Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 01-2717, SECTION "R" (5)
July 18, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Sally Mistretta's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion.
I. Background
On September 5, 2000, at about 3 p.m., defendant Sally Mistretta, an investigator with Louisiana's Department of Social Services, Child Protection Service, arrived at the door of plaintiff Nicole Bennett's trailer residence. Mistretta announced that there had been complaints that Bennett had abused James, Jr., Bennett's three-year-old step-son. At this time, Bennett was 32 weeks pregnant.
Plaintiff alleges that Mistretta questioned plaintiff for about two hours inside the trailer. Roughly 45 minutes into the questioning, defendant Randy Biamonte (incorrectly identified in the complaint as Trent Biamonte), an employee of the Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, arrived. Two police cars, one marked and one unmarked, blocked plaintiff's driveway during the questioning. Plaintiff alleges that during this questioning, Mistretta told her on numerous occasions that she was "going to jail no matter what she said or did." Plaintiff asserts that Mistretta screamed at her and said, "Tell me what I want to hear and I'll release you and Donovan [plaintiff's nine-year-old son] to the custody of your mother [Mary Dow]." Plaintiff alleges that throughout the questioning she was never advised of her right to an attorney. After the questioning, Biamonte told plaintiff to walk outside. He handcuffed her and brought her down to the St. Bernard Parish Jail. Plaintiff alleges that Mistretta's aggressive questioning constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct by which Mistretta intended to inflict severe emotional distress, or, alternatively, that she knew that emotional distress was certain or substantially certain to result.
Bennett remained in the St. Bernard Parish Jail for two hours and was released to the custody of her mother, Mary Dow, and father, Terry Dow, the same evening. Plaintiff's release was on the condition that she stay away from her husband, her husband's ex-wife, and her two step-sons, James, Jr., and Jason. Deputy Sheryl Ducote told plaintiff and the Dows that they could pick up Donovan from the Campsen residence (where he was staying temporarily) and bring him to the Dow's residence. When plaintiff and the Dows arrived at the Campsen's, however, the Campsens refused to turn Donovan over. Plaintiff and the Dows drove three doors down to plaintiff's residence and called the Sheriff's Office.
Plaintiff alleges that when Biamonte arrived he handcuffed her, stating that she was being arrested for disturbing the peace and contempt of court. About 15 or 20 minutes later, Biamonte removed the handcuffs from plaintiff, put them on her father, and brought her father to jail. As a result, plaintiff alleges that she went into premature labor and experienced contractions every two minutes. Medication controlled the contractions, however, and plaintiff ultimately gave birth to a healthy child one week early.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and costs from Biamonte and his employer, Jack Stephens, Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, and punitive damages and attorney fees from Biamonte for use of excessive force in Biamonte's second visit to plaintiff's residence.
Defendants Biamonte and Stephens have answered plaintiff's complaint. Defendant Mistretta moves the Court to dismiss the claim against her for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, defendant Mistretta's motion is denied.
II. Discussion
An action must be dismissed if it appears that the Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3). As the party invoking jurisdiction, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). Unlike the district court's review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court may examine evidence outside of the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that the district court may base its decision on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion on "`(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; and (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.'" Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
The statute authorizing supplemental jurisdiction provides in pertinent part:
"[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a). It is well established that to be part of "the same case or controversy," each separate claim "must derive from a common nucleus of operative facts and [be] such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966) . A loose factual connection between the claims is generally sufficient. 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3567.1, at 117 (2d ed. 1984); but see Early v. Bruno, 2001 WL 775968, *2 (N.D.Ill. 2001) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the facts underlying proof of liability for the federal claim differ from those underlying the state-law claim). Moreover, considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants support a wide-ranging power in the federal courts to decide state-law claims in cases that also present federal questions." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349, 108 S.Ct. 614, 618 (1988).
Plaintiff alleges that Mistretta inflicted emotional distress — a state law claim — when she questioned plaintiff in the afternoon and that Biamonte used excessive force — a federal claim — when he returned later that evening. The Court finds that plaintiff's claims arise from a common nucleus of facts. Though separated by a brief period of time, these two incidents relate to one another and flow from one to the other. First, Mistretta's actions at the residence during the afternoon set in motion a chain of events that led to Biamonte's actions later that evening. Indeed it was Mistretta who allegedly informed plaintiff that she would be able to retain custody over Donovan, which plaintiff says she was attempting to effectuate when Biamonte returned in the evening. Second, plaintiff alleges that her premature labor was caused by both the emotional distress inflicted by Mistretta and the use of excessive force influenced by Biamonte. Thus plaintiff asserts that the same damage was produced by both the alleged state and federal wrongdoers.
The Court recognizes that the facts necessary to establish Mistretta's liability may differ from those that are necessary to establish other defendants' liability. Nevertheless, the Court finds that as long as there is also a federal claim before the Court, the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, as well as convenience to the parties, support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of either of these claims.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.