Summary
denying front pay in court's discretion in part because the back pay award fully compensated plaintiff
Summary of this case from U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com. v. CopelloOpinion
No. 96 C 2422
June 25, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Valerie Bennett ("Bennett") brought a racial discrimination claim against the Board of Education Community Unit School District No. 200 and its individual board members (collectively, "District") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a jury trial, this court entered a verdict for Bennett and against the District on Bennett's disparate treatment claim. This memorandum opinion and order addresses various post-trial motions. First, the plaintiff requests front pay damages and prejudgment interest as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed below, Bennett's Motion to Amend Judgment and Award Front Pay is granted in part and denied in part. In addition, the defendants seek to stay enforcement of the judgment without posting bond. The defendants' motion is denied. The respective motions will be considered in turn.
I. Discussion
A. Front Pay
In 1994 and again in 1995, Bennett applied for full-time teaching positions in District 200. The jury found that the District rejected Bennett because of her race. In addition to the back pay and compensatory damages previously awarded to the plaintiff, she now seeks front pay. Bennett's theory is that the District's failure to hire her deprived her of two years of seniority that she would have accrued but for the defendants' discriminatory acts.
Under Title VII, prevailing plaintiffs may obtain both equitable and compensatory remedies. Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes the courts to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). In construing this provision, the courts have approved front pay as an equitable remedy available under Title VII. See Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F.3d 944, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that front pay "fall[s] squarely within the statutory language authorizing `any other equitable relief'").
Front pay is the "functional equivalent of reinstatement because it is a substitute remedy that affords the plaintiff the same benefit (or as close an approximation as possible) as the plaintiff would have received had she been reinstated." 137 F.3d at 951. Generally, front pay is awarded where reinstatement — or, in the case of a discriminatory failure to hire, enjoining employment — is not an option, either because a plaintiff is unable to procure her rightful position because it is unavailable, or because an acrimonious relationship between the plaintiff and her employer renders reinstatement inappropriate. See id. (noting that trial court awarded front pay instead of reinstatement because merger eliminated plaintiff's position) ; 5 Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination (2d ed.) at § 92.12 (citing examples of unavailability). See also Price v. Marshall Erdman Assoc.. Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing limited scope of hostile relationship exception to reinstatement).
Because it is a substitute for reinstatement, front pay does not rectify:
[T]he subsequent decrease in the employee's attractiveness to other employers into the future, leading to further loss in time or level of experience. Reinstatement [and thus front pay] does not revise an employee's resume or erase all forward-looking aspects of the injury caused by the discriminatory conduct.137 F.2d at 953 (quoting district court's November 21, 1996 Memorandum Opinion Order at 22).
Where front pay is unable to fully compensate a plaintiff, an award of lost future earnings redresses the long-term effects of discriminatory employment actions. See Williams, 137 F.3d at 953 (describing front pay as redressing the "immediate effects" of an unlawful termination while future lost earnings compensates plaintiff for "diminish[ed] . . . lifetime expected earnings"). Just as a physical injury may diminish the earning capacity of a manual laborer, reputational or other long-term injuries caused by an employer's discriminatory actions may impair one's future earning ability. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing case in which award given for career disruption resulting from emotional turmoil of discriminatory act). Also labeled lost earning capacity, plaintiffs may claim these nonpecuniary losses by producing "competent evidence suggesting that his injuries have narrowed the range of economic opportunities available to him."Williams, 137 F.3d at 952.
Here, Bennett urges the court compensate her for two years of lost seniority. In the absence of the District's discriminatory failure to hire, Bennett argues, she would have gained two years of full-time teaching experience. In turn, the additional experience would have increased her salary every year thereafter, since teacher's salaries are based on seniority. Thus, Bennett seeks monetary compensation equal to the difference in pay she would have received with two years of additional experience under her belt. She requests that the award span from the time she began a new teaching job at another Chicagoland school in 1996 until she reaches the retirement age of 63. Bennett titles her motion as a request for front pay, but she also uses the term "lost future earnings" interchangeably. As discussed above, however, lost future earnings are conceptually distinctive from front pay and the two claims will be considered separately.
With respect to Bennett's claim for front pay, it is denied. A front pay award would approximate the benefit Bennett would have received had the District employed her throughout the 1994-95 and 1995-96 schoolyears. Bennett's backpay award, however, already compensates her for the injury she suffered by not earning a full-time salary for those two years.
Bennett may have been entitled to front pay for additional years beyond those initial two years, but not on this record. When calculating front pay awards, a court terminates the inquiry at the point at which the plaintiff can "reasonably be expected to have moved on to similar or superior employment." 137 F.3d at 954 (observing that front pay awards are limited in duration). Here, there is no need to speculate on when Bennett would have changed jobs because in June 1997, Bennett relocated to Texas with her husband. From that point on, Bennett would have no longer worked for the District; any front pay award would be foreclosed by the transfer.
To the extent that Bennett demands compensation for loss of seniority, her claim is better construed not as a claim for front pay, which only affords the same relief as reinstatement, but as a claim for lost future earnings. To reiterate, Bennett seeks to remedy her loss of seniority, on which her future career compensation as a teacher is based. Relief under the theory of lost future earnings is more fitting here because such an award "compensate[s] the plaintiff for the diminution in expected earnings in all of her future jobs for as long as the reputational or other injury may be expected to affect her prospects." Williams, 137 F.3d at 954. Bennett's lost seniority, like a reputational harm, will indefinitely limit her future employment prospects and compensation.
Although the theory of lost future earnings applies to the instant case, this court cannot award relief. Front pay is an equitable remedy determined by the court, but lost future earnings qualifies as a compensatory remedy to be decided by a finder of fact. 137 F.3d at 954;Hasham v. United States Disrtict Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, 1998 Lexis 12078, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 1998) (denying post-trial motion for lost future earnings where plaintiff did not present issue to the jury as an element of compensatory damages). As such, this court does not retain jurisdiction to decide the matter.
Even if this court were authorized to award Bennett with damages for lost future earnings, Bennett's claim would nevertheless be denied. Bennett has not offered any competent evidence establishing the difference in pay two years of seniority would have earned her. In setting a briefing schedule on Bennett's motion for front pay, the court explicitly stated that no reply briefs would be considered. See Minute Order of Feb. 1, 2001. Almost two months after the District filed its response brief, however, Bennett supplied the court with a reply without obtaining leave of court. Not only is Bennett's reply in direct contravention of this court's order, but the brief merely presents unauthenticated and therefore inadmissible evidence.
B. Prejudgment Interest
Bennett also seeks an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of $31,368.00. As a rule, prejudgment interest is "presumptively available to victims of federal law violations." McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372. Because Bennett was denied employment in August 1994 and the modified judgment was entered in December 2000, Bennett arrives at the requested amount by multiplying 6.25 years by the sum of her compensatory and backpay awards. Prejudgment interest, however, is available only on backpay awards. See McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372 ("Title VII authorizes pre-judgment interests as part of the backpay remedy in suits against private employers.")
Although this court will award Bennett with prejudgment interest, interest shall only accrue on the backpay award. Thus, in accordance with the formula set forth by the plaintiff, and in light of the defendant's agreement thereto, Bennett will be awarded $12,547.00 in prejudgment interest. C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
The amount of backpay awarded to Bennett was $29,731.00. The final pre-judgment interest award was determined by rounding the backpay figure to $30,000 and applying an interest rate of 5.75% for 6.25 years under a compound interest formula.
Bennett's disparate treatment claim was submitted to the jury, which determined that the District had engaged in racial discrimination in refusing to hire her. In addition, Bennett brought a disparate impact claim, which was submitted to this court. In view of the jury's finding of intentional discrimination, this court previously denied Bennett's disparate impact claim as moot. Bennett now urges the court to amend that ruling and grant her declaratory and injunctive relief.]
The court finds that Bennett is entitled to neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. Bennett fell far short of proving that the District's hiring practices had a disparate impact. Bennett presented scant evidence to establish that the screening committees used by District 200 had a disparate impact on minority hiring. As such, Bennett's motion for declaratory relief is denied. In addition, Bennett seeks injunctive relief and notes in her reply to the Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum on Disparate Impact Claims that claims of other minority applicants for District 200 positions "have not been waived and are still pending before the Court." Br.At 2. This case has not been brought as a action suit, and the court finds that no injunctive relief is warranted. Therefore, Bennett's motion to amend this court's previous judgment is denied.
D. Stay
District seeks to stay enforcement of the judgment without posting a bond. The District argues that, as a public entity, it is entitled to a stay under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(d) and 62(f). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d), (f). Rule 62(d), captioned "Stay Upon Appeal," requires that an appeal be pending before a stay is granted. In this case, the parties did indeed file an appeal with the Seventh Circuit. However, in February 2001, the appellate court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss the appeal pending a ruling on the front pay issue. See Order 2/22/01, Doc. 188. Since no appeal is currently pending, the District cannot rely on Rule 62(d).
Defendants also seek a stay under Rule 62(f), but that provision, too, requires a pending appeal. Rule 62(f) authorizes a district court to stay the execution of a judgment and waive the requirement that an appellant post a bond in accordance with state law. Fed.R.Civ. p. 62(f). Under that provision, the District is entitled to a stay if: (1) the judgment would result in a lien on the property of the judgment debtor; and (2) the judgment debtor is entitled to a stay under state law. See Smith v. United State Dist. Ct. for the No. Dist. of Ill., No. 84 3269, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19625, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1991).
Section 12-502 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that, once the plaintiff files a certified copy of the judgment in the office of the Recorder of Cook County, the judgment operates as a lien on the judgment debtor. In addition, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305, a municipality is entitled to a stay without requiring the posting of a bond. See Smith, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19625, at *3 However, Rule 305, like Fed.R.Civ. p. 62(d), permits a stay pending appeal. Hence, the defendant is not entitled to a stay under Fed.R.Civ. p. 62(f).
The parties' appeals were previously dismissed pending this court's ruling on the issue of front pay. In all likelihood, the parties will file an appeal now that all the issues in this case have been ruled upon. Thus, although the District's motion to stay enforcement of judgment without posting bond is denied, it is denied without prejudice.
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Bennett's Motion to Amend Judgment and Award Front Pay is granted in part and denied in part. Bennett's motion to amend judgment is denied. Likewise, Bennett's motion for front pay is denied. Bennett shall, however, be awarded $12,547.00 in prejudgment interest. With respect to the District's motion to stay enforcement of judgment without posting bond, the motion is denied.