Opinion
No. 22010003
05-07-2022
Alexandra Bennett and KYLE SCHMIDT, Plaintiffs, v. Blue Barn Cider Corp., Defendant.
ALEXANDRA BENNETT and KYLE SCHMIDT, By: Sean T. Hanna, Esq. BLUE BARN CIDER CORP., By: Jill Wolf, President.
Unpublished Opinion
ALEXANDRA BENNETT and KYLE SCHMIDT, By: Sean T. Hanna, Esq.
BLUE BARN CIDER CORP., By: Jill Wolf, President.
HON. MICHAEL A. SCIORTINO, Town Justice, Town of Parma.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs, ALEXANDRA BENNETT and KYLE SCHMIDT ("plaintiffs") commenced this small claim against BLUE BARN CIDER CORP. ("defendant") in the Justice Court for the Town of Parma, County of Monroe, State of New York, in the amount of $2,612.50 for, according to the Small Claims Complaint Form, "Please see attached complaint grounded in breach of contract. Plaintiffs seek return of deposit for wedding reception cancelled by defendants due to state Covid restrictions." Consistent with the attached Complaint received, plaintiffs are also seeking $15.00 for the filing fee. The amount being claimed by plaintiffs is within this Court's monetary jurisdiction. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §202 (a money action filed in a small claims part of a Town Court is limited by law to $3,000.00). The Court Clerk properly served the Notice of Small Claim by mailing it by certified mail and by first class mail. See, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §214.10(e). The parties participated in a fair and impartial hearing of this small claim on April 7, 2022, and each witness was properly sworn under oath prior to providing any testimony to the Court. The Court confirmed that the plaintiff resided in the Town of Parma as the defendant's physical office is not located within the Town of Parma, nor did it have an office for the transaction of business within the municipality giving rise to this Court's jurisdiction. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §213(a) (McKinney's 2022). At the hearing of the small claim, the parties presented evidence in their own behalf, including testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant. Plaintiffs introduced, and this Court received, five (5) pieces of documentary evidence. Defendant introduced, and this Court received, one (1) pieces of documentary evidence.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that a corporation appearing in the defense of a small claim may do so by an attorney, who is presumed to have authority to act on behalf of the corporation. See, compare, CPLR §321(a) (McKinney's 2022) (statutory provision requiring corporations to appear by an attorney in formal court actions and proceedings). However, as an alternative to having counsel formally appear at a small claim, the corporation may appear by an authorized officer, director or employee, provided that the non-lawyer's appearance is done with authority to bind the corporation at a settlement or trial. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1809 (McKinney's 2022). Therefore, the Court may make an inquiry to determine the authority of this person. See id. In this particular small claim, following a reasonable inquiry by the Court it was determined that Jill Wolf who appeared on behalf of the defendants as "President" had the requisite authority to bind the corporation in a settlement or at trial consistent with Uniform Justice Court Act §1809(2).
Next, the plaintiffs filed this small claim against "BLUE BARN CIDERY CORP.". It is well settled that a plaintiff may bring an action in small claims court against any business defendant "in any name used by it in conducting business." See, Uniform Justice Court Act § 1814 (McKinney's 2022). If the court determines defendant's true name at the hearing, the law permits the court to amend all papers to conform to such determination so as to assist a prevailing plaintiff in enforcing the judgment. Here, the evidence at the hearing established that defendant goes by BLUE BARN CIDERY CORP. although some of the documentary evidence refers to defendant as "POMONA AT BLUE BARN". Accordingly, the caption of this matter is appropriate.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts in this matter were captured using the Court's digital recorder. In an effort to avoid duplication of facts, the Court relies upon the recording as the sole source of facts in this particular matter.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The purpose of a small claims procedure is to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1804 (McKinney's 2022); see, Hampton v. Annal Management Co., Ltd., 164 Misc.2d 287 (City Civ. Ct. 1994), appeal dismissed, 168 Misc.2d 138 (App. Term 1996). Small Claims Court is designed to provide litigants with a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for the prompt determination of claims. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1802 (McKinney's 2022). Although procedural rules may be relaxed, cases must be decided according to the rules and principles of substantive law. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1804. This Court is bound by this standard; a standard which has been supported throughout many terms of this Court and others similarly situated throughout New York State. Accordingly, the goal of this Court throughout this entire proceeding is to ensure that substantial justice is done between the parties relying on the sound principles of statutory and case law; in doing so, this Court is required to deliberate upon the facts and apply the law to those facts. Under New York law, even in the relatively informal atmosphere of small claims court, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing its case by a preponderance of the evidence. See, Naclerio v. Adjunct Faculty, 1 Misc.3d 135 (Appellate Term 2003); see also, Rodriguez v Mitch's Transmission, 32 Misc.3d 126 (Appellate Term 2011). In other words, plaintiff must prove its case by the greater weight of the evidence. If the testimony is evenly balanced, judgment must be rendered against the plaintiff.
Here, in this particular case, plaintiff filed a small claim against defendant for $2,612.50 for the return of the deposit for plaintiffs' wedding reception allegedly cancelled by defendant due to COVID-19 restrictions, and also for the $15.00 Court filing fee. Uniform Justice Court Act §202 states that "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall have jurisdiction of actions and proceedings for the recovery of money or chattels where the amount sought to be recovered or the value of the property does not exceed $3000." Uniform Justice Court Act §202 (McKinney's 2022). Plaintiff's small claim is well within the monetary jurisdiction of this Court. However, plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing a basis of liability on the part of defendant for this small claim. The sworn testimony and documentary evidence received by the Court did not establish that defendant cancelled plaintiffs' wedding reception but rather were ordered to close due to COVID-19 restrictions.
The Rental Agreement of May 9, 2019 ("Rental Agreement") scheduled a wedding reception for July 31, 2020. See, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A. The Rental Agreement was executed before the federal declaration of the COVID-19 Pandemic in March 2020 and the State's response. Interestingly, the Rental Agreement did not contain a Force Majeure provision that is used to excuse performance of various agreements by the parties for delays or failures in performance resulting from events beyond such party's reasonable control. See id. Such events may often expressly include acts of God, riots, acts of war, acts of terrorism, epidemics, pandemics, acts of government, fire, power failures, nuclear accidents, earthquakes, unusually severe weather, or other disasters, for example. Once again, the Rental Agreement is devoid of a Force Majeure provision. However, the Rental Agreement does contain a provision "Cancellations: Venue deposits are nonrefundable." Id.
Defendant set forth testimony that the parties agreed to reschedule the July 31, 2020 wedding reception for August 21, 2020 as a backup date, and then agreed to schedule it on a second date of April 17, 2021, when the limits for attendees at large gatherings were anticipated to be expanded by New York State. Plaintiffs initially agreed to rescheduling and corresponded with defendant on scheduling the first backup date, and then the second date. Thereafter, plaintiffs subsequently rejected the dates and elected not to have a wedding reception at defendant's venue.
Plaintiffs' argument for rejection of the proposed wedding date that the COVID-19 Pandemic rescinded the operational effect of the Rental Agreement by the law of recission is unpersuasive. This Court is not aware of any New York State Executive Order or other enacted federal, state, or local law as a result of the COVID-19 Pandemic that rescinded all binding agreements between contracted parties. Plaintiffs' additional argument that plaintiffs were not subject to a binding agreement as they never signed a new agreement defendant had sent over for either of the proposed dates is also unpersuasive. The fact remains that there was a Rental Agreement that committed the defendant to hosting a date for a wedding reception and committed the plaintiffs to a deposit for the venue for this date. The fact also remains that defendant performed its very best efforts at the height of the COVID-19 Pandemic to accommodate a first backup date, and then a second date which plaintiff initially agreed to, but then cancelled on their own accord. See, Defendant's Exhibit 1. Defendant reserved both dates for plaintiffs for a period of time, and was intending to comply with its other obligations under the Rental Agreement. The fact that plaintiffs cancelled the rescheduled wedding reception date triggers the express language that "Venue deposits are non-refundable."
Based upon the credible testimony of the plaintiffs and defendant, and the documentary evidence introduced, this Court concludes that the principles and rules of substantive law along with the purpose of substantial justice compel a determination that plaintiff has no cause of action in this Court that would entitle plaintiffs to damages on this small claim against the defendant. In short, plaintiff has not met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs' small claim against Defendant is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
For the benefit of the parties to this small claim, review of this Court's Decision, Order, and Final Judgment may be taken consistent with Uniform Justice Court Act §1807. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1807 (McKinney's 2022). Moreover, pursuant to Uniform Justice Court Act §1703(b), "An appeal as of right from a judgment entered in a small claim or a commercial claim must be taken within thirty days of the following, whichever first occurs:
1. service by the court of a copy of the judgment appealed from upon the appellant.
2. service by a party of a copy of the judgment appealed from upon the appellant.
3. service by the appellant of a copy of the judgment appealed from upon a party.
Where service as provided in paragraphs one through three of this subdivision is by mail, five days shall be added to the thirty day period prescribed in this section. See, Uniform Justice Court Act §1703(b) (McKinney's 2022).
This constitutes the Decision, Order, and Final Judgment of the Justice Court in the Town of Parma, County of Monroe, State of New York.