Under the weight of authority as it now exists, the test as to what constitutes "casual" employment is not the length of the employment, but the nature of the employment. Sabella v. Brazileiro, 86 N.J.L. 5051, 91 A. 1032; Schaeffer v. De Grottola, 85 N.J. L., 444, 89 A. 921; American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 99, 119 N.E. 902; Caca v. Woodruff, 70 Ind. App. 93, 123 N.E. 120; Miller Lux, Inc., v. Industrial Accident Commission, 32 Cal.App. 250, 162 P. 651; Dyer v. James Black Masonry Contracting Co., 192 Mich. 400, 158 N.W. 959; Scott v. Payne Bros., Inc., 85 N.J.L. 446, 89 A. 927; Mullen v. Walker, 105 N.J.L. 199, 143 A. 363; Jordan v. Weinman, 167 Wis. 474, 167 N.W. 810; Holman Creamery Assn. v. Industrial Commission, 167 Wis. 470, 167 N.W. 808; Gotchy v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 49 N.D. 915, 194 N.W. 663; Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Pfister v. Doon Electric Co., 199 Iowa 548, 202 N.W. 371; Gaynor's Case, 217 Mass. 86, 104 N.E. 339, L.R.A., 1916A, 363; Johnson v. Choate, 284 Ill. 214, 119 N.E. 972. Under the general doctrine of these cases, the test is whether the employment was in the usual course of the employer's business. If so, the employment is held to be not "casual".
Keeping the turkeys, chickens, and cows which relator did was surely a part of his farming operations. True, a farmer can embark in some other business or vocation as in Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N.W. 106; Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Durrin v. Meehl, 163 Minn. 325, 204 N.W. 22. But it must be of some magnitude and not a mere temporary incident of farming. It may be claimed that relator was in the summer resort business. It does not appear how the two cottages were used. Relator catered to fishermen, having 14 boats for rent. But the evidence does not support a finding that respondent was in any employment growing out of keeping the so-called summer resort. The real contention on the trial and here is that relator went into the business of cutting and selling wood.
A person or corporation may be engaged in two or more businesses or occupations. Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Durrin v. Meehl, 163 Minn. 325, 204 N.W. 22. The farm was not a necessary part of the creamery business. Undoubtedly it was thought that in its operation, if a number of turkeys and hogs were kept thereon, a profitable use might be made of a large part of a by-product of the creamery — the buttermilk.
The employment must be outside the ordinary business of the employer in order to take a person out of the ranks of employees. Mitchell v. Maine Feldspar Co. 121 Me. 455, 118 A. 287, 33 A.L.R. 1447; Northfield v. District Ct. 131 Minn. 352, 155 N.W. 103, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 866, 11 N.C.C.A. 366; Nenoy v. Torkelson (Minn.) 201 N.W. 312; Gotchy v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 194 N.W. 663; Wass v. Bracker Constr. Co. 240 N.W. 464. In construing a statute, the usual and ordinary definition of the word "casual" as given by lexicographers is usually accepted.
the usual course of that business within the meaning of our Workmen's Compensation Act. Without giving our approval to all of the following cases, in principle they support the conclusion we have reached, and some go much further: Davis v. Industrial Commission, 297 Ill. 29, 15 A.L.R. 732, 130 N.E. 333; Allen v. American Milling Co., 209 Ill. App. 73; Storrs v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 595, 121 N.E. 267; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 45 Cal.App. 328, 187 P. 452; De Carli v. Manchester Public Warehouse Co., 107 Conn. 359, 60 A.L.R. 1191, 140 A. 637; Holmen Creamery Assn. v. Industrial Commission, 167 Wis. 470, 167 N.W. 808; Gross Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 167 Wis. 612, 167 N.W. 809; Wagner v. Wooley, 85 Ind. App. 259, 152 N.E. 856; Gotchy v. North Dakota Workmen's Com. Bureau, 49 N.D. 915, 194 N.W. 663; HygeiaIce Coal Co. v. Schaeffer, 152 Md. 231, 136 A. 548; Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 660, 230 P. 1; Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312.)
We find ample evidence to sustain the findings of the commission that plaintiff's employment was in the usual course of the business or trade of the employer. See State ex rel. Foss v. Nelson, 145 Minn. 123, 176 N.W. 164; Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N.W. 106; Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Durrin v. Meehl, 163 Minn. 325, 204 N.W. 22; Workman v. Endriss, 164 Minn. 199, 204 N.W. 641; Reed v. Township of Monticello, 164 Minn. 358, 205 N.W. 258; Holmen Creamery Assn. v. Industrial Comm. 167 Wis. 470, 167 N.W. 808; Archbishop v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 194 Cal. 660, 230 P. 1. The order of the industrial commission is affirmed.
In commenting on the cases of Miller Lux, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 7 A.L.R. 1291, 1296, and Uphoff v. Industrial Bd. 271 Ill. 312, 111 N.E. 128, L.R.A. 1916E, 329, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1, and cases cited in the notes thereto, this court said [ 154 Minn. 501]: "In all of them the work was primarily agricultural in its nature and was being done in the usual course of the business of farming." In Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312, the employer was engaged principally in farming, but incidentally at times bought potatoes from others and stored and shipped them with his own. He was engaged in building a potato warehouse at the railway station near his farm. A finding by the commission that a carpenter employed in building the warehouse was not a farm laborer or engaged in a farming activity was sustained.
A person may at the same time engage in two or more different occupations and businesses, the servants in one or more being covered by the act and those in one or more of the others being excluded. Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Durrin v. Meehl, 163 Minn. 325, 204 N.W. 22. So may an institution. It cannot be said that the industrial commission's finding that relator's decedent was a farm laborer was without support.
Under the findings Ramczik was within the protection of the compensation law while unloading the iron, and the injury if sustained while engaged in that work would unquestionably have been compensable. State ex rel. City of Northfield v. District Court, 131 Minn. 352, 155 N.W. 103, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 866; Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N.W. 106; Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Workman v. Endriss, 164 Minn. 199, 204 N.W. 641; O'Rourke v. Percy Vittum Co. 166 Minn. 251, 207 N.W. 636; Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72, 208 N.W. 421. Ramczik quit work on his job shortly after six o'clock and stepped into the foundry for a drink of water. He saw the three men trying to lift a heavy form, termed a flask, which they seemed unable to handle.
We can well conceive that a person may embark in the owning and letting of houses so that it results in a business or occupation. But had this small dwelling been owned by a merchant, doctor, or lawyer and had Sink been employed to reshingle the same, could it have been said that the employment was in the usual course of the business or profession of the owner? True, a person may engage in more than one business or be in a profession and a business at the same time. Benoy v. Torkelson, 161 Minn. 223, 201 N.W. 312; Klein v. McCleary, 154 Minn. 498, 192 N.W. 106. In Bosel v. Henderson Holding Co. 167 Minn. 72, 208 N.W. 421, the casual work was in the business for which the employer, the corporation, was organized.