Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-1256-D (Consolidated with Civil Action No. 3:98-C V-2476-D).
May 18, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this settled employment discrimination case that involved the entry of confidentiality orders, defendants Employers Reinsurance Corporation and Employers Reassurance Corporation (collectively, "Employers") move the court to reconsider the magistrate judge's March 15, 2000 order denying in part their March 1, 2000 motion to enforce and modify agreed confidentiality orders and for sanctions and their March 1, 2000 motion to vacate dismissal. The court denies the motion as untimely.
I
The parties advised the court in December 1999 that they had settled this case, and the court directed that the case be closed administratively for statistical purposes. On February 15, 2000 the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, and the court on the same day filed an order dismissing the case according to the terms of the stipulation.
On March 1, 2000 Employers filed two motions: a motion to modify agreed confidentiality orders and for sanctions, and a motion to vacate dismissal. The court referred these motions to United States Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan for determination and/or recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Judge Kaplan conducted a hearing and on March 15, 2000 filed an order in which he denied Employers' motion to vacate dismissal, and denied the motion to enforce and modify agreed confidentiality orders and for sanctions, insofar as that motion did not seek injunctive relief To the extent the motion did seek injunctive relief, he recommended that the court deny the motion to enforce and modify agreed confidentiality orders, Employers filed the instant motion for reconsideration on May 12, 2000.
II
In Employers' motion for reconsideration, it no longer seeks injunctive relief. See Mot. Recon. at 4 n. 3 ("In seeking relief from this Court, Defendants are no longer pursuing the remedy of injunctive relief."). Therefore, the only parts of the magistrate judge's order at issue are the parts that he determined. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(A) empowers the court to designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine certain matters. Employers does not dispute Judge Kaplan's authority to determine its motion to vacate dismissal, and its motion to enforce and modify agreed confidentiality orders and for sanctions (insofar as the motion did not seek injunctive relief).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), Employers' objections to the magistrate judge's order were due "[w]ithin 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order[.]" If an objection is not timely made, "a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge's order[.]" Although Rule 72(a) literally applies to "a pretrial matter," the court sees no reason not to apply the rule here. First, the ten-day limit applies uniformly to all magistrate judge rulings — dispositive, see § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b), and nondispositive, see Rule 72(a). It is well-recognized among the Bench and Bar as the controlling deadline for filing objections in magistrate judge matters. Second, if the court does not apply Rule 72(a), there would effectively be no time limit on filing objections, and a magistrate judge order would be subject to challenge for an indeterminate period.
Employers cannot circumvent the applicable deadline by asserting objections under the rubric of a motion for reconsideration. The court's study of the motion shows that it is in all respects a set of objections. Nor may Employers do so under the guise of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Mot. Recon. at 2, 12-13. Although nothing in today's decision precludes Employers from later filing a second Rule 60(b)(6) motion if it has grounds to do so, that rule cannot be used to lodge untimely objections to a magistrate judge order. Cf. Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that "Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal." (quoting 12 James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.22[2] (3d ed. 1998))), cert. denied, ___ U S ___ 119 S.Ct. 1143 (1999); see also Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir.) ("`Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as a backdoor substitute for an omitted appeal, and, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, a party's neglect to prosecute a [timely] appeal will bar relief under the rule.'" (quoting Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995)), cert. denied ___ US ___ 119 S.Ct. 591 (1998).
The court recognizes that Employers sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief in its March 1, 2000 motion to vacate, but that motion had the limited purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the court to rule on Employers' companion motion to enforce and modify agreed confidentiality orders and for sanctions. See Mot. Vacate at 7, ¶ 4. The court refers here to a merits-based Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Parenthetically, the court also notes that, unlike a state court that loses jurisdiction once a judgment is final, a federal court does not. The dismissal order in this case need not be vacated in order to confer jurisdiction on this court to enforce its orders.
* * *
Employers' May 12, 2000 motion for reconsideration of magistrate's order is denied.
SO ORDERED.