Id. at 564. In Bennett v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 170 Ga. App. 829, 830 ( 318 S.E.2d 670) (1984), the court stated that in order to find coverage, "[t]here must be more of a connection between the use of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and the resulting injury than mere presence in the vehicle when the injury was sustained." Id. at 830-831.
The vehicle was not running, any "maintenance" had already been performed by someone else, and there was at most a remote connection between Boykin's injuries and the vehicle. See Westberry v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 179 Ga. App. 700, 701 (1) ( 347 S.E.2d 688) (1986); Bennett v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 170 Ga. App. 829, 830 ( 318 S.E.2d 670) (1984); Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 153, 154 ( 312 S.E.2d 173) (1983); Leverette v. Aetna Cas. c. Co., 157 Ga. App. 175, 176 ( 276 S.E.2d 859) (1981). The injuries did not result "from an accident peculiar to the motor vehicle" nor were they "intrinsically related to the vehicle itself."
In cases in which an issue is presented as to whether a gunshot wound sustained by an insured in a motor vehicle can be considered an injury arising out of the use of the vehicle, the general rule is set forth in Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 142 Ga. App. 562, 564 ( 236 S.E.2d 550), that "where a connection appears between the 'use' of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and resulting injury such as to render it more likely that the one grew out of the other, it comes within the coverage defined." This court considered the same issue in Bennett v. Nat. Union Fire c. Ins. Co., 170 Ga. App. 829 ( 318 S.E.2d 670), in which the insured and his wife were seated in their moving automobile and a third party intentionally shot at them from outside the car. We affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, holding that to reach a finding that the injury arose out of the "operation, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle . . . [t]here must be more of a connection between the use of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and the resulting injury than mere presence in the vehicle when the injury was sustained."
There must be some connection between the use of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and the resulting injury greater than mere presence in the vehicle when the injury is inflicted or sustained. See Bennet v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, 170 Ga. App. 829, 318 S.E.2d 670 (1984) (victims who were riding in their automobile when shot by an individual outside the vehicle just happened to be in the car when the assailant came "gunning" for them, and the injury thus did not arise out of the maintenance or use of the vehicle); Curtis v. Birch, 114 Ill. App.3d 127, 69 Ill.Dec. 873 448 N.E.2d 591 (1 Dist. 1983) (where an uninsured driver fired at another driver, the shooting was not related to the use of a vehicle, as it could just as easily have taken place had the assailant been on foot or on a bicycle). Although Klug was pursued along the highway, was forced to take evasive action, and was, at one point, rammed by Bahe's vehicle, none of these acts produced Klug's injury.