But within those limits we have ordered comprehensive declaratory and injunctive relief, directing the filing of plans for orderly revaluation. Coan v. Assessors of Beverly, 349 Mass. 575 (1965) (taxpayer suit under G.L.c. 40, § 53). Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239 (1968) (same). In Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxation, 366 Mass. 558, 565-568 (1974), we dealt with the problem of discrimination against those cities and towns whose assessors act lawfully, in favor of those whose assessors engage in the illegal practice of fractional valuation.
We have no doubt that many assessors have taken the oath and subscribed the statutory statement in the belief, or even on the advice of counsel, that it was to be understood in an Aesopian or Pickwickian sense. See Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240 (1968). We do not advocate wholesale prosecutions for knowing undervaluation or for perjury.
Lexington Savings Bank v. Commonwealth, 252 Mass. 180, 182, 147 N.E. 569, 570 (1925). See M.G.L. c. 59, § 38; Bennett v. Board of Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240, 237 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1968). In 1966 Massachusetts adopted substantially the present statute, extending the deposits tax to federal associations.
Further, if an action under § 7A is properly brought, "public officials [like the Secretary] . . . will be assumed to carry out their duty once the law under which they must act has been judicially declared." Id. at 397, quoting Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968), and cases cited. It is, therefore, not to be expected that, if the court found failures in the FSEIR, the Secretary would thumb his nose at the court's determination that a revised EIR is required.
We anticipate that the city will adhere to the requirements of law which are stated in this opinion. See Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968). No claim has been made concerning the recovery of funds already expended.
Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 230-232 (1961). Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240 (1968). First Natl. Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 559 (1971).
The rule we reiterate relates only to an action at law to secure adjustment of an excessive tax. Other remedies to correct nonproportional assessment and assessment at less than 100% of full, fair cash value, to the extent they may be available, are not before us, e.g. (1) declaratory and injunctive relief ( Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223; Leto v. Assessors of Wilmington, 348 Mass. 144, 148-149; Nearis v. Gloucester, 357 Mass. 203), and (2) relief under G.L.c. 40, § 53. Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239. We do so because the intent of the Legislature mandates such a result.
1. The proper method of assessment of real property is at 100% of fair cash value. See Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and also art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights; G.L.c. 59, §§ 38, 52; Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 231-232; Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 371-372, and cases cited; Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240. The requirement that real estate assessments be proportional is firmly established.
Assessments of less, or more, than 100% of full fair cash value in some cases necessarily would be the basis upon which the taxes would be computed. Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240, and cases cited. The estimated taxes, which would not be proportional, would violate Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth which empowers the General Court "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said Commonwealth. . . ."
" It is settled in this Commonwealth that "public officials, including municipal officers, will be assumed to carry out their duty once the law under which they must act has been judicially declared." Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968), and cases cited. In respect of Prudential's claim that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we need only say that the case comes up on the allowance of a motion to dismiss and, as the final judge noted, there was an adequate showing in this respect to survive the motion.