"When property alleged to be stolen is proven to be stolen property and the crime charged has been committed by someone, the recent unexplained possession of the stolen property by the defendant is a circumstance from which guilt may be inferred." Humes v. State, 143 Ga. App. 229 ( 237 S.E.2d 704). The contention that such evidence does not show the defendant committed the burglary has been rejected by Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 28-29 ( 234 S.E.2d 831), which disapproved the language of Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207). See Wells v. State, 151 Ga. App. 416 (1) ( 260 S.E.2d 374) (overruled as to Division 7 by Copeland v. State, 160 Ga. App. 786, 789 ( 287 S.E.2d 120)); Porter v. State, 155 Ga. App. 883 ( 273 S.E.2d 644); Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 474 (1) ( 278 S.E.2d 31); Bankston v. State, 159 Ga. App. 342, 343 (4) ( 283 S.E.2d 319).

No further circumstances or direct proof showing defendant committed the burglary is necessary for conviction. Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 29 ( 234 S.E.2d 831). We expressly reject defendant's suggestion that we revive Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207), the reasoning of which we disapproved in Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, supra. After careful review of the entire record and transcript we find that a rational trier of fact (the jury in the case sub judice) could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of burglary.

The state presented evidence on all of the essential elements of the crime of burglary, which was clear, convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant cites Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207) (1975). In that case one of the three judges concurred in the judgment only.

However, his evidence of alibi did not exclude his presence at the scene of the crime or the spot where the officers saw him with the motorcycle. 1. Appellant contends there was no evidence showing an unauthorized entry by him of the burglarized service station, and in the absence of such proof the evidence was insufficient to convict him of burglary, relying on Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207). We quote the facts and the ruling in that case, emphasizing the language relied upon by the appellant.

The evidence, showing a burglary occurred, how the dwelling was entered and what was stolen, including the recovery of the various items stolen, fully corroborates the admission of guilt. 3. Counsel for defendant requested a charge "that the crime of burglary cannot be proved nor inferred simply from recent possession of goods stolen in the alleged burglary," citing Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207). He now enumerates as error the fact that there was no proof whatsoever outside of his confession that he had made an unauthorized entry into the burglarized premises but only that he had some clothing in his possession. However, as noted in Division 2 above, there was corroborating evidence as to the burglary of the premises, all of which evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of burglary, and the case is not simply based on recent possession of stolen goods.

The defendant was in possession of the stolen guns less than an hour after the burglary, and pawned one of them the next day, saying it belonged to his "daddy." The instant case is distinguishable from the case of Bennett v. State, 136 Ga. App. 806 ( 222 S.E.2d 207), in which the defendant's possession of the stolen gun was merely "later that day or the following day," as contrasted to within an hour after the burglary in the case sub judice. Enumerated error 3 is without merit.

According to Miles, Georgia law did not define burglary as an unlawful entry into a building or other structure at the time of his conviction. See Bennett v. State, 136 Ga.App. 806, 222 S.E.2d 207 (1975) (describing the unlawful entry into an automobile as a "burglary"). Furthermore, Miles contends that the district court did not find that his conviction for two counts of burglary in 1965 were for felonies "committed on occasions different from one another" as required under section 924(e)(1).