The rule in this regard is a fundamental one. ( Bennett v. Brown, 206 Cal. 424 [ 274 P. 532]; Young v. Young HoldingsCorp., Ltd., 27 Cal.App.2d 129 [80 P.2d 723]; Baar v. Smith, 97 Cal.App. 398 [ 275 P. 861]).
As stated in Saint v. Saint, 120 Cal.App. 15, 22 [ 7 P.2d 374], "he who executes a conveyance of property for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his creditors, cannot by any action in equity obtain a reconveyance from his grantee, nor can anyone claiming under him, except an innocent purchaser". We pause to cite but a few of the innumerable authorities containing declarations to this effect: Bennett v. Brown, 206 Cal. 424, 428 [ 274 P. 532]; Faria v. Faria, 100 Cal.App. 177, 181 [ 280 P. 187]; Allstead v. Laumeister, 16 Cal.App. 59 [ 116 P. 296]. [2] The mere fact that the creditor at the time of the conveyance had not procured the deficiency judgment which the conveyance was intended to defeat, is immaterial.
From that judgment Bennett appealed. The decision is reported in Bennett v. Brown, 206 Cal. 424 [ 274 P. 532, 533]. The evidence in the record demonstrated conclusively that Bennett had in fact deeded said property to Arthur J. Brown in order to forestall his wife from asserting any rights in said property and preparatory to his seeking a divorce from her in Reno, Nevada.
"The rule in this regard is a fundamental one. ( Bennett v. Brown, 206 Cal. 424 [ 274 P. 532]; Young v. Young Holdings Corp., Ltd., 27 Cal.App.2d 129 [ 80 P.2d 723]; Baar v. Smith, 97 Cal.App. 398 [ 275 P. 861]). It was succinctly explained in Allstead v. Laumeister, 16 Cal.App. 59, 64 [ 116 P. 296], where the court, quoting from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, said that `"whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy."' (See, also, Richman v. Bank of Perris, 102 Cal.App. 71 [ 282 P. 801].)
"The rule in this regard is a fundamental one. ( Bennett v. Brown, 206 Cal. 424 [ 274 P. 532]; Young v. Young Holdings Corp., Ltd., 27 Cal.App.2d 129 [ 80 P.2d 723]; Barr v. Smith, 97 Cal.App. 398 [ 275 P. 861].) It was succinctly explained in Allstead v. Laumeister, 16 Cal.App. 59, 64 [ 116 P. 296], where the court, quoting from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, said that `"whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy."' (See, also, Richman v. Bank of Perris, 102 Cal.App. 71 [ 282 P. 801].)