Bennett v. Board of Assessors of Whitman

12 Citing cases

  1. Tregor v. Board of Assessors of Boston

    377 Mass. 602 (Mass. 1979)   Cited 24 times

    But within those limits we have ordered comprehensive declaratory and injunctive relief, directing the filing of plans for orderly revaluation. Coan v. Assessors of Beverly, 349 Mass. 575 (1965) (taxpayer suit under G.L.c. 40, § 53). Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239 (1968) (same). In Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxation, 366 Mass. 558, 565-568 (1974), we dealt with the problem of discrimination against those cities and towns whose assessors act lawfully, in favor of those whose assessors engage in the illegal practice of fractional valuation.

  2. Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corporations Taxation

    366 Mass. 558 (Mass. 1974)   Cited 27 times
    In Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxation, 366 Mass. 558 (1974), we emphasized, not for the first time, that the legal duty was "to assess property at its 'fair cash valuation.'"

    We have no doubt that many assessors have taken the oath and subscribed the statutory statement in the belief, or even on the advice of counsel, that it was to be understood in an Aesopian or Pickwickian sense. See Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240 (1968). We do not advocate wholesale prosecutions for knowing undervaluation or for perjury.

  3. United States v. State Tax Commission

    481 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973)   Cited 30 times

    Lexington Savings Bank v. Commonwealth, 252 Mass. 180, 182, 147 N.E. 569, 570 (1925). See M.G.L. c. 59, § 38; Bennett v. Board of Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240, 237 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1968). In 1966 Massachusetts adopted substantially the present statute, extending the deposits tax to federal associations.

  4. Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs

    432 Mass. 132 (Mass. 2000)   Cited 87 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that Massachusetts declaratory judgment statute “does not provide an independent statutory basis for standing”

    Further, if an action under § 7A is properly brought, "public officials [like the Secretary] . . . will be assumed to carry out their duty once the law under which they must act has been judicially declared." Id. at 397, quoting Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968), and cases cited. It is, therefore, not to be expected that, if the court found failures in the FSEIR, the Secretary would thumb his nose at the court's determination that a revised EIR is required.

  5. Anderson v. Boston

    376 Mass. 178 (Mass. 1978)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that the city lacked authority to appropriate money to expend for the purpose of urging voters to support a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts constitution pertaining to property tax assessments because such expenditures were inconsistent with the state's comprehensive campaign finance regulations and holding that the city's first amendment right to speak was not abridged because the state had a legitimate “interest in assuring that a dissenting minority of taxpayers is not compelled to finance the expression on an election issue of views with which they disagree”

    We anticipate that the city will adhere to the requirements of law which are stated in this opinion. See Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968). No claim has been made concerning the recovery of funds already expended.

  6. Coomey v. Board of Assessors of Sandwich

    367 Mass. 836 (Mass. 1975)   Cited 24 times

    Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 230-232 (1961). Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240 (1968). First Natl. Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 559 (1971).

  7. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Somerville

    363 Mass. 756 (Mass. 1973)   Cited 23 times

    The rule we reiterate relates only to an action at law to secure adjustment of an excessive tax. Other remedies to correct nonproportional assessment and assessment at less than 100% of full, fair cash value, to the extent they may be available, are not before us, e.g. (1) declaratory and injunctive relief ( Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223; Leto v. Assessors of Wilmington, 348 Mass. 144, 148-149; Nearis v. Gloucester, 357 Mass. 203), and (2) relief under G.L.c. 40, § 53. Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239. We do so because the intent of the Legislature mandates such a result.

  8. First Natl. Stores v. Bd. of Assessors of Somerville

    358 Mass. 554 (Mass. 1971)   Cited 19 times

    1. The proper method of assessment of real property is at 100% of fair cash value. See Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and also art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights; G.L.c. 59, §§ 38, 52; Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 231-232; Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 371-372, and cases cited; Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240. The requirement that real estate assessments be proportional is firmly established.

  9. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives

    249 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1969)

    Assessments of less, or more, than 100% of full fair cash value in some cases necessarily would be the basis upon which the taxes would be computed. Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 240, and cases cited. The estimated taxes, which would not be proportional, would violate Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth which empowers the General Court "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said Commonwealth. . . ."

  10. Boston Investments Ltd. v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs

    35 Mass. App. Ct. 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    " It is settled in this Commonwealth that "public officials, including municipal officers, will be assumed to carry out their duty once the law under which they must act has been judicially declared." Bennett v. Assessors of Whitman, 354 Mass. 239, 241-242 (1968), and cases cited. In respect of Prudential's claim that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we need only say that the case comes up on the allowance of a motion to dismiss and, as the final judge noted, there was an adequate showing in this respect to survive the motion.