The ICA has taken the position that HRS § 580-47 does not preclude Hawaii's appellate courts "from narrowing the discretion available to the various family courts by establishing and mandating adherence to uniform categories, USPs, uniform limits on the range of choice, and uniform procedures." Bennett v.Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 422, 807 P.2d 597, 601-02 (1991). In view of the plain meaning and our construction of the statute, we disagree.

The general question on appeal is whether the family court abused its discretion. The required utilization of Categories of NMVs and USPs for the award of the Categories of NMVs, seeGardner v. Gardner, 8 Haw. App. 461, 810 P.2d 239 (1991); Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 807 P.2d 597 (1991); Malek v. Malek, 7 Haw. App. 377, 768 P.2d 243 (1989); Woodworth v.Woodworth, 7 Haw. App. 11, 740 P.2d 36 (1987), overruled in part,Myers v. Myers, 70 Haw. 143, 764 P.2d 1237 (1988), and when the case is appealed, the required specification by the family court of the factual considerations upon which the deviation or the refusal to deviate from the USP is based, seeMuraoka v. Muraoka, 7 Haw. App. 432, 776 P.2d 418 (1989), make the question much more specific. The USPs specify how the Categories of NMVs to be divided and distributed in a divorce case shall be divided and distributed if the evidence in the record establishes only the date of the marriage, the entitlement to a divorce, and the ownership of Categories of NMVs and if there is no evidence relevant to

If the family court's division and distribution of the assets and debts of the parties is appealed and the appellant is dissatisfied because the family court's division and distribution materially differs from the USP, then the family court must specify the factual considerations upon which the difference is based. If the appellant is dissatisfied because the family court's division and distribution does not materially differ from the USP in the manner requested at the trial by the appellant, then the family court must specify the factual considerations upon which the denial of the requested difference is based. In Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 421, 424-25, 807 P.2d 597, 601, 603 (1991), we stated: The process we have developed is designed to standardize and facilitate the factual analysis, facilitate settlements, identify the reasons for a particular decision, facilitate appellate review, facilitate the continued case-by-case development of express and uniform ranges of choice applicable statewide in similar fact situations, and bring as much statewide consistency, uniformity, and predictability as is possible to family court decisions dividing and distributing property in divorce cases.

"Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the family court's decision will not be disturbed unless the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant ... [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason." In Interest of Doe, 77 Hawai‘i 109, 115, 883 P.2d 30, 36 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 416, 807 P.2d 597, 599 (1991) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). IV. DISCUSSION

Except in those rare situations where the appellate court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the family court had only one choice, its only authorized courses of action are to affirm or to vacate and remand. Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 416, 807 P.2d 597, 599 (1991). In Gussin, this court emphasized the wide discretion conferred upon the family court by HRS § 580-47 (Supp.

In Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 488-89, 836 P.2d 484 (1992), the Hawai'i Supreme Court stated, in relevant part, as follows: The ICA's analysis of the gift issue in this case is inconsistent with what it required of the family court in Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw.App. 415, 807 P.2d 597 (1991). In Bennett, the family court found that a premarital cash contribution made towards the purchase of a marital residence was a gift.

[127 Hawai'i 156] disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant; (2) the family court failed to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason." Tougas, 76 Hawai‘i at 26, 868 P.2d at 444 (emphasis added); accord Torres v. Torres, 100 Hawai‘i 397, 428, 60 P.3d 798, 829 (2002) ; Carroll v. Nagatori–Carroll, 90 Hawai‘i 376, 381, 978 P.2d 814, 819 (1999) ; Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai‘i 475, 486, 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App.1998) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw.App. 415, 426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991). In this case, it was the court's obligation to exercise its equitable discretion.

Under [the abuse of discretion] standard of review, the appellate court is not authorized to disturb the family court's decision unless (1) the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant; (2) the family court failed to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason.Wong v. Wong, 87 Haw. 475, 486 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App. 1998) (brackets in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991)). III. DISCUSSION

Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the family court's decision will not be disturbed unless "the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant . . . [and its] decision clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of reason." Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 416, 807 P.2d 597, 599 (1991). C. Due Process 1. Braendlein's Availability for Cross Examination

(2) the family court failed to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason. Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai‘i 475, 486, 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App. 1998) (brackets omitted) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991) ). The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has recently reiterated: