Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 157110
SCOTLAND, P.J.
I. Robert Bennett appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for a restraining order to prohibit his neighbor, Glenn M. Moore, from harassing him. Bennett contends the court erred in declining to issue the injunction, excluding certain evidence, and awarding Moore attorney fees. He also claims reversal is required because opposing counsel committed fraud during the hearing, and his own trial counsel was ineffective.
For reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The parties are owners of adjacent parcels of land. This case represents Bennett’s second petition for an injunction and restraining order to prohibit Moore from harassing him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) Bennett previously sought a restraining order against Moore in September 2005. The proceedings arising from Bennett’s 2005 petition were settled, the parties’ claims were released, and the case was dismissed.
Bennett filed the second petition in April 2006, averring that Moore “blamed [Bennett] for water leaking into [Moore’s] home and threatened to shoot [him]” and that Moore “has brandished and discharged firearms while angry [and] [r]ecently came at” Bennett while he was in his vehicle.
Moore denied ever brandishing a firearm or making any threats of violence. He declared that Bennett’s petition represented mere retaliation for Moore’s initiating criminal proceedings against Bennett for demolishing a fence and birdhouse on Moore’s property.
At trial, Bennett argued that he reasonably feared for his safety as a result of the following two incidents in 2006.
According to Bennett, the first incident occurred in January 2006, when Moore accused him of drilling a hole in Moore’s roof to make it leak. Moore then screamed and threatened to shoot Bennett and his dogs if either came onto Moore’s property. But Bennett’s testimony regarding the date of this event was inconsistent; he also appeared to say that it occurred in December 2005, or perhaps in the late Spring of 2005.
Bennett testified that the second incident occurred in April 2006, when Moore became angry while surveyors were working near the parties’ property boundary, and Moore made “very loud outbursts and accusations, and [made] very negative comments.” Bennett described Moore’s conduct as “heckling.” Testimony by other witnesses supported Bennett’s account. For example, the surveyor testified that Moore was “hysterically screaming” at Bennett for several minutes, calling him “evil” or a “bad person”; the surveyor “fully expected” that a fight would break out between Bennett and Moore, but it did not.
Bennett also testified that incidents preceding the filing of the second petition were relevant to show that Moore is violent. According to Bennett, Moore confronted him and a teenaged boy who was stacking wood against their common chain-link fence in July 2005, and “pushed the entire pile over onto” the boy. The boy testified that Moore pushed the chain link fence and caused some pieces of wood to fall. Bennett also testified that in the fall of 2005, he saw Moore shoot three rounds into the ground in anger.
Moore’s counsel challenged Bennett’s credibility by showing that Bennett was convicted in Nevada of making false statements on an application for insurance and submitting a false claim for insurance benefits, both felonies. Bennett testified that he was “cleared of all those charges” in postconviction proceedings, but he admitted being convicted in 1983 for possessing marijuana.
Moore acknowledged that he had accused Bennett of drilling a hole in his roof, but testified he did so long before July 2005. In response to allegations about firearm use, Moore said the only gun he ever fired on his property was a pellet or air gun. Moore offered no testimony about his April 2006 exchange with Bennett in front of the surveyors.
The trial court denied Bennett’s petition for an injunction and entered judgment in Moore’s favor. The court reasoned that Bennett had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence his entitlement to an injunction and, specifically, Bennett had failed to establish that Moore committed any violence or made any credible threat of violence against him.
Finding that Moore was the prevailing party, the trial court ordered Bennett to pay Moore attorney fees and costs in the amount of $7,360.
DISCUSSION
I
We begin by setting forth some general rules that govern our review of the trial court’s decision.
We must presume that the trial court’s judgment is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Bennett, as the appellant, has the burden of showing reversible error; in the absence of such a showing, the judgment must be affirmed. (Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 373.) In order to prevail, Bennett must present an analysis of the facts and legal authority on each point made; he must also support arguments with appropriate citations to the material facts in the record. Issues not fully or properly briefed are forfeited, and we do not consider them. (Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46, 59; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
That Bennett is representing himself does not exempt him from the rules governing appeals. A person who is representing himself is treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and their attorneys. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; see Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121 [self-represented parties held to the “same ‘restrictive procedural rules as an attorney’”].)
II
Bennett contends that the trial court “err[ed] in granting a judgment for [Moore] when a reasonable fear of stalking or harassment was present.” This is so, he argues, because “several witnesses testified” that Moore “exhibited ‘unwanted’ stalking and harassing actions toward” Bennett. The contention fails in light of the standard of review on appeal.
A trial court’s decision whether to grant an injunction rests within its sound discretion, and the decision will not be disturbed without a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) When there are disputed factual issues, we review the court’s findings under the substantial evidence standard. We resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in the respondent’s favor and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment so long as it is supported by evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.; Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 [appellate court determines “whether substantial evidence supports the requisite elements of willful harassment, as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6”].)
In denying Bennett’s petition for an injunction, the trial court found that Moore’s conduct did not constitute harassment as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. (Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.)
Even if the finding is not express, we infer the trial court impliedly made all necessary findings to sustain its judgment. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1135.)
Not all uncivil behavior creates legal justification for an injunction. Section 527.6, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part that “[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).) “‘Unlawful violence’” means any assault or battery (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1)) or stalking (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1); Pen. Code, § 646.9). “‘Credible threat of violence’” is defined as “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) A “‘[c]ourse of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
The grant or denial of a civil harassment petition brought pursuant to section 527.6 involves no balancing. The sole issue is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that harassment, as defined by the statute, has occurred. (§ 527.6, subd. (d); Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 664.)
Here, the trial court did not err in finding Bennett failed to show Moore’s conduct fell within the prohibitions of section 527.6. There was no testimony that Moore committed violence (defined by the statute as an assault, battery, or stalking). And based on Moore’s testimony, the court was entitled to find that Moore did not make any threats or engage in “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct,” i.e., “a series of [harassing] acts over a period of time.”
Bennett argues the trial court wrongly failed to credit the testimony of “[s]everal witnesses” who said that Moore engaged in unlawful conduct. On appeal, however, we do not ask whether there was evidence to support the appellant’s position; instead, we must determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (See In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) Where there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm despite the existence of contrary evidence. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873.)
In making this determination, we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and we must defer to the trial judge on issues of fact and credibility. (See In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) We may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Here, substantial evidence believed by the trial court was sufficient to support the court’s factual determinations. Bennett relied on only two incidents in 2006 (after his dismissal of the prior petition) to establish unlawful harassment by Moore. As to the first incident, Moore testified that the confrontation over his leaking roof occurred in 2005, before Bennett’s dismissal of his prior petition. The court apparently believed Moore. Such a conclusion was not inconsistent with Bennett’s own testimony, in which he agreed that this roof leak confrontation could have occurred in 2005, as Moore testified. Events concerning the parties’ property dispute and claims of harassment that occurred prior to the dismissal of the 2005 petition are covered by the parties’ written settlement agreement and release, and cannot be relied upon to support the second petition.
As to the other incident upon which Bennett’s second petition was based--the confrontation in April 2006 while surveyors were working on the property--the evidence that Moore was angry and screamed at Bennett was unchallenged. But the court found this single shouting incident did not constitute “a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct” within the meaning of section 527.6, subdivision (b) and, thus, did not constitute unlawful “harassment” under the statute. That decision was not an abuse of discretion. The testimony did not establish that Moore committed, or threatened to commit, an act of violence; and a single uncivil event is not a “course of conduct.”
Bennett also asserts that the evidence established Moore had engaged in stalking behavior. It did not. A person engages in stalking if he “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and . . . makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family.” (Pen. Code, § 646.9; see also § 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) The evidence showed that, in the relevant time frame, Bennett once (or perhaps twice) encountered Moore while each was on his own side of their shared property line. On only one such occasion, in April during the survey, Moore became angry and started screaming at Bennett. There was no evidence that Moore followed Bennett, telephoned him, or otherwise deliberately or maliciously contacted him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly concluding Bennett failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Moore’s behavior constituted stalking.
In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to deny Bennett’s application for an injunction.
III
To parry the impeaching evidence of his conviction in Nevada for insurance fraud, Bennett testified that he had received “post-conviction” relief from the judgment. When he attempted to introduce an order from the Nevada court to this effect, Moore objected on the grounds that the document was irrelevant, unauthenticated, and constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court examined the document, found it was not certified or otherwise properly authenticated, and refused to admit it into evidence.
A trial court may properly take judicial notice of the records of any court of record of any state of the United States. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, the record does not establish Bennett gave Moore “sufficient notice of the request” so as to render judicial notice compulsory (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (a)). The court apparently concluded that Bennett failed to “[f]urnish[] the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter” (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (b)), and Bennett has failed to show here how that conclusion was error.
We also reject Bennett’s contention that Moore’s counsel committed “a deliberate fraud in not supplying a complete record of plaintiff’s previous criminal record.” Bennett has not shown on appeal how the Nevada criminal records submitted as evidence were either “incorrect” or “incomplete,” as he claims.
IV
Bennett claims (under a number of argument headings) that his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial, produce key witnesses, and seek postjudgment remedies, such as bringing a motion for trial de novo, and otherwise failed to afford him effective assistance of counsel. In raising these contentions, Bennett purports to invoke the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 691-692].
Bennett also invokes the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” However, he does not attempt to show how this amendment furthers his assertion that he should be permitted to seek relief in this court for what he perceives as inadequate performance by his trial counsel.
However, the constitutional right Bennett attempts to invoke inures by its very language to the benefit of criminal defendants, not unsuccessful civil plaintiffs. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense”]; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [“[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant’s defense”].)
Although he asserts that “[a]n indigent civil Plaintiff is as vulnerable as a criminal defendant,” his remedy for claimed ineffective assistance is a separate action for civil liability under a theory of professional negligence. (See Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.)
V
Section 527.6 subdivision (i) states the “prevailing party in any action brought under this section may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” By way of a postjudgment motion, the trial court granted Moore’s request for attorney fees in the amount of $7,360.
The judgment from which Bennett appeals was entered on July 12, 2006. It contains no provision for attorney fees. Bennett filed his notice of appeal from the judgment on August 24, 2006. The order awarding attorney fees was apparently made on September 21, 2006, although rather than enter a separate order, the court clerk apparently handwrote the amount of the attorney fee award onto a copy of the judgment bearing the original date of July 12, 2006.
Because the judgment of July 12, 2006, said noting about attorney fees, and Bennett did not appeal from the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees, a challenge to the postjudgment order cannot be raised in this appeal from July 12 judgment. (DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43-44.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(4).)
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.