Opinion
1:02CV00620
September 15, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Everett Wayne Bennett, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, on July 23, 2001, in the Superior Court of Guilford County, pled guilty to three counts of armed robbery, one count of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer, and one count of second-degree kidnapping. Petitioner was sentenced to 77-102 months imprisonment. Petitioner Bennett was represented by Assistant Public Defender Jennifer L. Rierson. He did not appeal and has not filed any state post-conviction motions with respect to his convictions.
Claims of the Petition
In his habeas petition, Petitioner Bennett claims that (1) his guilty plea was involuntary; (2) there was no evidence he committed the crimes; and (3) his lawyer was ineffective.
Discussion
Claim (1) — that Petitioner's guilty plea was involuntary. In his habeas petition, Petitioner Bennett asserts:
At the last minute before the jury trial, my lawyer came up and said that the DA had a witness who could identify me. I told my lawyer I wanted a jury trial. She said that the DA was not going to take it to a jury trial, and I had to take the plea, and that was that.
(Petition at 5.)
Petitioner's bold assertions in his petition are, however, contradicted by the printed transcript of plea form that Petitioner swore to before the trial court. Petitioner, a 36-year-old high school graduate, swore under oath in open court that he understood he had a right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury; that he understood he was giving up his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and other constitutional rights; that his lawyer had explained the charges to him and he understood every element of each charge; that he had discussed his case with his lawyer, including possible defenses; and that he considered that it was in his best interest to plead guilty. (Tr. of plea form, attached to State's brief.)
Absent compelling circumstances not shown here, Petitioner's solemn in-court representations are deemed conclusive. See Via v. Superintendent, Powhatan Correctional Center, 43 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1981); Little v. Allsbrook, 731 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1984) (Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by what he said at the time of guilty plea and defendant's answers under oath to inquiries as to whether he had discussed the case fully with counsel and whether the plea was induced by promises or threats were not perfunctory statements and could not lightly be disregarded as inconsequential procedural dialogue.) As the Supreme Court held in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977):
[Re]presentations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a [guilty plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in subsequent collateral proceedings.Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74.
Nothing shown by Petitioner in this action is sufficient to breach the formidable barrier of Blackledge. Claim (1) of the petition is without legal merit.
Claim (2) — that there was no evidence Petitioner committed the crimes.
By entering his knowing and voluntary guilty plea, Petitioner admitted all the essential elements of each crime charged. His plea itself is sufficient support his convictions. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (requirements for valid guilty plea). There is no federal constitutional requirement for any additional factual basis to support the plea. Id. Claim (2) is without merit.
Claim (3) — that Petitioner's lawyer was ineffective.
In support of this claim, Petitioner asserts:
The lawyer would not help me at all, and would not let me have a jury trial, the lawyer knew there was no evidence or witness of me doing any crime, other then my ex-girlfriend, who got mad at me.
(Petition at 6.)
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, Petitioner must show a professional dereliction and a reasonable probability that an objectively reasonable person in his position would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
In the case at bar, Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are all contradicted by his sworn statements before the trial court. His sworn representations are not called into material question by his general and conclusory allegations of attorney error. He swore under oath in open court that he understood he had a right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury; that he understood he was giving up his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and other constitutional rights; that his lawyer explained the charges to him and he understood every element of each charge; that he had discussed his case with his lawyer, including possible defenses; and that it was in his best interest to plead guilty. (Tr. of plea form.) On the basis of the same authority as it set out under Claim (2), Petitioner is bound by his solemn in-court representations and the trial court's findings and conclusions concerning the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. Petitioner has shown neither a professional dereliction nor prejudice as required by Hill v. Lockhart.
Conclusion
For reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (Pleading No. 6) is GRANTED and this action be dismissed with prejudice. A judgment dismissing this action with prejudice will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. A certificate of appealability is not issued, the court finding that no substantial issue is presented.
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The State does not waive non-exhaustion, but the court reaches the merits in view of their clear lack of merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).