Opinion
File No. 986
Argued February 10, 1981 —
Decided June 12, 1981
Action to recover a real estate commission, brought to the Court of Common Pleas at Stamford, and tried to the court, Driscoll, J.; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants have appealed. Error; judgment directed.
Merged with the Superior Court on July 1, 1978.
John F. Kavanewsky, for the appellants (defendants).
Simon Sumberg, for the appellee (plaintiff).
In this suit to recover a real estate commission the plaintiff claims the breach of an exclusive sale agreement by the defendants, who are husband and wife and who owned a two-family house in Norwalk. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. Upon this appeal taken by the defendants, the dispositive issue is whether the failure of the defendant husband to sign the commission agreement in person constitutes a noncompliance with General Statutes 20-325a (b), which establishes certain requirements for such contracts. Accordingly, we shall not consider the other issues raised which are related to the authority of the defendant wife to sign her husband's name to the agreement, as she did.
General Statutes 20-325a (b) provides as follows: "No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or bring any action in respect of any acts done or services rendered after October 1, 1971, as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection any such contract or authorization shall (1) be in writing, (2) contain the names and addresses of all the parties thereto, (3) show the date on which such contract was entered into or such authorization given, (4) contain the conditions of such contract or authorization and (5) be signed by the parties thereto."
The provision of 20-325a (b) upon which the defendants rely in contending that the agreement was invalid specifies that a real estate commission contract must "be signed by the parties thereto." The defendants maintain that the statute requires that each party sign in person rather than through an agent, regardless of the authority which the agent may have. This contention of the defendants has been upheld in the case of Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, 184 Conn. 228, 230, 439 A.2d 946 (1981), which was decided by our Supreme Court after the argument of this appeal. The decision holds squarely that a listing agreement signed by an agent of the owner of the property does not meet the statutory requirement of a signature by a party.