Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-912, SECTION "R" (3)
January 9, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants City of New Orleans and the Honorable Paul R. Valteau, Civil Sheriff of Orleans Parish, move the Court to dismiss plaintiffs1 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion.
I. Background
In July 1983, plaintiff Michael Bennett suffered physical and mental injuries in an automobile accident. One year later, Bennett sued the City of New Orleans in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. In March 2000, the state court entered judgment against the City and in favor of Bennett for $2,069,469.87 in damages. The City appealed to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied supervisory review.
In July 1993, plaintiff Alan Wiley suffered injuries in an automobile-pedestrian accident. In 1994, Wiley sued the City of New Orleans in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. In 1999, the state court entered judgment in favor of Wiley for $200,000 in damages and $8,231.25 in costs. Both Wiley and the City appealed to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, which increased Wiley's damages to $300,000. In all other respects, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied supervisory review.
Plaintiffs allege that, despite repeated amicable demands, the City has refused and continues to refuse to pay plaintiffs any part of the judgments. In April 2003, Bennett and Wiley sued the City in this Court, asking for injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs ground jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988, alleging that they have been deprived of their Constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities under color of state law and that they have no state remedy to rectify this deprivation. Plaintiffs also ground jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343, asserting claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs allege that the City's failure to pay their judgments amounts to a taking of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that they have been denied equal protection of law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the City satisfies federal court judgments before it satisfies state court judgments. Moreover, plaintiffs assert that article XII, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution ("the anti-seizure provision") is unconstitutional because it denies them equal protection of law and deprives them of their property without due process. Plaintiffs also allege a number of state law claims.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to enter an injunction requiring the City to pay their judgments. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory relief. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' Constitutional claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. Legal Standard
When the defendant's challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the Court must "find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of plaintiff's case." Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). Therefore, when a defendant moves to dismiss a plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Court must first determine whether plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim. See Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1572.
To resolve a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court will dismiss the claim if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
III. Discussion
a. Due Process of Law
Plaintiffs allege that the City has deprived them of their property without due process of law by continuing to refuse to release funds to satisfy their judgments. Plaintiffs allege that, procedurally, there is no remedy under state law that enables them to enforce the state court judgments. Plaintiffs note that the Constitution and laws of Louisiana prohibit Louisiana state courts from issuing writs of mandamus, temporary restraining orders, and preliminary and permanent injunctions to enforce plaintiffs1 judgments against the City. In effect, plaintiffs ask the Court to enforce their state court judgments. Defendant argues that the enforcement of a state court judgment does not give rise to a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court finds defendant's argument persuasive.
The Court finds that the City's failure to pay plaintiffs' state court judgments is not a denial of due process. In Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that a Louisiana school board's failure to pay a plaintiff's state court judgment was not a denial of due process. 803 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883)). Relying on Folsom, the Fifth Circuit held that "the property right created by a judgment against a government entity is not a right to payment at a particular time but merely the recognition of a continuing debt of that government entity." Id. (citing Folsom, 109 U.S. at 289-90). Under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent, the City's failure to pay plaintiffs' judgments does not, therefore, give rise to a federal cause of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit has also explicitly rejected plaintiffs' argument. In Williamson v. Chicago Transit Authority, the Seventh Circuit held that "the failure of a unit of state or local government to make payment on either a judgment award or settlement agreement does not give rise to a due process claim." 185 F.3d 792, 795 (1999). The court stressed that "[f]ederal courts should not, under the guise of the Due Process Clause, become embroiled in a party's attempt to enforce . . . state court judgments and settlement agreements against states and municipalities." Id. (citing Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1993) (action to enforce consent decree with city does not give rise to federal cause of action under the Due Process Clause).
Plaintiffs' claims impinge on comity principles that operate in the area of federal-state relations. To hold that every unpaid state court judgment provides a would-be plaintiff with a cognizable due process claim "would assign the federal courts the role of ombudsmen in monitoring the execution of state court judgments," a role that would surely be destructive of federal-state relations. Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 105 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's reliance on Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 294 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2002), in support of their takings claim is misplaced. In Vogt, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had stated a federal takings claim when the Orleans Parish Levee Board withheld private finds in the form of mineral royalties. Id. at 697. Here, plaintiffs make no such claim. Plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize the seizure of public property to enforce their tort judgments. The Fifth Circuit in Vogt expressly disavowed an intention to transform every tort or breach of contract claim against a government entity into a federal takings claim and limited its holding to cases in which the government has forcibly appropriated private property without a public or regulatory purpose. See id.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs fail to state a federal due process claim.
b. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). When a party claims that state law denies him equal protection, "the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)). If social or economic legislation is at issue, the states enjoy wide latitude under the Equal Protection Clause, and the Constitution presumes that the democratic process will rectify even improvident decisions. See id. On the other hand, if a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, the general rule gives way, and the Court must subject such a statute to strict scrutiny and can sustain it "only if i[t] is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
Plaintiffs' equal protection argument rests on the contention that the Budget Ordinance adopted by the New Orleans City Council discriminates against them by appropriating insufficient funds to pay state court judgments while it appropriates and reserves sufficient funds to pay federal court judgments. Plaintiffs argue that this discrimination is based on citizenship and residency, since both Bennett and Wiley were citizens of Louisiana when they filed suit and could not meet applicable jurisdictional requirements to sue the City in federal court. Plaintiffs argue that had they not been from Louisiana, they could have obtained a federal court judgment and would have been more likely to receive payment because the City pays federal judgments first. Plaintiffs thus argue that the City's policy discriminates between in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs also assert that as citizens of Louisiana, the Eleventh Amendment bars them from suing the City in federal court. This argument is wrong. It is well-established law that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against a political subdivision in federal court. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) ("Political subdivisions exist at the whim and behest of the State . . ., yet cities and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.") (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, the City has been a defendant in numerous suits in federal court brought by local residents who allege a federal cause of action.
The Court first rejects plaintiffs' arguments that the City's policy involves a classification based on citizenship or residency. Rather, the classification is based on the court that issues the judgment, not the residency of the suitor. This follows because there is no allegation that the City treats Louisiana plaintiffs who sue it in federal court differently from Mississippi plaintiffs who sue it in federal court. Further, plaintiffs do not assert that non-residents who obtain a judgment against the City in Louisiana state court receive any better treatment than does a Louisiana resident. The Court finds that plaintiffs1 allegations fail to assert a classification based on citizenship or residency.
Because the Court finds that no suspect classification is involved here, the Court will subject the City's policy on satisfaction of judgments to rational basis review. Therefore, the policy is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the policy is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
The Court notes that the City's policies, not legislation, are at issue here. However, the parties do not dispute that policies are "legally analogous to legislation for Equal Protection purposes." Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, 742 So.2d 55, 59 n. 6 (La.Ct.App. 1999); see also FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Equal Protection analysis to city council's policy).
In Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated that a school board's practice of paying federal court judgments before state court judgments did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and that a rational relationship exists between the practice and a legitimate state interest. 742 So.2d 55 (La.Ct.App. 1999). In Cooper, the plaintiff received a $3 million judgment against the Orleans Parish School Board. Id. at 57. After repeated attempts to collect her judgment, plaintiff sued in state court, asserting an Equal Protection challenge to the priority system that OPSB used to pay judgments. Id. at 58. The court noted that the school board's priority system for the payment of state court judgments did not include federal court judgments and worker's compensation judgments. Id. at 61. The court noted that the "effect of this exemption is that federal court judgments and worker's compensation claims are paid in preference to all claims subject to the regulation." Id. at 61-62. The court held:
We find a reasonable basis for each of these classifications rationally related to a legitimate interest of the School Board. The preference given to the payment of federal court judgments recognizes that more effective enforcement mechanisms are available for the execution of those judgments relative to state court judgments . . . Accordingly, the preference given federal court judgments over state court claims does not violate plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights.Id. at 62.
Like the Cooper court, this Court finds a rational basis for the City's practice of paying federal court judgments before paying state court judgments. Under Louisiana law, state courts are prohibited from issuing writs of seizure or mandamus to enforce state court judgments. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10; LA.REV.STAT. 13:5109; see also De Laureal Eng'rs, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 406 So.2d 770 (La.Ct.App. 1981) (holding that court cannot issue mandamus to compel enforcement of state court judgment). A federal court, on the other hand, can command a state court to pay a judgment from state funds despite state anti-seizure provisions when there is a federal interest in the monetary remedy. See Specialty Healthcare Management v. St. Mary Parish Hospital, 220 F.3d 650, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding district court order directing county to pay attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 despite Texas statute prohibiting execution of judgment against counties); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Bowman v. City of New Orleans, 747 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. La. 1989) (ordering execution of a writ of fieri facias to satisfy a judgment assessing attorney fees against city pursuant to a consent judgment), aff'd, 914 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1990).
The City's decision to satisfy federal court judgments before state court judgments is merely a recognition of the power of federal courts to enforce their judgments when there is a federal interest in the remedy. The City's desire to avoid the costs and consequences of a federal enforcement action is a rational basis for paying federal judgments first. The Court finds that the City's practice of satisfying federal court judgments before it satisfies state court judgments does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiffs' equal protection claims.
c. Anti-Seizure Provision
Plaintiffs also challenge the anti-seizure provision of the Louisiana Constitution, arguing that it deprives them of their property without due process of law and is violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The Louisiana Constitution provides:
[T]he legislature by law may limit or provide for the extent of liability of the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision in all cases, including the circumstance giving rise to liability and the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages. It shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision and provide for the effect of a judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure . . . No judgment shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision against which the judgment is rendered.
LA. CONST., art. XII, § 10 (emphasis added). In addition, Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5109, passed pursuant to article XII of the Louisiana Constitution, states:
Any judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, . . . shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature, if the suit was filed against the state or a state agency, or out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision, if the suit was filed against a political subdivision.
LA.REV.STAT. § 13:519(B)(2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs argue that both the constitutional provision and the statute deprive them of property without due process of law. Plaintiffs argue that there is no mechanism for the enforcement of their judgments because the anti-seizure provision prohibits the seizure of public property. Plaintiffs argue that an interest in a judgment is a fundamental right and therefore the constitutional provision and statute at issue are subject to strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs also argue that the constitutional provision and the statute are constitutionally infirm because they do not permit seizure of public property that is not used for a public purpose.
Substantive due process protects individual liberty against "'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'" Doe v. Taylor Indep. School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Nevertheless, "[s]ubstantive due process affords only those protections so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." Bowers v. City of Flint, 325 F.3d 758, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990)). Generally, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the area of rights protected by the substantive due process clause. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. Although it is well-settled law that a money judgment creates a vested property interest in the holder, see McCullough v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898), there is no precedent that holds an interest in a money judgment to be a fundamental right. Indeed, in Minton, the Fifth Circuit found that a plaintiff's interest in the payment of a state court money judgment did not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. 803 F.2d at 132. Absent precedent to the contrary, the Court declines to extend the area of rights guaranteed by substantive due process. Further, the only Louisiana decision to consider the constitutionality of the anti-seizure provision held that it did not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. See Foreman v. Vermilion Parish Policy Jury, 336 So.2d 986, 989 (La.Ct.App. 1976).
Because the Court finds that plaintiffs' interest here is not a fundamental right, the applicable standard of analysis is rational basis review. To determine whether the anti-seizure provision passes muster under rational basis review, the Court must ask two questions: (1) whether the constitutional provision has a legitimate purpose; and (2) whether the Louisiana legislature could rationally believe that exempting public property from seizure furthers that purpose. See Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1061 (5th Cir. 1984). "The question here is only whether a rational relationship exists between the [policy] and a conceivable legitimate governmental objective." FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1996).
The City points to Revised Statute 13:5106(E) as stating the state's legitimate interest in exempting public property from seizure. This statute states:
The legislature find and states:
(1) That judgment against public entities have exceeded ability to pay on current basis.
(2) That the public fisc is threatened by these judgments to the extent that the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry may be threatened.
(3) That the limitations set forth in this Section are needed to curb the trend of governmental liability abuses, to balance an individuals claims against the needs of the public interests and the common good of the whole society, and to avoid overburdening Louisiana's economy and its taxpaying citizens with even more new and/or increased taxes than are already needed for essential programs.
(4) That the purpose of this Section is not to reestablish any immunity based on the statute of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive content and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles and laws and also to assist in the implementation of Article II of the constitution.
LA.REV.STAT. § 13:5106(E).
The Court finds that the legislative concerns expressed in R.S. § 13:5106(E) constitute a legitimate state interest. Protection of the public welfare and the public fisc has long been recognized as a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1998) ("We are also aware of a state's legitimate interest in preserving public funds."); Valot v. Southeast Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Among Defendants' asserted interests is protection of the public fisc. As noted above, that interest is not only legitimate, but also laudable."). In addition, the Court finds that the Louisiana legislature could have rationally found that exempting public property from seizure furthers the goal of protecting the public fisc and the public welfare. The state has an interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of all of its citizens, not just claimants with tort judgments. Further, the government has limited resources, and the legislature expressly found that judgments have exceeded the government's ability to pay them on a current basis. Absent an anti-seizure provision, the assets of state and local governments could be dissipated through seizure actions, which could impair the ability of governments to perform vital public functions. Barring seizure and requiring an appropriation to pay judgments is a rational response to this predicament. The Supreme Court "has long stressed that federal courts must refrain from assuming the role of 'superlegislatures to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in . . . the local economic sphere.'" Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1060 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976)). This Court cannot substitute its own judgment as to the wisdom of economic policies adopted by a democratically elected legislature and, in the case of a constitutional provision, approved by a majority of Louisiana voters.
Plaintiffs argue that they should be able to seize property like the French Market buildings or the Pontalba apartments, for example, because, according to plaintiffs, they are used for commercial, not public, purposes. The State's determination that the public fisc is best protected by exempting all public property from seizure, regardless of how it is used, is an economic decision best left to the State. Further, the Foreman court rejected a similar argument. See Foreman, 336 So.2d at 988. Moreover, these properties are still public assets, and it is well within the City's authority to decide the most efficacious use of them. If plaintiffs have a quarrel with these decisions, this lawsuit is not the proper vehicle to air it. Further, the exception plaintiffs urge could potentially mire the courts in complex litigation over whether there is any discernable public purpose in particular uses of public property every time a plaintiff sought to seize public property to enforce a judgment. The State would not have acted irrationally if it sought to avoid such a result. In sum, that the legislature chose not to carve out an exception to the anti-seizure rule of the type advocated by plaintiff does not render the anti-seizure provision and its companion statute vulnerable to a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.
In addition, plaintiffs challenge the anti-seizure provision of the Louisiana Constitution as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs concede that the anti-seizure provision involves no invidious discrimination or suspect classification. Because no suspect classification exists here, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the statute be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court has already determined that the anti-seizure provision satisfies rational basis review. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiffs' Equal Protection challenge to the anti-seizure provision.
d. State Law Claims
As noted above, plaintiffs allege numerous claims under state law in addition to their federal claims. Plaintiffs allege that the City's refusal to earmark funds for satisfaction of state court judgment violates the City's Home Rule Charter, which requires a balanced budget. Plaintiffs also allege that the antiseizure provision violates Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution, which abrogates the contractual and tort immunity of political subdivisions. In addition, plaintiffs argue that the antiseizure provision violates Article I, Section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights." LA. CONST. art. I, § 22. Because the court has dismissed plaintiff's federal claims, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Absent an independent basis exists for federal jurisdiction over the state law claims, plaintiffs' claims may remain in federal court only if this Court determines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under this statute, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction; or (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(1)-(3).
The Court determines that plaintiffs' state law claims raise novel and complex issues of state law. Plaintiffs' claims raise questions of first impression under Louisiana law. For example, the issue of whether the City Council's alleged refusal to adopt a balanced budget in which state court judgments are satisfied is unconstitutional is an issue for which there exists no case law. The Court finds that the paucity of pertinent state judicial precedent weighs in favor of submitting these issues to the state courts. See Scott v. Long Island Sav. Bank, 937 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Court further notes that all federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. When all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed, the Court has wide discretion to dismiss the pendent state law claims as well. See Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998); Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1992). As the Supreme Court has stated,
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties . . . Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Further, this case has been pending in this Court for eight months, the parties have submitted no pretrial order, and the trial is not imminent. Neither have the parties conducted much discovery. Further, any discovery that has been done can be used in state court. This Court finds no reason to entertain jurisdiction over the state law claims now that the federal claims have been dismissed.
III. Conclusion
The Court is not indifferent to plaintiffs' plight and to their frustration at being unable to collect on their lawful judgments. Nor is the Court unmindful of the potential for abuse presented if the City could arbitrarily thumb its nose at these judgments. Nevertheless, the Court's conclusions are dictated by established federal precedent, and plaintiffs' allegations fail to establish that they are victims of arbitrary, irrational or invidiously discriminatory government action.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES plaintiffs1 federal claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiff's remaining state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.