 17, 413 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (1980). In short, plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to find the element of breach.